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ABSTRACT 
LYNN S. REDINGTON, M.P.H., M.B.A. The Orphan Drug Act of 1983: A Case Study of  
Issue Framing and the Failure to Effect Policy Change from 1990-1994 (Under the 
direction of THOMAS C. RICKETTS, Ph.D., M.P.H.) 
 
 
 Both low- and high-commercial-potential (LCP and HCP) orphan drugs are eligible for 
benefits provided by the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (ODA).  During 1990-1994, legislators 
attempted to amend the law to better target benefits to LCP drugs and “restore the spirit of the 
law” to promote the development of LCP drugs for rare diseases that might otherwise be 
abandoned, or “orphaned.”  These amendment attempts were not successful. 
 This dissertation research examines: 1) how ODA stakeholders attempted to shape the 
debate about HCP orphan drugs in the 1990s, and, 2) potential factors that may have impeded 
or promoted ODA reform in the 1990s. 
 ODA reforms were debated in four Congressional hearings from 1990-1994.  Hearing 
transcripts were obtained and thirty-eight statements were coded.  The qualitative research 
method of memoing was used to construct four frames from the Congressional text: 1) ODA 
Reform as Economics and Access, 2) ODA Reform as Patient Relief, 3) ODA Reform as Rules 
of Participation, and 4) ODA Reform as Congressional Action. 
 Potential reform factors were proposed a priori and subsequently evaluated based on a 
review of over 100 documents and ten informant interviews. 
 The research offers a microcosmic window into how policy stakeholders define 
problems, propose solutions, and advance their interests in debates over social conditions and 
public policies.  In the 1990s, legislators asked: does market exclusivity for HCP orphan drugs 
provide an unnecessary monopoly that leads to excessively high orphan drug prices, windfall 
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profits, and other problems?  The research illustrates how disputants chose to define, or avoid 
defining, terms such as “unnecessary monopolies,” “excessively high drug prices,” “windfall 
profits,” and “problems” that result from these conditions. 
 The research demonstrates how policy development and framing theory can structure 
inquiry into attempted policy reform, aid in developing a priori hypotheses, and, shape analyses 
and recommendations.  The dissertation includes a guide for analyzing policy development and a 
guide for constructing and deconstructing issue frames.  These are applied to the historical case 
of attempted ODA reforms, but may be useful for other cases. 
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Introduction 
  The Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (ODA) provides the pharmaceutical industry with 
incentives to encourage development of drugs for rare diseases and conditions (conditions that 
affect fewer than 200,000 Americans).  The law’s incentives effectively reduce the costs of 
clinical testing, and ensure a seven-year monopoly on use of a particular drug compound for a 
specific rare disease.  This latter “market exclusivity” provision is widely regarded as the law’s 
most important incentive. 
 Congress’s intent and rationale for creating the ODA are reflected in the law’s text: 
 (1) there are many diseases and conditions, such as Huntington’s disease, myoclonus, 
ALS (Lou Gehrig’s disease), Tourette syndrome, and muscular dystrophy which affect 
such small numbers of individuals residing in the United States that the diseases and 
conditions are considered rare in the United States; (2) adequate drugs for many of such 
diseases and conditions have not been developed; (3) drugs for these diseases and 
conditions are commonly referred to as “orphan drugs”; 
(4) because so few individuals are affected by any one rare disease or condition, a 
pharmaceutical company which develops an orphan drug may reasonably expect the 
drug to generate relatively small sales in comparison to the cost of developing the drug 
and consequently to incur a financial loss; (5) there is reason to believe that some 
promising orphan drugs will not be developed unless changes are made in the applicable 
Federal laws to reduce the costs of developing such drugs and to provide financial 
incentives to develop such drugs; and (6) it is in the public interest to provide such 
changes and incentives for the development of orphan drugs. 
 
 The ODA has been considered “one of the most successful US legislative actions in 
recent history” (Haffner et al 2002). In the decade prior to the law’s enactment, 10 orphan drugs 
were developed by pharmaceutical companies and approved for marketing by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA).  Since enactment in 1983, approximately 1700 drugs have been 
designated as orphans, and 300 orphan drugs have received FDA approval. 
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 Despite its apparent success, one aspect of the law has generated significant controversy 
for the past two decades.  The law presumes that orphan drugs are unprofitable without 
government support.  But means testing to determine a drug’s financial (or “commercial”) 
potential is not currently required as a condition for such support.  Hence, both low- and high-
commercial-potential (LCP and HCP) orphan drugs are eligible for ODA benefits.  During 
1990-1994, legislators attempted to amend the ODA to limit the conditions of eligibility or 
revoke certain benefits for HCP orphan drugs.  These amendment attempts were not successful. 
 The issue of whether HCP orphan drugs should continue to receive ODA benefits, 
particularly the seven-year market exclusivity benefit, continues to stir debate and media 
coverage. A key question in the debate has been: does market exclusivity for HCP orphan drugs 
provide an unnecessary monopoly that leads to excessively high orphan drug prices, windfall 
profits, and other problems?  Sub-questions that naturally arise from this larger question include: 
1) when is a monopoly necessary; 2) at what point is a profit or price excessive; 3) what 
problems are created by excessive profits or prices; 4) how should these identified problems be 
addressed; 5) if an amendment to the ODA is warranted, how should this be done; and, 6) will 
the benefits of amending the ODA be worth the risk, if any, of diminishing industry interest in 
orphan drug development? 
 Many stakeholders are intensely interested in how the above sub-questions are addressed.  
Shaping opinion about market protections (e.g., patents or government-granted market 
exclusivity), drug prices, industry profits, healthcare financing, government subsidies for research 
and development (R&D), and patient access to medications is important, not just for the future 
of the ODA, but for the future of larger social, technological, economic, and political/legal 
issues. 
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 An examination of how ODA stakeholders attempted to shape the debate about HCP 
orphan drugs and potential ODA reforms offers a microcosmic window into strategies that can 
be used to frame issues, influence the course of debates, and promote or impede policy 
development.  Moreover, the literature on issue framing, political influence, and policy 
development is extensive, and offers the opportunity “to stand on the shoulders of giants” and 
use extant research and theory to structure and guide such an inquiry. 
 Utilizing the historical case of ODA developments and debates, along with extant theory 
and research, this dissertation research explored two general questions: 1) what factors seem to 
promote or impede policy development; and, 2) how does issue framing support policy 
development?  This qualitative inquiry used mixed methods, including literature reviews, 
informant interviews, and a content analysis of Congressional transcripts.  
 The research demonstrates how policy development and framing theory can structure a 
case inquiry, aid in developing a priori hypotheses, and shape the analysis and recommendations 
that can be culled from the research.  Kingdon’s (1995) Multiple Streams (MS) model provided 
the foundation to examine the ODA’s history and evolution, including how activities in the 
problem, policy and politics streams converged or diverged, and favored or disfavored policy 
changes.  MS also provided foundational assumptions for successful policy development, such as 
the need for a “policy entrepreneur” and “windows of opportunity.”  The MS model assumes 
the policy development world is fluid and ambiguous, and subject to multiple interpretations. 
Policy entrepreneurs use political acumen to promote selective interpretations and actions to 
further their interests.  Framing theory was used to drill down into the political acumen aspects 
of the MS model.  Detailed guidance on framing is lacking in the MS model, and framing theory 
complements the model well. 
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 To frame is to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” 
(Entman 1993, p. 52).  Strategic framing is considered an important tool in influencing individual 
attitudes, knowledge, or behavior (Gandy 2003); exerting political influence (Entman 2007), 
exercising power (Reese 2003), instigating social change, and winning debates or adherents 
(Lakoff 2004, Pan 2003); mobilizing collective action (Snow, Rocheford, Worden and Benford 
1986, Benford 1993, Benford and Snow 2000), and, expanding social and political actors’ realm 
of influence (Pan 2003).  
 Extant framing theory and research were used to develop a priori hypotheses about the 
function and utility of framing, and the characteristics of potent frames.  The literature review 
provided optional methods for constructing frames from text, along with their strengths and 
weaknesses. This research utilized the method of a single researcher coding text and “memoing” 
to construct frames, a method that yields information-rich frames but risks having poor inter-
coder reliability. 
 After an extensive review of the policy development and framing literature, two a priori 
guides were developed.  The first guide identified factors that may impede or promote policy 
development and was used to assess why the proposed ODA reforms did not result in an 
amendment to the law.  The second guide summarized factors that may be important in 
recognizing, understanding, and developing effective frames. 
 The research will be useful for students and practitioners of health policy and political 
communications.  The dissertation culminates in lessons learned from the ODA case, and 
recommendations for using these lessons.  Public health advocates often struggle to develop 
succinct messages that are rooted in a potent frame (Dorfman, Wallack and Woodruff 2005).  
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The ultimate goal of this research is to improve communications competencies that could 
advance health policy advocacy and instigate positive social change. 
 In addition to its general utility, this research generates new insights and strategies to 
address a policy controversy that has cast a shadow on a law that has otherwise produced many 
benefits for the public’s health. 
  
 
 
Chapter 1—Overview of Research 
 Utilizing the historical case of ODA developments and debates, along with extant theory 
and research, this dissertation research explored two general questions: 1) what factors seem to 
promote or impede policy development; and, 2) how does issue framing support policy 
development?  This qualitative inquiry used mixed methods, including literature reviews, 
informant interviews, and a content analysis of Congressional transcripts. This chapter provides 
an overview of the dissertation research by describing the research approach, its importance, the 
conceptual model used to structure the research, some definitions, and the scope of the research 
that was conducted.  For more detail on research methods, see Chapter 4. 
 Research Approach 
 This case study of the ODA was divided into four aims or steps: 1) describe the 
contextual backdrop and history of key ODA events and changes; 2) examine how issues were 
framed in Congressional hearings related to ODA amendments from 1990-1994; 3) identify 
factors that contributed to the failure of ODA amendments that were proposed from 1990-
1994; and, 4) based on the analysis of findings and extant theory, develop practical guidance on 
framing analysis and strategy in policy development.   
 First, the general history, chronology and rationale of the ODA were summarized from a 
review of published research reports, articles and legal briefs.  This provided context for the 
remaining research. 
 Second, a descriptive review of how issues were framed in ODA amendment 
proceedings from 1990-1994 was completed. Four Congressional hearings were held between 
 7 
1990-1994 to discuss the issue of whether, and to what degree, HCP drugs should continue to 
receive ODA benefits.  Thirty eight witnesses presented statements on this issue and/or 
proposed ODA reforms.  Transcripts of these statements were obtained from a government 
documents library.  These were coded using a list of variables and coding categories developed 
from theory and research in policy development, political communications and framing. Four 
frames were then developed using the qualitative research method of “memoing” (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). 
 Third, a descriptive review of factors that may have influenced the course of ODA 
reforms during 1990-1994 was completed. First, potential critical success and failure factors were 
proposed and assembled into a guide.  The guide was derived from the framing and policy 
literature and conceptually structured using Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams model.  Using the 
guide along with a review of over one hundred documents and ten informant interviews, an 
assessment of which factors seemed to influence the course of ODA reforms that were 
proposed in 1990, 1992 and 1994 was made. 
 Fourth, the dissertation concludes with practical framing strategy recommendations and 
guidance.  This was synthesized from Aims 1-3.  The practical guide addresses strategies for 
advancing policy development amidst controversy and was informed by study findings as well as 
extant research and theory on frame reflection (Shon and Rein 1994), problem definition and 
issue framing (Rochefort and Cobb 1993, Kingdon 1995), taxonomies of policy language (Stone 
2002), frame breaking and creativity processes (Fredin 2003), and strategic frame analysis (The 
FrameWorks Institute 2007). 
 Importance of Research 
 This dissertation research is innovative and significant because 1) it uniquely identifies 
and applies findings from framing theory and research, a field commanding ever-growing 
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attention; 2) it analyzes an important health policy issue; and, 3) it may aid public health 
advocates’ understanding and competency in advancing difficult or contentious policy positions.  
Moreover, no research with similar aims has been published to date. 
 Framing has been touted as a key communications tool for instigating social change 
(Lakoff 2004).  A number of studies have demonstrated the marked change in attitudes and 
behaviors that can result from subtle changes in the description of a social phenomenon (e.g., 
Tversky 1981).  Hence, framing seems to hold promise for health policy advocates.  But the 
literature review (see Chapter 2) points to a number of challenges in translating research into 
practice. By carefully applying extant theory to a real world problem, this research could 
demonstrate the promise and limits of framing theory, thereby providing important lessons for 
both framing scholars and framing practitioners. 
 Furthermore, the topic of the ODA is an important one because changes in the law 
could impact a number of stakeholder groups—either positively or negatively.  ODA changes 
could affect: 1) many Americans, as approximately 1 in 10 has at least one of the 6000 known 
rare illnesses; 2) many firms, as dozens are in the process of developing orphan drugs; and, 3) 
many payers—as individuals, employers and government insurers indirectly support the ODA 
tax credits or pay for orphan drugs directly. 
 Moreover, this research heeds the call of Hertog and McLeod (2003) to conduct more 
research on:  
. . . the framing of social concerns within public and private institutions of power 
and the social impact of such framing.  Certainly, one of the assumed reasons for 
study of the framing of social concerns is that it has an impact on social policy and 
plays a role in the process of social control.  Perhaps the analyses of congressional 
debates and hearings, corporate publications, and stockholder meetings can be 
combined with popular culture studies on the one hand and policy votes and 
investment decisions on the other.  If, as we believe, framing is one of the most 
powerful forces in determining public and private social policy, this form of 
research could stand as some of the most important political and social 
communication research ever carried out. (p. 160) 
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 Conceptual Model 
 Because the public policy development process is extremely complex, Sabatier (1999) 
urges the use of a conceptual model to focus and structure policy inquiries.  He reminds 
researchers: “One simply cannot look for, and see, everything.” (Sabatier 1999 p. 4)  A 
conceptual model enables individual researchers to surface assumptions and clarify the factors 
that are of importance to the study (Miles and Huberman 1994).  Additionally, if multiple 
researchers use the same conceptual framework, cross-case analyses then become more possible 
(Miles and Huberman 1994).  The ability to compare the case being studied to previous case 
studies improves the usefulness of the study.  Rather than producing knowledge that is 
idiosyncratic, i.e., useful for and applicable to only the case at hand, study findings can be 
generalized or applied to other cases. 
 To structure parts of this research and enable analytic generalization, the Multiple 
Streams (MS) framework of Kingdon (1995) was used as a foundation to examine the ODA’s 
history and evolution, including how activities in the problem, policy and politics streams 
converged or diverged—favoring or disfavoring policy developments and modifications.  MS 
also provided foundational assumptions for successful policy development, such as the need for 
a “policy entrepreneur” and “windows of opportunity.”   
 Kingdon developed the MS model from his study of 23 American federal policy cases in 
the fields of transportation and health.  Since its dissemination in his original 1984 book, Agendas, 
Alternatives and Public Policies, Kingdon’s theory of policy development garners approximately 80 
citations each year (Sabatier 1999).  Such frequent referencing and use may enable greater cross-
case analyses. 
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 According to Zahariadis (1999), the MS model is suitable for examining the policy 
formation processes under conditions of ambiguity.1  The model is also useful for analyzing 
factors that contribute to the failure of health policy (Kingdon 1995). 
 The MS model was selected for several reasons.  First, the MS model is suitable for 
policies that develop under ambiguous conditions.  The ODA seemed to develop in ambiguous 
conditions based on an exploratory review of the ODA.  Second, the MS model’s emphasis on 
agenda setting and policy formation seemed to be suited to the review of the early history of the 
ODA and ODA amendment processes from 1990-1994. (According to Longest (2002), the 
processes of policy modification and policy formation are similar.)  Third, the MS model seemed 
to complement extant framing theory well.  MS provided a broader roadmap of the policy 
development process, and framing theory enabled a drill down into a specific aspect of the 
process, i.e., how actors construct arguments that influence the course of policy developments. 
 As depicted in Figure 1, and described by Kingdon, MS theory asserts that policy 
changes typically occur if three “streams” converge.  A policy entrepreneur and a window of 
opportunity are two key catalysts in this process.  The three streams of actors and activities are 
described as 1) a problem stream, where problems are defined and solutions are implicated, 2) a 
policy stream, where solutions are advocated and matched with problems, and, 3) a politics 
stream, which includes elected officials and dominant ideologies, the public mood and pressure 
group trends.  A policy entrepreneur paves the way for a proposal and takes advantage of the 
windows of opportunity to match their proposal to important problems of the day, and match 
problems to political preferences.  
                                                 
1 Ambiguity is the capacity to have multiple meanings.  According to Stone (2002) ambiguity is central to politics, 
and is an important feature of political symbols.  Symbols, such as “civil rights” and Martin Luther King, can mean 
two or more things, e.g., to one social movement they symbolize racial injustice; to another social movement, they 
may symbolize discrimination against obesity, homosexuality, personal disabilities, etc. Ambiguity unites people who 
may benefit from the same policy but for different reasons. 
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 The MS model is based on the “garbage can model” of decision making (Kingdon 1995) 
where organized anarchies prevail and decisions arise from a confluence of events.  In complex, 
ambiguous and unstable contexts, the garbage can model asserts that decision makers don’t yet 
know their preferences and that they use trial and error to discover means, ends and underlying 
causes.  According to the model, decisions will bubble up out of a stew of interaction, 
epiphanies and choice opportunities. (See Appendix A for more details) 
 
 12 
Figure 1. The Multiple Streams Model of the Policy Development Process 
As Described by Kingdon (1995) 
 
 
  
 The MS model addresses three issues: 1) how the search for solutions and problems is 
conducted; 2) how policymakers focus their attention; and, 3) how issues are framed (Zahariadis 
1999). As mentioned, Kingdon’s MS concepts were complemented by a literature review of 
extant research and theory on issue framing (see Chapter 2) because, as Zahariadis points out, 
the MS model addresses the first two issues better than the last.  Moreover, the MS model was 
originally developed more than two decades ago and the field of framing has developed 
significantly during this time. 
 In Kingdon’s research of 23 cases, policy entrepreneurs played a significant role in 
coupling the streams in all but 3 cases.  Policy entrepreneurs champion a cause, solution or 
problem that they deem important or worthy.  According to Kingdon, policy entrepreneurs are 
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promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive or 
solidary benefits” (p. 179). To advance their cause, policy entrepreneurs get ready for the right 
moment, when a window of opportunity opens, to match their solutions to problems and find 
politicians receptive to their ideas. As depicted in Figure 1, and described by Kindgon, a policy 
entrepreneur is like a surfer that rides or carves the waves of opportunity.  Kingdon asserts that 
policy entrepreneurs don’t create the waves.  Instead, they wait for the right set of opportunities 
and carve them to the advantage of their cause. 
 Qualities of effective policy entrepreneurs include persistence, technical expertise and 
political acumen (Kingdon 1995).  Related to political acumen, policy entrepreneurs use issue 
framing in their attempt to couple the three streams (Zahariadis 1999). Language, word choice 
and symbols are important as they are used to promote selected interpretations, mobilize 
support, and influence the political environment. By using selected words, these actors highlight 
aspects of problems and make them salient, and connect how selected solutions can solve 
selected problems.  When a selected problem diminishes in importance, for whatever reasons, 
the policy entrepreneur can repackage the description of their solution and attach it to a new 
problem. (Kingdon 1995) 
 According to Kingdon, windows of opportunity for policies can be opened in the 
problem stream, e.g., when the crash of a large passenger jet underscores the problem of airline 
safety and steps up the search for airline safety policies.  They can also open as a result of 
changes in the politics stream, e.g., a change of presidential administration, a shift in national 
mood, or a shift in Congressional partisanship majority. While focusing events and political 
changes can create windows of opportunity for selected policies, ideas and perceptions of 
problems and solutions are also important factors. “Policy problems are not simply givens, nor 
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are they matters of the fact of a situation; they are matters of interpretation and social definition” 
(Rochefort and Cobb 1993 p. 57, quoting Cobb 1983). 
 As conceptualized in Figure 2 and described by Kingdon, any number of conditions that 
lay dormant in the world could become problems.  A problem is usually perceived as such only 
when there is pressure to do something about it.  A lobbyist said to Kingdon, “If you have only 
four fingers on your hand, that is not a problem; that’s a situation” (Kingdon 1995, p. 109).  
Many problems and issues compete for the attention of policymakers.  The victors that rise to 
the top of the policy agenda tend to benefit from a persuasive and compelling problem 
definition (Portz 1996). The media can play a role in galvanizing public and governmental 
attention on a problem or issue.  However, in Kingdon’s research, the media were important in 
only 4 of the 23 cases studied. 
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Figure 2. Problem Definition and Policy Modification 
Issues become problems when demands for action occur (Kingdon 1995) 
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 Cognitive Cultural Models: Deeply held understandings that motivate thought and 
behavior in largely unconscious and automatic ways. They are a kind of prototypical framing that 
includes several elements packaged together, and that are culture-specific – for example, what it 
means to be a neighbor, a leader, a parent, etc. The basic elements of a cognitive cultural model 
include “participants” (people, objects, activities that are associated with that concept or model), 
a “scenario” (a series of expected, standard events that show the relationships between the 
participants and are expected to occur in a particular sequence), “presuppositions” (assumptions), 
“entailments” (conclusions), and “evaluations” (assessments as to whether the model itself, as a 
whole, is a good thing or a bad thing). (FrameWorks Institute 2002) 
 Drug: Refers to a medication for a medical condition that is approved by the FDA or 
has potential to become FDA-approved.  “Drug” may also refer to a general class of drugs, such 
as drugs generally or potentially useful for a medical condition.  “Drug” also refers to 
medications that are derived using traditional chemical methods or via genetic engineering, and 
those that are considered biologics (derived from living organisms). 
 Frames: Organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time that 
work symbolically to meaningfully structure the world (Reese 2003).  To frame is to “select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way 
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1993, p. 52).   
 Frame Alignment:   Linking interpretive frameworks, i.e., between that of an individual 
and a social movement organization (SMO).  There are four frame alignment processes: frame 
bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation. (Snow et al. 1986) 
(These concepts are further described in Chapter 3.) 
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 Framing vs. Marketing:  Framing and marketing are two related but different concepts.  
Kotler and Armstrong (1989) define marketing as a “social and managerial process by which 
individuals and groups obtain what they need and want through creating and exchanging 
products and value with others.” (p. 5) Marketing has traditionally emphasized the end-goal of 
an exchange between a target audience and a firm that offers products and services.  However, 
social movement organizations (SMO) can use the principles of marketing more broadly to help 
meet their goal of increasing support for the SMO’s cause.  In either case, framing theory can 
inform and guide how organizations: 1) conduct research on target audiences and perceptions of 
products, services or social causes; 2) determine marketing strategies, such as segmentation, 
targeting, positioning, and messaging strategies; and, 3) craft, deliver and test specific messages. 
 Framing vs. Positioning: Framing structures the way we think about problems, and 
how we select and compare potential solutions to those problems.  In this regard, framing 
complements an important marketing concept known as “positioning.”  Positioning is the 
process of influencing target audiences to view a product or idea as superior to alternatives.  
Positioning is about establishing that Product A or Idea A is better, different, or special 
compared to B, C, and D.  Positioning emphasizes the mental processes of comparison, while 
framing emphasizes the higher-level mental processes that organize and structure how 
comparisons are made.  Marketers can use framing theory to better understand this higher-level 
“schemata of interpretation” (Goffman 1974), and explore how target audiences can think in 
new ways about problems, causes, and solutions.  A frame analysis might reveal that an idea or 
product is perceived as superior to other solutions only when the problem is framed in a certain 
way.  Reframing can change the set of alternatives that are evaluated, e.g., reframing can imply 
that Idea A should be compared to alternatives X, Y, and Z, rather than B, C, and D.  Or, 
reframing can change the way that existing alternatives are evaluated—by using a new set of 
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criteria, or a different value and belief system.  For example, reframing may imply that Idea A 
should be compared to B, C, and D using principles of social equity rather than principles of 
economic efficiency. 
 High Commercial Potential Drug:  A drug that could potentially generate substantial 
financial returns for its sponsor.  Consensus is lacking on what constitutes a HCP orphan drug.  
 Issue Frame:  Descriptions of social policies and problems that shape understanding of 
how the problem came to be and the important criteria by which policy solutions should be 
evaluated. Issue frames usually originate from professional politicians, advertisers, spokespeople, 
editorialists, think-tankers and others who care about molding public opinion.  Many issue 
frames can be summarized by a simple tagline, such as “reverse discrimination” and “right to 
life.” (Nelson and Willey 2003) 
 Orphan Drug:  Refers to a drug that could potentially be developed to improve a 
medical condition, but no sponsor seems willing to support its development.  In reference to the 
Orphan Drug Act, an orphan drug is a drug for a rare disease or condition. 
 Orphan Drug Act of 1983: By providing incentives to companies, the law encourages 
development of drugs to treat rare diseases affecting fewer than 200,000 Americans. 
 Orphan Drug Designation: Refers to the process by which a sponsor applies to the 
FDA to have a selected drug designated as an orphan drug.   
 Policy: A conscious and deliberate effort to influence behavior. 
 Policy Discourse: The verbal exchange, or dialogue, about policy issues; usually 
embedded within an institutional context. (Schon and Rein 1994) 
 Policy Forums: Institutional vehicles for policy debate; including legislative arenas, the 
courts, public commissions, councils of government and political parties, the editorial pages of 
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magazines and newspapers, academic settings, radio and television programs (Schon and Rein 
1994) and internet blogs and chat rooms. 
 Policy Frame: The frame an institutional actor uses to construct the problem of a 
specific policy situation. (Schon and Rein 1994) 
 Priming: The process of consciously triggering a cognitive cultural model and then 
applying its reasoning to other issues. Priming can also mean the ability to affect the criteria by 
which political leaders or ideas are judged. (Iyengar and Simon, 1994) 
 Problem Definition: Pertains to what we choose to identify as a public issue and how 
we think and talk about the concern (Rochefort and Cobb 1994).  A problem definition is a 
malleable, strategic portrayal of a situation, aimed at accomplishing political goals (Kingdon 
1995). 
 Public Policy:  The sum of government activities, whether acting directly or through 
agents, as it has an influence on the life of citizens. (Birkland 2001, quoting Peters 1999) 
 Rare Disease:  As defined in the text of the Orphan Drug Act, “any disease or 
conditions which (A) affects less than 200,000 persons in the United States, or (B) affects more 
than 200,000 in the United States and for which there is no reasonable expectation that the cost 
of developing and making available in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will 
be recovered from sales in the United States of such drug.” 
 Reframing: Changing the lens through which people can think about the issue, so that 
different interpretations and outcomes become visible to them. 
 Sponsor: Refers to an individual or organization that takes responsibility for developing, 
manufacturing and marketing a drug.  In the case of orphan drugs, the sponsor is like a parent 
that adopts a neglected drug or area of drug research.  Sponsors are usually pharmaceutical or 
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biotechnology companies.  But government agencies, individual academicians and others could 
serve as lead investigators and devote the resources necessary for development. 
 Stakeholders: Parties who are affected by or have a vested interest in the success of an 
initiative or policy. 
 Symbols: According to Stone (2002), a symbol is anything that stands for something 
else.  Symbols are collectively created and their meaning depends on how they are interpreted, 
used or responded to.  A good symbol captures the imagination and shapes perceptions.  
Metaphors are a common symbolic device that is used in text. 
 Scope of Research 
 Sabatier’s reminder to researchers that “One simply cannot look for, and see, 
everything” (Sabatier 1999 p. 4) also applies to the scope of a research project.  To ensure focus 
and feasibility of completing the dissertation, this research was limited by the following 
parameters. 
 Conceptual Model:  As mentioned previously, Kingdon’s Multiple Streams model 
guided and focused the proposed research.  This was supplemented by extant theory and 
research on framing and policy discourse.  The multiple streams model guided the identification 
and clarification of the issue and its place in the policy process. Framing theory was then used to 
further understand why the ODA was not amended and to help structure guidance for future 
policy arguments around the ODA. 
 Subtopics within the Orphan Drug Act of 1983:  The emphasis of this research was 
on the ODA as it applies to medicines for rare health conditions.  Since its original enactment in 
1983, the ODA has been extended to apply to foods and medical devices for rare conditions. 
The ODA also provides incentives for firms to develop medicines for common conditions if the 
firm can demonstrate that research and development costs would likely exceed revenue that 
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would be generated by the medicine.  However, the law’s support of orphan foods, orphan 
medical devices, or unprofitable medicines for common illnesses was not the focus of the 
research. 
 Other countries have enacted legislation that is similar to the American orphan drug law.  
The adoption of such laws is mentioned briefly in the research, but the focus of this research is 
on the Orphan Drug Act legislation in the United States. 
 Frame Processes:  The emphasis of this research is on producing frames strategically 
and intentionally to attract support for a social or political issue, and not on unintentional or 
subconscious frame production.  The importance of how these strategic frames are consumed or 
disseminated is acknowledged.  However, frame consumption and dissemination were not 
addressed to any extent in this research. 
 Direct Discourse over Mediated Discourse:  Much of the framing literature addresses 
how the media frame issues.  In contrast, this research focused primarily on unmediated 
discourse—as it attempted to construct frames from Congressional testimony.  Although 
Congressional testimony is edited to some degree, it is assumed that the published testimony 
substantially reflects the original testimony.  The fact that testimony may be carefully prepared 
and written by individuals, other than the speaker, is acknowledged. 
 Text over Structure and Images:  Content analysis research sometimes focuses on the 
complete set of textual data as well as where and how certain elements of text are featured in 
written documents (e.g., coding for contents of the headlines and lead paragraphs).  Such 
research also codes aspects of images that accompany the text.  In contrast, this research only 
focused on the complete set of textual data and not on its structure or accompanying images.  
  
 
 
Chapter 2—Overview of Orphan Drug Act of 1983 
 In 1983, the Orphan Drug Act was signed into law (Public Law 97-414) as an 
amendment to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.2  The objective of the ODA has been 
to stimulate industry interest in developing drugs and biological products for the treatment of 
rare diseases and conditions. Rare diseases are currently defined in the law (See Appendix E) as 
diseases and conditions that affect fewer than 200,000 Americans.  Such rare diseases include 
Huntington’s disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig’s disease), Tourette syndrome, 
Crohn’s disease, and cystic fibrosis.  
 As of 2008, the benefits and assistance for designated orphan drugs include:3 
• Tax credits for the costs of clinical research  
• Annual grant funding to defray the costs of qualified clinical testing expenses ($14 
million total for 2008)  
• Assistance in clinical research study designs  
• Seven-year period of exclusive marketing after an orphan drug is approved  
• Waiver of Prescription Drug User Fee Act filing fees (about $1,000,000 per application 
in 2008) 
  
To be designated as an orphan drug, the sponsor of the drug must submit an orphan drug 
application to the FDA.  In the application, the sponsor must successfully demonstrate that 
fewer than 200,000 patients will be eligible for treatment under the drug’s proposed indication.  
Orphan designation is specific to the indication of the drug that will be tested in subsequent 
clinical trials.  Hence, one drug can have multiple orphan designations, and a drug may also be 
                                                 
2 Information on the Orphan Drug Act was derived from a review of more than 80 articles that contained detailed 
discussions (i.e., greater than 4 paragraphs) of the ODA in the general, business and medical press.   Approximately 
fifty federal government documents were also reviewed.  
  
3 From http://www.fda.gov/consumer/updates/oda020808.html, accessed August 27, 2008 
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FDA approved for a common problem.  For example, Botox (Botulinum toxin type A) has 
orphan designation for two indications: 1) treatment of strabismus associated with dystonia, and, 
2) treatment of cervical dystonia.  The drug is also widely used to temporarily improve the 
appearance of facial wrinkles, an indication that has FDA approval. 
 Multiple sponsors can obtain orphan designation for a singe drug/indication.  While 
sponsors of all designated orphan drugs can receive the tax credits, FDA assistance, and so forth, 
only one sponsor will receive market exclusivity.  That sponsor is the one that is first to receive 
FDA clearance for the drug’s use in a specific indication. For example, three corporations 
applied for orphan designation for use of their recombinant human growth hormone (hGH) 
product in children with short stature due to growth hormone deficiency.  Genentech was first 
to gain FDA approval, and to gain ODA market exclusivity. As a result, Serono and Lilly were 
“blocked” from marketing their product for the next seven years.  The FDA will not approve 
another similar orphan designated drug for use in this indication unless the sponsor can 
demonstrate that their drug is different in some way or that it has significant safety or 
effectiveness advantages.  Early in the ODA’s history, the criteria by which FDA would 
determine whether a drug is the same or different than other drugs in its class were not 
established.  Lilly successfully argued that a structural difference in their hGH molecule met the 
criteria of being different.  Based on this argument, the FDA approved Lilly’s hGH product for 
short stature.  Genentech and Lilly then shared market exclusivity for growth hormone for short 
stature.  This action unleashed a firestorm of lawsuits and controversy over what “different” or 
“same” meant.  FDA subsequently addressed this issue when final rules were approved and 
implemented in 1992. 
The FDA approval process is nearly the same for non-orphan designated drugs and 
orphan designated drugs, e.g., rigorous clinical trials must be completed to the satisfaction of 
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FDA, whether the drug is an orphan or not.  In the case of the drug approval process, the FDA 
must review and approve the sponsor’s New Drug Application (NDA) before the drug is 
allowed to be marketed in the US.  If the orphan product is a biologic, the FDA must review 
and approve the sponsor’s Biologic License Application (BLA). 
The entire process from FDA orphan drug designation to FDA approval has been 
described as a race where the winner takes all, because only the first sponsor to gain FDA 
approval will receive market exclusivity.  Market exclusivity is widely regarded as the most 
attractive feature of the ODA.  Hence, losing the race to approval can be devastating for small 
companies that have invested tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in drug development.  
Launching a “me-too” drug seven years later can be too little, too late for many sponsors.4 
 Market exclusivity can mean higher profits for a drug sponsor because: 1) in the absence 
of competitive bidding, the sponsor can charge a higher price; 2) in the absence of competing 
marketing campaigns, the sponsor with exclusivity can lower their marketing expenses when it is 
easier to command attention and interest in the product with 100% of the market “voice;” and, 
3) market exclusivity means, by definition, having 100% of the sales in that product category.  
Capturing all of the market generally translates to a higher volume of sales (in units).  Higher 
unit sales usually translate into lower costs per unit because of scale efficiencies and the ability to 
amortize costs over a greater number of product units. 
 As of early 2008, twenty-five years after the ODA’s enactment, more than 300 orphan 
drugs and biological products received FDA approval, and 1700 orphan drugs received FDA 
orphan designation. 
                                                 
4 Since a drug’s 20-year patent life begins from the time of the patent filing, the patent may expire during or shortly 
after FDA approval. Patent expiration opens the market to generic competition.  Generic competitors usually enter 
the market at a fraction of the price of the branded drug’s price before it went off patent.  Waiting 7 years makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to recoup the investments that were made to get the drug approved. 
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As can be seen in Table 1, it took nearly three years to get the ODA passed.  Since 1983, 
the ODA has been amended five times in an effort to clarify terms, improve its implementation 
and effectiveness, and to convene a National Commission on Orphan Diseases to assess public 
and private sector activities related to rare diseases.   In 1992, the FDA issued its final rules to 
implement the law.  These key events in the ODA’s history are further described in Chapter 5. 
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Table 1--Chronology of the ODA: Enactment, Amendments, and Final Rules 
 
Date Event or Change Related Bills 
 
June 1980-
December 
1982 
 
Pre-enactment legislative activities included a June 1980 
hearing about the issues, a survey of rare disease drug 
developments at pharmaceutical companies, and getting 
H.R. 5238 passed.  H.R. 5238 was introduced in 1981 
 
 
n/a 
January 1983 The Orphan Drug Act (P.L. 97-414) amended the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) 
 
H.R. 5238 introduced by 
Representative Waxman 
October 1984 P.L. 98-551 changed the definition of “rare disease or 
condition” to a numeric prevalence threshold of 200,000 
Americans.  Previously, orphan drugs were defined as 
drugs lacking profitability 
 
S. 771 introduced by 
Senator Hatch 
August 1985 P.L. 99-91 enabled all orphan drugs, patentable or not, to 
become eligible for seven years of market exclusivity.  
Previously, market exclusivity only applied to non-
patented drugs.  P.L. 99-91 also established a National 
Commission on Orphan Diseases, and made 
modifications related to antibiotic drugs and financial 
assistance for pre-clinical testing expenses 
 
H.R. 2290 introduced by 
Representative Waxman, 
S. 1147 introduced by 
Senator Hatch 
April 1988 The allowable timing of the orphan drug designation 
request was amended by P.L. 100-290.  It requires that 
the application for designation be made prior to the 
submission of an application for marketing approval, New 
Drug Application (NDA) or Product License Application 
(PLA). Previously, the designation request could be filed 
at any time prior to FDA's approval to market the product.  
This amendment also made medical foods and medical 
devices for rare illnesses eligible for grants and contracts 
to support clinical studies 
 
H.R. 3459 introduced by 
Representative Waxman  
January 1991 FDA proposed regulations to implement ODA 
 
n/a 
December 
1992 
FDA issued final regulations to implement section 2 of 
the ODA, which added 4 sections to the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Regulations were issued under 
the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 21 (21 CFR 316) 
 
n/a 
August 1997 The tax credit of up to 50% of clinical research performed 
for designated orphan drugs was made permanent by 
P.L. 105-34 (Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Title VI, Sec. 
604) 
 
H.R. 2014 introduced by 
Representative Kasich 
November 
2002 
The available funding for FDA’s Orphan Products 
Research Grant Program was increased to $25 million 
for 4 years by P.L. 107-281 Rare Diseases Orphan 
Product Development Act 
H.R. 4014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3—Literature Review of Framing Theory and Research 
  
 The literature on framing theory and research, as it relates to political communication 
and influence, will now be reviewed.  This chapter introduces the reader to the field of framing 
and includes a description of how frames organize thinking, where frames are located, and what 
frames do.  To inform the methods part of this research, literature on constructing frames from 
text are then reviewed.  Frame analysis and strategy literature are then reviewed, followed by a 
review of reframing and policy development literature. A guide for analyzing factors that may 
favor or impede the passage of legislation is then proposed. The chapter closes with 
foundational theories of the ODA that may be useful for understanding current and future 
ODA frames. 
 The Literature on Framing 
 As we often use frames in communication to better understand complex phenomena, it 
seems ironic that the literature on framing seems very complex and difficult to comprehend.  
Framing theory novices, such as this researcher, apparently are not alone in this assessment.  
Even framing scholars characterize the field as theoretically and empirically vague (Scheufele 
1999). Terms in the field seem ill-defined, e.g., one scholar asserts that the term frame is being 
used to describe a “variety of disjointed and incompatible concepts” (Fisher 2003, p. 1).  
Differences in terms, such as agenda setting and framing, are disputed.  Arguments over terms are 
characterized as “border disputes” (Maher 2003).  Maher has commented, “When scholars who 
are doing framing research disagree to this degree, we must then wonder if they mean the same 
thing when they use the word framing” (p. 83). 
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 Perhaps early scholars could have set clearer foundations for later work, e.g., Goffman’s 
1974 book, Framing Analysis, has been widely cited, yet Goffman’s foundational definitions lack 
clarity: 
I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles 
of organization which govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective 
involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic 
elements as I am able to identify.  That is my definition of frame.  My phrase 
“frame analysis” is a slogan to refer to the examination in these terms of the 
organization of experience (Goffman 1974, p. 10-11). 
 
 Framing research programs can be found in a number or disciplines—from 
anthropology, cognitive psychology, economics, linguistics and discourse analysis, 
communication and media studies, sociology, and, political science and policy studies (Van Gorp 
2007, Benford 2000).  Hertog and McLeod (2003) have described this as a mixed blessing: “The 
range of approaches political scientists, sociologists, media researchers, and others bring to the 
study of frames and framing is both a blessing and a curse (p. 39).”  The blessing is that of 
conceptual openness and creativity, the curse is that “findings, methodological insights and 
theoretical conclusions don’t ‘add up’” (p. 40). 
 In 1993, Entman challenged communications scholars to improve theoretical clarity: 
“Despite its omnipresence across the social sciences and humanities, nowhere is there a general 
statement of framing theory that shows exactly how frames become embedded within and make 
themselves manifest in a text, or how framing influences thinking” (Entman 1993, p. 51). 
Fortunately, many authors have risen to the challenge and have proposed clearer definitions and 
theoretical propositions (e.g., Reese 2003). 
 To deal with the challenging task of summarizing the framing literature, this researcher 
first read through nearly 3000 pages of interrelated literature regarding issue framing, policy 
development, policy analysis and political debate.  Concepts relevant to the aims of the proposed 
research were culled from this broad sampling of articles and books, and then organized into a 
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typology (See Appendix B).5 Fortunately, it was discovered post facto that this approach is 
endorsed by policy case study researchers.  According to George (2004), typologies and 
typological theories that are coupled with case studies based on real world problems can be 
highly useful to policy makers because they help them identify patterns and conditions that can 
lead to outcomes of interest. 
 The terms frame and framing will now be defined, followed by a description of how 
frames work to provide meaning and structure to human experience.  Next, the following 
aspects of the framing literature will be described: where frames are located, what frames can do, 
how frames are used strategically, what characterizes a potent frame, and what processes lead to 
frame alignment.  Finally, the framing literature was reviewed in order to inform specific aspects 
of this research, i.e., methods to construct and analyze frames, and ways to devise framing 
strategies, were reviewed.  The framing literature review was then synthesized and combined 
with related policy development literature. 
 About Framing and Frames 
 Entman (2007) defines framing as the process of culling a few elements of perceived 
reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a 
particular interpretation.  Fundamentally, framing theory assumes that our mental 
representations of reality are socially constructed, that complex social issues have multiple 
possible interpretations, and that these interpretations are malleable. 
                                                 
5 According to George (2004), typologies characterize variants of a phenomenon, whereas typological theories seek 
to identify the causal mechanisms and pathways that link the independent variables of each “type” with its outcome.   
George defines a typological theory as “a theory that specifies independent variables, delineates them into the 
categories for which the researcher will measure the cases and their outcomes, and provides not only hypotheses on 
how these variables operate individually, but also contingent generalizations on how and under what conditions they 
behave in specified conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on specified dependent variables. . .” (p. 235).  
Typological theories draw together in one framework the research of many social scientists. 
 30 
 Language is critical to the process of understanding complex social issues, i.e., we often 
look to others to describe “what is going on here?”  Rhetoric can help lodge a particular 
understanding of issues in the minds of people (Rochefort and Cobb 1993) and frames are the 
rhetorical devices that privilege6 and promote particular points of view (Kinder 2007), render 
events meaningful, and thereby organize experience and guide action (Snow et al. 1986). Though 
several types of frames have been described in the literature, including collective action frames, 
decision frames, and news frames (Nelson and Willey 2003), this literature review focuses most 
on issue frames.  Nelson and Willey define issue frames as “descriptions of social policies and 
problems that shape the public’s understanding of how the problem came to be and the 
important criteria by which policy solutions should be evaluated” (p. 247).  
 By providing a central, organizing idea or set of principles (Reese 2003), frames allow 
people to rapidly identify why an issue matters, who might be responsible, and what should be 
done about it (Nisbet 2007).  Framing is used in ideological contests and political struggles 
where “participants maneuver strategically to achieve their political and communicative 
objectives” (Pan 2003, p. 40). 
 How Frames Organize Thinking 
 According to Reese (2003), cognitive frames invite us to think about social phenomena 
in a certain way, often by appealing to our basic psychological biases. Frames introduce or raise 
the salience of certain ideas and trigger mental schemas that work to help individuals understand 
the idea. In other words, people assimilate new information by fitting it into their existing way of 
viewing similar things (Entman 2007, Goffman 1974, Snow et al. 1986).  Hence, our preexisting 
meaning structures or schemas influence how we interpret complex social issues (Scheufele 
1999).   
                                                 
6 In the context of this sentence, privilege means to make important, dominant or to set as the de facto standard. 
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 Using metaphors is a form of framing (Lakoff 2004) and illustrates the notion of 
cognitive frames.  Using a single word, such as the word epidemic in the description obesity epidemic, 
invokes a schema of obesity as a contagious disease that is spreading and in need of urgent 
attention. Metaphors draw a comparison from one thing to another.  But in a subtle way, 
metaphors can imply a whole narrative story and a prescription for action (Stone 2002). 
 According to Reese (2003), cultural frames also organize our thinking.  But in contrast to 
cognitive frames, cultural frames invite us to summon a deeper, more persistent understanding 
of our world and enable us to apply broader constructs to account for our social reality. 
 Where Frames are Located 
 Frames seem to be everywhere in the “discursive universe” (Fisher 1997).  Frames are 
found within communicators and receivers of information, and within text; but our most 
enduring frames are located in our culture (Entman 1993, Maher 2003 and Van Gorp 2007). 
 Frames Located in Culture 
 Schon and Rein (1994) describe cultural meta-frames as broadly shared beliefs, values 
and perspectives among societal members.  In politics, institutions and interest groups derive 
their values and perspectives from cultural meta-frames.  Van Gorp (2007) describes frames in 
culture as a sort of grand inventory of culturally guided ways of understanding and 
communicating about the world.  Communicators and receivers constantly select frames from 
this inventory.  Occasionally, a creative person or social movement organization will use a new 
frame that ultimately becomes widely shared and part of the cultural stock of frames.   
 The stock of cultural frames can serve as both resource and constraint in politics.  
According to Benford et al. (2000), the cultural stock of meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, 
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values, myths and narratives can constrain political opportunity if the political movement cannot 
create a frame that is resonant with the extant cultural stock. 
 Schon and Rein have described example cultural meta-frames as: 1) the market frame, 
where principles of economic exchange and self-interest serve as the guide to social actions; 2) 
the social welfare frame, where principles of societal obligation guide us to help people in need 
when other means, such as the market, have failed; and, 3) the social control frame, where 
principles of criminality and protection serve as guide.  Each of these cultural meta-frames is, in 
essence, a theory about how the world works based on a set of beliefs. 
 In a similar vein, Benford et al. (2000) have described example “master frames.” These 
include rights frames, choice frames, human injustice frames, environmental frames, 
oppositional frames and hegemonic frames.  Master frames are often created or referenced by 
innovative social movements and later used as a springboard in a different domain.  For example, 
the rights frame was defined by the southern civil rights movement, later picked up by the 
women’s movement and other ethnic movements, and, further “diffused to gay rights, animal 
rights, abortion rights, fetal rights, and student rights” (Oliver 2000, p. 41). 
 Frames Located within Communicators 
 Communicators (e.g., writers or speakers) consciously or unconsciously select frames to 
help get their point across or to influence receivers to see the world as they do.  Scholars have 
focused on how and why journalists, as communicators, present selected frames of events or 
persons (e.g., Maher 2003, Pan 2003).  Other scholars have focused on framing in social 
movement organizations (Snow et al. 1986, Benford et al. 1993, 2000), public relations firms 
(Hallahan 1999), policy advocates (Schon and Rein 1994, Stone 2002) and a variety of other 
communicator types. 
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 Frames Located within Receivers 
 Goffman (1974) refers to “schemata” as the frames or mental structures used by 
individuals as receivers (e.g., readers or listeners). Receivers may rely on their own schemata to 
make sense of a situation or event and may not rely on the frames offered or intended in 
messages (Entman 1993). Framing is a dynamic process as receivers can accept, modify, reject or 
ignore frames that are embedded in messages.  An individual’s schemata or frame can act as 
blinders for new information because if new information does not fit into the receiver’s frame, 
the information may be rejected (Lakoff 2004).  Van Gorp (2007) asserts that “. . . sometimes, a 
kind of shock is required for the receiver to be able to break through a persistent frame” (p. 69).  
 Frames Located within Text 
 Frames are manifested in text by the presence or absence of “certain keywords, stock 
phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically 
reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (Entman 1993, p. 52).  The ways in which frames can 
be constructed from text will be discussed later in this literature review. 
 How Socio-Cultural Interactions Create Meaning and Frames 
 Benford et al. (2000) describe how communicators, receivers and culture interact to 
create meaning and generate new or modified frames.  Social groups are both consumers and 
producers of frames because they consume existing cultural meanings and produce new 
meanings.  As frame communicators and receivers interact, receivers can affect the form and 
content of the message.  In other words, receivers can precipitate frame transmission. 
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 What Frames Do 
 So far, the discussion of framing has been fairly abstract.  As this review turns to the 
function of frames and how they can be used to improve the way we communicate and 
influence others, concepts should become more concrete. 
 Stone (2002) asserts that typical policy arguments are politically constructed to advance 
certain definitions of goals, problems and solutions.  Each construction then invokes a different 
set of rules or ways to solve social issues. Because framing is central to policy and political 
rhetoric, political elites and social movement organizations strategically use frames in their 
communications.  Politics is about controlling interpretation because shared meanings motivate 
people to action. (Entman 2007, Benford et al. 2000, Snow et al. 1986, Stone 2002) 
  Benford (2000) categorizes frames by the tasks they can accomplish.  Diagnostic frames 
articulate a cause or blame for a situation or event.  Prognostic frames suggest the solution or 
remedy for a problem.  Motivational frames articulate the rationale for action by describing the 
severity or urgency of a problem, or the efficacy or propriety of solving a problem. 
 How Frames are used to Mobilize Consensus and Action 
 Entman (2007) asserts that, if power is the ability to convince other people to do what 
you want, then framing is a critical communications tools in the exercise of political power.  
Convincing people what to think about, and how to think about it, is how power is exerted in 
non-coercive political systems. 
 Lakoff (2004) believes that reframing social issues is the way to achieve social change 
and has written a book on how American progressives need to better use framing theory to win 
debates, and attract adherents and votes. 
 Pan (2003) has described a number of ways that frames can be used strategically in social 
and political movements.  Frames can be used to promote a new configuration of social and 
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political forces; unify a discursive community; promote a more deliberative democracy; promote 
political goals and attract more supporters; mobilize collective action; expand social and political 
actors’ realm of influence; and, increase one’s chance of winning debates or adherents.  
 Pan (2003) asserts that the key framing strategies that political actors must consider 
include which frame to sponsor; how to sponsor it; and, how to expand its appeal.  In terms of 
which frame to sponsor, the choice can be based on a variety of criteria, e.g., potency and 
breadth of appeal.  Benford et al. (2000) point out that collective action frames increase in 
potency if they are broad in their interpretive approach.  Moreover, frames should be inclusive 
and flexible, and they should be culturally resonant.  Cultural resonance can be enhanced when a 
collective action frame is connected to an historical movement, e.g., connecting gay rights 
frames to civil rights frames of the 1960s. 
 Van Gorp (2007) provides guidance on how to recognize a potent frame.  A potent 
frame would activate a schema with just a single reference and trigger a causal chain of reasoning 
devices.  Moreover, a potent frame is implied and hidden.  Except for the evidence of framing 
devices (e.g., words, metaphors, exemplars, descriptions and arguments), the frame is not explicit 
in the text.  Effective issue frames can be summarized by a simple tagline, such as “reverse 
discrimination” and “right to life” (Nelson 2003). 
 Dorfman et al. (2005) believe that effective framing is critical to advocate’s ability to 
influence how issues are interpreted.  They have advised public health advocates to emphasize 
the social context of issues when presenting their views and to craft messages that will trigger 
frames that connect to values.  According to Dorfman et al., this is done by generating Level 1 
messages to express the overarching values, i.e., why a particular stance on a social issue matters.  
Level 2 messages address the general issue at hand, while Level 3 messages address the details of the 
issue.  Level 1 messages connect with the audience in the deepest way. 
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 Pan (2003) believes that frames can become more potent if they link with societal values; 
use appropriate cultural attributes and symbolic devices; and, link with news values that are in 
current use in society. 
 Snow et al. (1986) have identified four processes that promote frame alignment, thereby 
attracting social movement adherents: 1) frame bridging; 2) frame amplification; 3) frame 
extension; and, 4) frame transformation.  Frame alignment links the interpretive framework of 
an individual to that of a social movement organization (SMO).  
 Frame bridging is the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally 
unconnected frames related to a particular issue or problem. 
 Frame amplification is the process of clarifying and invigorating an interpretive issue 
frame.  There are two varieties of frame amplification: value amplification and belief 
amplification.  Value amplification is a type of frame amplification that clarifies the link between 
the target and the social movement.  Values are defined as models of conduct or states of 
existence that are thought to be worthy of protection and promotion.  Value amplification 
means identifying, idealizing and elevating one or more values that are presumed to be basic to 
potential supporters but, for whatever reasons, have yet to inspire their support.  (Snow et al. 
1986) 
 Belief amplification is another type of frame amplification.  Here, beliefs refer to a 
particular tenet, or a body of tenets, that are held by a social group, e.g., “God is dead, the 
Second Coming is imminent, capitalists are exploiters, and black is beautiful” (Snow et al. 1986: 
p. 469).  Belief amplification is a springboard for mobilizing support and clarifies and invigorates 
a belief frame of a particular issue.  In the literature on social movements, there are five kinds of 
beliefs that are especially relevant: 1) beliefs about the seriousness of the issue at hand, 2) beliefs 
about the locus of blame or causality, 3) stereotypes about individuals or groups that are targeted 
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for influence or vilification, 4) beliefs about the probability that collective action will achieve 
results, and, 5) beliefs about the importance or moral imperatives of joining a cause. (Snow et al. 
1986) 
 The third process of frame alignment is frame extension.  This is a kind of grafting of 
interests and frames, which is necessary when potential adherents may not share the sentiments 
or beliefs of the social movement organization. In frame extension, the SMO extends the 
boundaries of its framework to appear congruent with that of potential adherents. For example, 
Snow et al have described a religious organization’s use of frame extension in recruiting 
members: they would identify that a potential recruit was interested in meeting attractive women, 
and recruiters would use this fact in their recruitment.  They would convince prospects to attend 
one of their meetings by emphasizing the fact that many “pretty girls” attended their meetings. 
 The fourth process of frame alignment is frame transformation, which is a time 
consuming and intense process of planting and nurturing new values and jettisoning old 
meanings or understandings (Snow et al. 1986).  Oliver and Johnston (2000) argue that 
ideological transformation is the correct description for what Snow et al refer to as frame 
transformation, because the concept of ideology better describes the conversion process.  
According to Oliver and Johnston, ideology is “a system of meaning that couples assertions and 
theories about the nature of social life with values and norms relevant to promoting or resisting 
social change” (p. 43).  Oliver and Johnston see a frame as an orientating principle that is easy to 
convey.  In contrast, an ideology is a system of ideas that has to be adopted through concerted 
education, socialization and debate.  Frames can be communicated with stock phrases or sound 
bites while ideologies are much more difficult to transmit.  Once conversion to a new ideology 
occurs, elements of the new ideology can function as frames. 
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 Benford et al. (2000) have described three factors that will increase the credibility of a 
frame: frame consistency, empirical consistency and the credibility of the frame articulators.  
Credibility is enhanced if the frame is consistent with receivers’ beliefs, claims and actions.  
Credibility is also enhanced through empirical consistency, i.e., when there is a fit between the 
frame and some observable or understandable evidence.  Lastly, credibility of the frame depends 
on the credibility of the person or institution using the frame in their speech or writing. 
 Benford et al. (2000) have also described the factors that influence frame salience: 
centrality, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity.  Centrality increases frame 
salience when the beliefs, values and ideas in the frame are also central to the targets of 
mobilization.  Experiential commensurability means the salience of a frame is increased because 
it is congruent with the personal everyday experiences of the targets of mobilization. Narrative 
fidelity is achieved when the frame resonates with narratives or myths that exist within the 
target’s culture. 
 Frames that Conflict 
 Scholars generally believe that framing is an important strategic tool to attract 
participation in social movements and support for political causes. Characteristics of “potent” 
frames and the processes that promote frame alignment have just been described.   
But frames do not always align; they often conflict. 
  Schon and Rein (1994) assert that when disputants hold conflicting frames, policy 
debates will often reach an impasse.  Because disputants have “mutually incompatible ways of 
seeing the policy situation” (p. 29) they talk past each other and, as a result, the policy situation 
will cease to develop.  In order to break a policy stalemate, Schon and Rein believe stakeholders 
must reflect on the frames that underlie political actors’ values, beliefs and perceptions.  But to 
do this, they must first become aware of their frames by constructing them “either from the 
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texts of debates and speeches or from decisions, laws, regulations, and routines that make up 
policy practice” (p. 34).  One aim of this research was to use theoretical insights from Schon, 
Rein, and other framing theorists to construct and reflect on frames utilized during the described 
1990-1994 ODA amendment hearings. 
 To guide this part of the research, the following topics were reviewed from the literature: 
1) the frame construction process, along with its challenges and limitations; and, 2) the process 
of analyzing frames and developing policy development strategies related to framing. 
 Methods of Constructing Frames from Text 
 This section of the literature review informed portions of Chapter 4 that pertained to 
methods of text analysis and frame construction. 
 As mentioned, one aim of this research was to examine how issues were framed in 
Congressional hearings related to ODA amendments from 1990-1994.  The reviewed literature 
indicates that constructing frames from text is a challenging process.  Nelson and Willey (2003) 
have described frames as “slippery and hard to measure” (p. 245).  Van Gorp (2007) has 
remarked, “Frames seem to be everywhere, but no one knows where exactly they begin and 
where they end” (p. 62).  These challenges, and options for addressing them, will now be 
described. 
 One of the key problems of constructing frames from text is their “stealth” nature, i.e., 
frames are not literally outlined in the text (Van Gorp 2007).  In fact, framing scholars assert that 
most elements of the frame reside in the receiver rather than the text, i.e., just one frame element 
in the text can trigger a much larger set of elements in the minds of the receiver/reader. (Van 
Gorp 2007, Fisher 1997) 
 Humor and frames seem to present similar challenges to text researchers.  In 
Neuendorf’s Content Analysis Guidebook (2002), challenges to coding humor include: “It’s 
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subjective, so much so that some scholars say it resides in the receiver rather than the message.  
It’s multidimensional, and multiple senses of humor (i.e., abilities to identify and appreciate 
humor types) may exist.  It’s primarily latent in nature rather than manifest, with the typical 
challenges that go along with latent content.” (Neuendorf 2002, p. 147) 
 Frames are latent like humor.  Neuendorf (2002) defines latent content as text consisting 
of “unobserved concept(s) that cannot be measured directly but can be represented or measured 
by one or more indicators” (p. 23). Inter-coder reliability is typically poor with latent content 
because constructs are difficult to conceptualize and operationalize so that two or more coders 
will look for and code the same values (Neuendorf 2002). 
 To improve inter-coder reliability of latent content, researchers seem to resort to tactics 
that diminish the usefulness and face validity of their research.  One tactic is to use the presence, 
absence or frequency of selected words to indicate whether certain frames exist in text. As an 
example, Andsager and Powers (1999) used word counts and cluster analysis to determine how 
popular media framed breast cancer.  Andsager and Powers concluded that three general frames 
emerged from the articles they examined: “basic information on breast cancer and its treatment; 
research on causes and prevention; and personal stories of cancer survivors or their relatives.”  
Andsager and Powers did achieve acceptable inter-coder reliability with this word count 
approach.  But, if frames suggest problem, cause, moral judgment and remedy (Entman 1993), 
then their three categories seem more characteristic of topics rather than frames.  Indeed, Reese 
(2007) has found that many doctoral students at his university “find in framing a more 
compelling hook to hang their content analyses on.  Often, it is simply a matter of substituting 
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‘frame’ for . . . ‘topic’ or ‘theme.’  If they cannot show how the frame does more ‘organizing’ and 
‘structuring’ work,7 I prefer they not use the label.” (p.151) 
 In contrast to the Andsager and Powers study, Saguy and Riley (2005) used a purely 
qualitative approach in a study of obesity framing.  Drawing on a mix of secondary and original 
data sources, the researchers read the selected documents several times and constructed theme 
sheets as different themes emerged.  Three competing frames emerged: fatness8 as body diversity, 
obesity as risky behavior, and obesity as disease.  These categories do fit Entman’s frame 
definition.  The “fatness as body diversity” frame, for example, implies that being fat or thin is 
part of human diversity, much like having light or dark skin color.  The frame further implies 
that, if the rights of all people should be supported or defended, then obese individuals’ rights 
should be supported (like civil rights).  Various remedies can be implied from this.  Society could 
make special concessions for the needs of the obese (e.g., by providing larger seats in planes) and 
reduce discrimination of obese individuals (e.g., by promoting tolerance and anti-discrimination 
through education and punitive means). 
 Tankard (2003) would likely describe the frame construction methods of Saguy and Riley 
as arbitrary, unsystematic and subject to confirmation bias.  Tankard advocates a more replicable 
approach to frame construction, but this approach seems to yield frames that lack richness and 
usefulness compared to that of Saguy and Riley. 
 In an attempt to remedy the weaknesses of inductive and interpretive frame construction 
methods, such as that of Saguy and Riley, Tankard has several recommendations.  Tankard 
assumes that defining characteristics of frames can be found in text and observers or coders can 
                                                 
7 Reese defines frames as “organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work 
symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (Reese 2007 p. 150, Reese 2003 p.10). 
 
8 Saguy and Riley use the seemingly derogatory words “fat” and “fatness” in their article.  “Fat,” they explain, is a 
word that is commonly used by advocates for the rights of overweight or obese individuals. 
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recognize and agree upon these characteristics.  He suggests that researchers be more precise 
about frame definitions, and more systematic about procedures used in identifying frames.  He 
recommends that researchers a) identify a list of frames for the particular domain of interest; b) 
specify keywords, catchphrases and images that will help detect each frame; then, c) identify 
frames in a content analysis.  However, when Tankard used this procedure to detect abortion 
issue frames in text, acceptable levels of inter-coder reliability were not achieved.  An acceptable 
level of 89% agreement between coders was reached only when all six frames were collapsed to 
two frames—generally favorable to abortion and generally unfavorable to abortion.  While 
Tankard’s procedure would likely reduce the problem of bias in constructing frames from text, 
his method seems to raise validity issues (i.e., are pro and con positions validly considered 
frames?). 
 Frame construction procedures outlined by Van Gorp (2007) and McLeod (2003) seem 
attractive for their multi-pronged, 360 degree approaches.  However, some scholars assert that 
one should not do both inductive and deductive frame construction because one approach may 
bias the other (personal communications with Felicia Mebane, August 2007). 
 Van Gorp (2007) recommends that researchers first inductively construct an inventory 
of frames based on media content, public discourse and a literature review.  The researcher 
should then list framing and reasoning devices that are most indicative of the identified frames 
(these can be placed in a matrix: where the rows include the frames, and the columns include the 
devices). Last, the researcher should deductively determine to what extent these framing devices 
are present in the complete data set. 
 McLeod (2003) believes that researchers should do some preparatory work before 
constructing frames from text by reading widely among ideologically divergent sources to gain 
awareness of an array of potential frames for the topic under study.  From this he advises 
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researchers to develop some preliminary models of frames and sub-frames (the more, the better, 
he says).  Next, the researcher should a) match the frames to sponsor groups; b) become 
sensitive to symbolic representations; and, c) then determine hypotheses about the relationships 
among frames, ideologies and narrative structures.  Last, the researcher should identify methods 
appropriate to studying frames in the context of the selected topic. 
 Van Gorp (2007), Fisher (1997), and Nelson and Willey (2003) caution that frame 
construction from text is labor intensive and there is no guaranteed yield. These scholars also 
caution that researcher subjectivity is inevitable and that researchers may need to be a member 
of the culture to find the storylines that characterize cultural frames.  As can be seen in Chapter 
4, this research used an inductive approach to constructing frames.  Compared to word counts 
or the deductive approach of Tankard, this is a more interpretive approach that would likely 
have poor inter-coder reliability.  However, the richness of this approach seemed preferable to a 
rigor that would yield little substance or usefulness. 
 Frame Analysis and Strategy 
 This section of the literature review informed the approach to Aim 4, which was to 
analyze issue frames used in the ODA amendment hearings from 1990-1994 and provide 
strategy guidance to ODA stakeholders.  Analysis and strategy were guided by theories and 
research pertaining to frame reflection (Schon and Rein 1994), political language (Stone 2002), 
frame potency (Pan 2003, Van Gorp 2007, Benford et al. 2000, Lakoff 2004), and frame 
breaking and creativity (Fredin 2003).  Theories that have not been previously addressed in the 
literature review will now be discussed briefly. 
 To recap, frames strategically portray a situation and imply problem definition, causation, 
moral judgment and remedies (Entman 1993).  Frames are used in political communications to 
persuade others to understand a situation in terms that favor the frame sponsor’s position. 
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 Schon and Rein assert that political debates reach an impasse when disputants hold 
conflicting frames. Schon and Rein have described four basic ways to address policy controversy 
and, possibly, advance policy development: 1) do nothing to intervene, and allow the 
controversy to continue, escalate or wane; 2) devise and implement a marketing strategy to 
better advance one’s policy position and attract adherents; 3) negotiate to arrive at a mutually 
satisfactory compromise, i.e., turning a win-lose proposition into one of win-win; and, 4) co-
design new policy, i.e., contending parties would use collaboration and frame reflection to 
redesign the policy object.   
 Reframing is one way to change the debate and attract political support (Lakoff 2004) 
and would likely be an important part of Schon and Rein’s marketing strategy alternative.  
Reframing means changing the lens through which people can think about an issue, so that 
different interpretations and outcomes become visible to them. 
 Many reframing options are usually available for consideration.  Fredin (2003) has urged 
journalists to create a web-based environment that would allow readers to explore alternative 
views of a news story.  Because aspects of this “frame breaking and creativity” environment 
were useful to consider for this research, some of its principles will now be described. 
 Fredin asserts that individuals can build a new understanding of a situation or event 
through browsing, creativity, and imagination.  Creativity involves sorting through a large 
number of alternatives to find those with potential.  Because many alternatives can become 
overwhelming, it is necessary to organize them in a web-based digression format that allows an 
individual to explore choices at different levels.  By using links and the ability to drill down to 
get more information, individuals can browse and imaginatively explore “first a little, then a lot.”  
Fredin offers suggestions for developing a frame database that would help individuals creatively 
invent new frames.  The database could be visualized as having the different frames listed in the 
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rows, and key elements of the frames listed in the columns.  Column elements might include the 
frame’s roots, core position, appeals to principle, metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases and 
depictions.  Using this database, with the addition of pertinent facts, new frames could be 
created by recombining elements or exploring counter frames. 
 Another interesting approach to reframing would be to use Stone’s (2002) policy 
taxonomy to explore different ways of viewing and describing a political situation or event.  
Stone asserts that politics is a creative process that helps us see from different perspectives.  In 
her book, Policy Paradox, she argues that policy goals, problems, causes and solutions have a 
generic structure to them.  Political actors promote one way of looking at policy situations to 
advance their causes.  In response, Stone created a “rhetoric of policy argument” to equip 
readers to continually re-envision problems and solutions. See Appendix B for a summary. 
 To illustrate the ways in which an argument can be dissected and reframed, Stone gives 
an example of sharing a cake with her class.  The idea of dividing the cake equitably so that, by 
definition, everyone would get the same amount is challenged by Stone’s multiple definitions of 
equity.  For example, if Stone gave everyone in the class an equal slice, those that missed class 
that day would lose out.  Also, students working close by might object to being left out. Stone 
offers several other scenarios that challenge the seemingly simple notion of equal slices for 
everyone.  For example, there are multiple ways to define everyone.  Does everyone mean those 
invited into the class, or should the notion of everyone be based on rank or some other 
definition of membership in a group.  By understanding the different possible interpretations of 
equity and other equally important concepts, one can use Stone’s policy taxonomy to consider 
different vantage points by which to view a situation.  From this exploration, different frames 
and political arguments can be crafted. 
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 Reframing and Policy Development 
 This section of the literature review guided the analysis of the failed ODA amendments 
and how reframing can be used to influence future ODA policy development.  
 As already mentioned, policy debates can reach an impasse because disputants have 
“mutually incompatible ways of seeing the policy situation” (Schon and Rein, p. 29). Reframing 
can change the rules and perspectives by which policy issues are judged and debated.  Framing 
advocates believe that reframing is a way to move policy issues forward and break the impasse. 
This dissertation research explored how framing supports policy development.  Given this, it 
seemed logical to close this literature review by relating framing theory back to theories of policy 
development, especially the Multiple Streams model.  Hence, how advocates might frame their 
messages to promote passage or blockage of legislation will now be explored. 
 Critical success and failure factors for the passage of legislation have been synthesized 
from the literature review and are listed in Table 2.  Note that these factors resemble Kingdon’s 
MS model streams (problem, policy, politics streams) and other important MS factors, such as 
the skill and activities of policy entrepreneurs. 
 Based on the Table 2 synthesis, the MS model and framing theory appear to intersect in 
several important ways.  First, a competent and persistent policy entrepreneur is needed to raise 
awareness of issues, and frame them in a way that promotes a selective understanding.  This 
means the policy entrepreneur must successfully use framing to define social conditions “out 
there” as tractable problems that are appropriate and feasible for government action, e.g., 
because the problem is a social (not a private) problem and it affects a powerful minority that is 
important to political actors. 
 Second, the policy entrepreneur must be vigilant and creative in scoping out emerging 
trends and windows of opportunities.  The policy entrepreneur can use previously described 
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framing theories to generate framing options and choose the frames that are most likely to 
succeed in shaping policy in a preferred direction.  The policy entrepreneur has many options for 
portraying their pet causes, problems and solutions.  Framing research can provide guidance on 
selecting potent frames or frames that can easily bridge to multiple political groups. 
 Third, the policy entrepreneur must know when the time is ripe to couple the streams 
and portray a problem in a way that advances their cause and suggests the entrepreneur’s 
preferred policy solution.  This means the entrepreneur must also frame problems and solutions 
in terms that will resonate and activate important political allies. 
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Table 2—Guide for Analyzing Factors that Favor or Impede Passage of Legislation 
Some Constructs and Propositions from the Policy and Framing Literature 
 
Construct Factors Favoring 
Passage of Legislation 
Factors Impeding 
Passage of Legislation 
 
Problem 
Definition 
 
 
-Defined as a social problem 
-Problem is getting worse 
-Suggests a solution that is tractable 
-Cause or blame is attributable to a 
source that is disliked 
-Problem was caused intentionally 
-Problem was caused secretly 
-Suggests problem has exciting 
qualities or is urgent 
-Problem affects a powerful minority 
or it affects the majority of people 
-Affected people are aware of 
problem 
-Defined so individuals can see they 
are or might become the next victim 
-Defined ambiguously to appeal to 
more people and leave wiggle room 
-Problem fixers gain resources, 
power, status 
 
 
-Defined as a private problem 
-Problem is getting better w/o policy 
-Suggests a solution that is intractable 
-Cause or blame is attributable to a 
source that is liked or favored 
-Problem was unintended/accidental 
-Problem was not created in secrecy 
-Suggests problem is not exciting or no 
longer seen as exciting; not urgent 
-Problem affects silent minority 
-Affected people are not aware of 
problem 
-Suggests a remote chance of becoming 
a victim in the foreseeable future 
-Defined explicitly and precisely, 
narrowing appeal and revealing specifics 
that can be disagreed upon 
-No one gains from fixing problem (or 
costs exceed benefits) 
Policy Promotion 
 
-Government action is only way to 
solve problem 
-Solution has obvious relative 
advantage to current situation or 
alternative solutions 
-Benefits of solution accrue to 
important interests 
-Policy is not seen as complex 
-Easy to communicate features 
-Policy sponsors are popular 
-Policy opponents are unpopular 
 
-Government action is one possible way 
to solve problem 
- Solution has no obvious relative 
advantage to current situation or 
alternative solutions 
-Benefits of solution accrue to 
unimportant interests 
-Policy is complex, risks are unknowable 
-Not easy to communicate features 
-Policy sponsors are unpopular 
-Policy opponents are popular 
Political Milieu -No major competing political issues 
-New political forces (e.g., new 
president) w/ compatible interests 
-Organized interest support or lack of 
opposition 
 
-Competing issues command attention, 
pushing issue/solution off agenda 
-No major changes in political stream that 
would favor legislation 
-Strong, organized interests opposed 
Events -Focusing event galvanizes support -Focusing event detracts from problem 
and/or solution 
 
Climate/mood -Economic, political, social, 
technological currents favor problem 
definition or solution 
 
--Economic, political, social, 
technological currents do not favor 
problem definition or solution 
Policy 
Entrepreneur 
-Persistent, credible, resourceful -No policy entrepreneur 
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 Foundations for Framing the ODA 
 At the heart of framing theory is the idea that a situation or event can be interpreted and 
described in a number of ways.  The text of the ODA contains many assumptions about a 
situation of rare diseases, a lack of treatments for these diseases, and the need for government 
intervention. These concepts will now be explored as a foundation for developing alternative 
views, or frames, of the ODA.  Alternative frames of ODA reforms that were proposed during 
1990-1994 are discussed in Chapter 8. 
 The ODA as Promoting Equity in Orphan Drug Access 
 As can be seen in the following excerpt of the law, Congress recognized or assumed that 
companies did not invest in orphan drug development because such investments would be 
unlikely to yield profits.  Rare disease patient advocates asserted that this created inequities:  If 
companies continued to invest in drugs for common illnesses, this meant that the medical needs 
of patients with common illnesses would be attended to while the medical needs of patients with 
rare illnesses would continue to be ignored.  In other words, the needs of the many were taking 
precedence over the needs of the few. 
 (1) there are many diseases and conditions, such as Huntington's disease, myoclonus, 
ALS (Lou Gehrig's disease), Tourette syndrome, and muscular dystrophy which affect 
such small numbers of individuals residing in the United States that the diseases and 
conditions are considered rare in the United States; 
(2) adequate drugs for many of such diseases and conditions have not been developed; 
(3) drugs for these diseases and conditions are commonly referred to as “orphan drugs”; 
(4) because so few individuals are affected by any one rare disease or condition, a 
pharmaceutical company which develops an orphan drug may reasonably expect the 
drug to generate relatively small sales in comparison to the cost of developing the drug 
and consequently to incur a financial loss; 
(5) there is reason to believe that some promising orphan drugs will not be developed 
unless changes are made in the applicable Federal laws to reduce the costs of developing 
such drugs and to provide financial incentives to develop such drugs; and 
(6) it is in the public interest to provide such changes and incentives for the development 
of orphan drugs. 
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 Theories of Efficiency vs. Equity and Markets vs. Government 
 Arguments for initial passage of the ODA implied that 1) drugs were being developed 
based on principles of economic efficiency, and, 2) this situation had created inequities because 
the needs of individuals with common illnesses were being addressed before the needs of 
individuals with rare health conditions.  Later, arguments for reform of the ODA implied that 
the market exclusivity provision of the ODA, the law’s primary “tool” to equitably distribute 
research and development resources, had created inefficiency in the market.  This suggests a 
tradeoff between efficiency and equity.  Potential theories that may help explain the role of 
markets and government in promoting efficiency and equity, and the potential tradeoffs between 
the two values, will now be discussed. 
 Market economists believe that markets—where buyers and sellers complete voluntary 
transactions and sellers compete for customers on the basis of price and quality—are the most 
effective way to meet the needs of a population. Market proponents believe that government 
intervention is warranted only when markets fail to efficiently meet the needs of individuals and 
society. 
 Economists assert that markets are efficient when scarce resources are allocated to 
producing the right type and amount of goods and services for the right price for the right 
consumers. Under theoretically perfect market conditions, supply and demand of goods and 
services reach an equilibrium where the cost of producing an extra unit (marginal cost) is equal 
to the value gained from consuming that unit (marginal benefit), and resources are used 
optimally.  The text of the ODA implies that companies did not allocate resources to orphan 
drugs because it was not economically efficient to do so. 
 Markets fail to allocate resources efficiently and equitably when market power is too 
concentrated, i.e., when either a monopoly or monopsony is in effect.  When markets are 
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monopolized, a firm is better able to charge a price that exceeds its cost by more than a normal 
profit.  Inefficiency is created when the marginal benefit to the consumer does not match the 
marginal cost, and when the firm restricts output to maintain prices.  When government acts in 
the public’s interests, actions are taken to reduce monopoly power by preventing price collusion, 
reducing barriers to market entrance, and improving consumer information.  In the case of the 
ODA, however, government acted in the interests of rare disease patients by increasing 
monopoly power. 
 Market economists also accept the need for government intervention when consumption 
and production create externalities for the greater community, and when the good produced is a 
public good.  Additionally, most economists acknowledge that the market model is an ideal 
because government is needed to provide fundamental enablers of commerce, such as a stable 
currency and enforcement of property rights.  These concepts are also important in better 
understanding principles of the ODA. 
 Markets can become inefficient when there are externalities.  Externalities are created 
when the market transaction has “spillover” effects to parties that were not part of the 
transaction.  The classic example of a negative externality is when a manufacturer is located on a 
river and, in the course of producing a product, dumps chemical pollutants into the river.  
Because no individual or entity owns the river water, normal market forces will not work to stop 
the polluting.  Though the producer and consumer may benefit from the production of the good, 
the community as a whole suffers the consequences (pollution) of producing that good.  
Government’s role in this case is to levy a fine or tax so that those who enjoy the benefits of 
producing and consuming a product pay all of the costs of its production.  Governments can 
also use laws, regulations and jail sentences to deter pollution, as well as developing clearer 
ownership rights for the resources that are being polluted.   
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 Externalities can also be positive.  If producing a product has positive spillover effects 
for society or the community at large, then governments may consider subsidizing or otherwise 
encouraging its consumption, production, or both, so the value of the external benefits are 
included in the market price and output level of these products. Public education, for example, is 
subsidized because it is regarded as having substantial external benefits.  Rare disease patient 
advocates extol the virtues of the ODA’s positive externalities when they emphasize that 
investment in rare disease R and D tend to simultaneously result in developments for common 
illnesses.  For example, Alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency is a genetic lung disease that produces a 
form of emphysema that develops 10 to 30 years earlier than the more prevalent form found in 
smokers.  Because it affects young people, it can be studied separately from all the complicating 
factors of the aging process. (Maeder 2003) 
 Public goods are different from products such as oranges or computers because people 
do not pay for each unit they use.  Instead, public goods, such as national defense, are purchased 
collectively for the entire nation.  National defense is a public good because no private business 
could sell defense services to those who want them.  In fact, national defense services are 
provided even if individuals do not use them or want them.  Everyone pays for national defense 
whether they want it or not.  A uniform mandate for payment of a public good avoids what 
economists call “the free rider problem” where some may want the benefits of a public good 
without having to pay for it.  The US has a long history of allocating government funds for 
fundamental R and D.  For example, basic research on biomedical diseases has been conducted 
at the National Institutes of Health for the better part of the last century.  The public good 
benefits of the ODA have been advocated as a justification for the law. 
 Governments play a critical role in creating and enabling commerce by assuring the 
conditions within which people and organizations can use, buy and sell goods and services.  For 
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example, providing a stable currency obviates the need for cumbersome and inefficient systems 
of barter, and establishing a set of property and contract laws, via legislation or judicial precedent, 
establishes the complex set of do’s and don’ts, and liabilities and privileges, that are needed as a 
foundation in our modern society.  As further discussed below, patents enable inventors to 
exclude others from using their intellectual property and “appropriate” returns on their 
investments.  Patents enable knowledge sharing, so patents also promote positive externalities.  
Knowledge is also considered a public good because it is not exhausted when it is used.  The 
ability to use knowledge beyond specific inventions and applications is the foundation for the 
US patent system. 
 The Advanced Technology Program (2005) asserts that investments in research and 
development produce benefits to society as a whole that are greater than the benefits that can be 
captured by the person or organization financing the work.  Patent laws strongly influence the 
pace of technological progress and the structure of industry because they establish ownership of 
knowledge and ideas and enable patent owners to convert that into salable property.  Patents 
permit the creator of an idea to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or 
importing into the United States the patented invention—generally for a period of 20 years from 
the date of filing.  In exchange for the patent, the patent holder places the information 
associated with the invention within the public domain.  Hence, the patent system has dual 
policy goals—providing incentives to the inventor to invent and disseminating technical 
information to spur further invention.  The intent of this information sharing is to stimulate 
further creativity in meeting similar and expanded demands in the marketplace. 
 In the early 1980’s, many biotech drugs were not patentable because they consisted of 
proteins and peptides that were copied from those found naturally in the body.  As a proxy for a 
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patent, the ODA’s market exclusivity provision gave biotech companies property protection for 
their drugs, enabling them to appropriate the benefits of their investments.  
 The usefulness of patents in protecting the inventor’s investment varies by industry.  
Some industries gain competitive advantage by using non-patent tactics, such as superior 
customer relations and being first to market with products that better meet customer needs.  
Patents, however, are seen as critical to the pharmaceutical industry.  The cost to bring a novel 
pharmaceutical product to market has been estimated to exceed one billion dollars.  Patents and 
other exclusivity provisions better enable the inventor to recoup this expense. 
 Congress has supported patent and market exclusivity protections for pharmaceutical 
and biological therapies on numerous occasions in the past two decades.  The Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-417), commonly known 
as the Hatch-Waxman Act, made it easier for generic copies of brand name drugs to gain FDA 
approval and enter the marketplace after the brand’s patent expires.  But, at the same time, the 
Act introduced several significant changes to patent laws in order to preserve investors’ interests 
in drug R&D.  These include methods for extending the term of a drug patent up to five years to 
reflect property rights lost during the long FDA review process.  The Act also uses marketing 
exclusivity provisions to protect drugs from competition if, for example, the drugs are new 
chemical entities or are being clinically studied in new ways.  Moreover, several bills were 
recently introduced in Congress to provide additional patent protection or FDA-administered 
marketing exclusivities as a tool to encourage development of bioterrorism countermeasures. 
 Federal government actions relating to property protection, positive externalities, and 
public goods are generally recognized as important in promoting innovation.  In this light, the 
ODA can be viewed as an expression of the federal government’s commitment to promoting 
innovation.   
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 In addition to using patents and market exclusivity provisions to protect private interests 
in innovations, the government supports R&D directly through grants, tax credits and other 
financial incentives.  As described by the Advanced Technology Program of the federal National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (2004), externalities or “spillovers” from R and D 
investments are the primary justification for government support.  For example, when a firm 
generates new knowledge to produces an innovative product or process, not all of the economic 
benefits of that knowledge accrue to the firm.  Other firms can reverse engineer the innovator’s 
products, and benefit from knowledge shared via the firm’s patent disclosures, publications and 
employees (that migrate to other firms).  Suppliers and other collaborators that work with the 
firm may also benefit from knowledge sharing. 
 The Public Interest vs. Self-Interest View of the ODA 
 In theory, the US government is “of the people and for the people” and is designed to 
respond to the demands of citizens.  Hence, promoting sound health policy is the responsibility 
of all citizens.  However, some political scientists (e.g., Wilson 2003 and Feldstein 2001) contend 
that the benefits of promoting policy change should equal or exceed the costs (in time, effort, 
political capital, or money) of doing so.  Hence, groups with concentrated interests that expect 
concentrated benefits are more likely to lobby for policy change than individuals that would have 
to expend considerable effort to promote change. 
 The specific benefits of the ODA to patients with rare diseases are obvious and have 
been previously described.  But more generally, the ODA encouraged a reallocation of resources 
toward rare diseases, enabling more equitable allocation of R&D funds.  This was a fundamental 
change, as it implied that the health needs of the many should not take precedence over the 
health needs of the few.  In this light, the ODA symbolizes the tangible results that a 
disenfranchised, minority group can achieve if they organize and advocate their cause effectively.  
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Congressional hearings are a forum for collective expression and protest, and legislation is a 
means to exert power. 
 Feldstein (2001) contends that political markets are no different than economic markets, 
where individuals and groups act to further their own self-interests.  Like a market exchange, 
legislators supply legislation and interest groups demand legislative benefits in exchange for 
providing political support.  According to this theory, legislators act in their own self interests to 
get reelected and carefully weigh the political benefits (i.e., campaign contributions, votes and 
volunteer time) vs. the political costs of not supporting legislation. 
 Government actions can also improve the economic conditions of individuals, firms, 
industries, states or countries.  The passage of the ODA increased the value of firms that had 
vested interests in orphan drug research, production and marketing.  Increased value of a firm 
can translate into 1) increased wealth for an individual, e.g., when an individual owns stock in an 
orphan drug producing firm; 2) increased wealth of an industry, i.e., when similar firms 
collectively increase in value; 3) increased wealth of a region, i.e., when wealth of the firm’s 
employees (and their families) translates to an increase in the overall economic activity, or 
“base,” of a geographical area; and, 4) increased wealth of a nation, e.g., when a nation has 
concentrated expertise that is valued by other nations, exports improve its economic position 
relative to other countries. 
 The ODA enhanced the value of firms that developed and marketed orphan drugs in a 
number of ways. First, the law provided tax credits, grants and FDA assistance.  These 
provisions reduced the size of the required research and development investment.  Second, the 
law provided market exclusivity.  By reducing or eliminating alternative sources of orphan drugs, 
firms are better able to charge higher prices.  Higher prices translate into increased revenue and 
profit per unit sold.  Market exclusivity could also translate into reduced marketing and product 
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production costs.  Without competing advertising, sales personnel, etc., firms would not have to 
spend as much on marketing and sales to get the attention and interest of prescribers, patients 
and other stakeholders.  Moreover, market exclusivity means, by definition, the firm is supplying 
100% of the market.  Based on the theory of experience curves, operating costs should decline 
when production increases.  Hence, serving 100% of the market should be more profitable than 
serving less than 100%. 
 Because drug companies focused on developing drugs for common illnesses, individuals 
with less common conditions did not get an equal or fair chance at accessing new, more 
effective therapies.  Reportedly, rare disease patient advocates demanded legislation to equalize 
their rights and enable them to access drug treatments just as patients with more common 
illnesses were able to do.
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4—Research Design and Methodology 
 Utilizing the historical case of ODA developments and debates, along with extant 
theory and research, this dissertation research explored two general questions: 1) what 
factors seem to promote or impede policy development; and, 2) how does issue framing 
support policy development?  This qualitative inquiry utilized mixed methods, including 
literature reviews, informant interviews, and a content analysis of Congressional transcripts.   
The research was divided into four aims.  
 After describing the researcher’s perspective and background, an overview of the 
four aims of this study will be presented in this chapter.  Next, methodological details of 
each of the aims will be described. 
 Researcher Perspective and Background 
 Because portions of this dissertation research required interpretation and judgment, 
it is important to be explicit about this researcher’s background and potential biases.  
Awareness of potential biases can inform and guide different stages of the dissertation 
research—from research design, to analysis and reporting. 
 Lynn Redington has worked in various aspects of the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries for many years.  She has also worked for a managed care 
organization.  Though Redington has master’s degrees in both business administration and 
public health, and tends to look at complex health issues through market and social justice 
frames, her business and market perspectives sometimes dominate.  
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 Redington has never directly worked on the ODA legislation, but she has worked to 
prepare orphan drugs for market launch.  While Redington may be most adept at adopting 
an industry perspective of the ODA, applications of the proposed research will not be 
limited to industry. Redington is equally interested in addressing the perspectives of other 
ODA stakeholders, e.g., patients with rare health conditions, legislators and payers.   
 Research Design by Aim 
 To recap, this dissertation study had four aims: 1) to provide a history and overview 
of the ODA for context setting; 2) to describe how issues were framed in ODA amendment 
hearings; 3) to identify factors contributing to ODA amendment failures from 1990-1994; 
and, 4) to analyze how issues were framed and provide framing strategy guidance for ODA 
stakeholders. Briefly, Aim 1 entailed identifying a set of published information and extracting 
and synthesizing specific information and themes.  Aim 2 entailed extracting and 
synthesizing original, unpublished text from government documents.  Aim 3 utilized mixed 
methods and several data types, including document reviews, informant interviews and 
theory-mediated analyses.  Aim 4 utilized selected data from Aims 1-3 and used framing 
theory and policy development theory to analyze and devise strategies. How data were 
sourced, collected and analyzed is summarized in Table 3.  This is further described in 
Appendix C.  Details on the research design for each aim will now be discussed. 
 Aim 1: History and Overview of the ODA 
 The first aim was to describe the context and history of the ODA and to provide an 
overview of its successes and challenges.  Completing this aim depended on collecting 
secondary data found in published articles, archived records and websites.  The information 
that was sought is outlined in Appendix C.  Generally, documents were identified via use of 
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computer search engines using the key words, “orphan drug.”  To cover the period leading 
up to the ODA’s enactment to the present, searches were restricted to documents produced 
between 1980 and 2008.  Documents were reviewed.  Desired information was highlighted 
on the documents, and then described in the form of a historical analysis.  Themes emerged 
with repeated readings of the documents.  For further description of inclusion criteria and 
sourcing of these documents, see Appendix C. 
 
Table 3--Data Collection and Analysis by Aim 
 
 Aim 1: ODA History 
& Overview 
Aim 2: Issue 
Frames 1990-
1994 
Aim 3: ODA 
Reform Factors 
Aim 4: Issue 
Frame Analysis & 
Strategy 
 
Data Sources 
 
Published articles, 
archival records, 
websites 
 
Congressional 
testimony re: 
ODA 
amendments 
 
Informant 
interviews + 
preliminary data 
from Aim 1 and Aim 
2 
 
 
Findings from Aims 
1 through 3 
Data type Secondary: 
documents 
Secondary: 
documents 
Primary: one-on-
one phone 
interviews 
 
Mixed: reduced and 
interpreted data 
from Aims 1-3 
Data 
Sampling 
Using key words 
“orphan drug;” search 
article databases: 
PubMed & Factiva; 
government records: 
Thomson databases, 
physical scan at 
government library; 
Google search of 
gray literature 
 
All records 
were used; no 
sampling 
Purposive 
sampling; included 
interviewees that 
represented 
different 
stakeholder groups: 
Industry, 
Government, 
Patients, Payers, 
Policy Advisors 
Based on 
relevance to Aim 4 
Data 
collection 
instrument 
Outline MS Excel 
spreadsheet, 
Iterative 
memos 
 
Interview guide n/a 
 
Data analysis Qualitative, 
descriptive 
Qualitative, 
descriptive and 
interpretive 
Qualitative, 
descriptive 
 
Qualitative, theory-
mediated analysis, 
interpretive 
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 Aim 2: Issue Framing in ODA Reform Debates during 1990-1994 
 The second aim was to describe how issues were framed in ODA reform debates 
that occurred at four Congressional hearings during 1990-1994.  Transcripts from four 
hearings were obtained from a government documents library.  All testimony was included 
in the sample.  The information that was sought from testimonies is outlined in Appendix C.  
Microsoft Excel was used to collect and descriptively analyze the data. 
 Aim 2 was conducted in two steps.  In Step 1, the Congressional testimony was 
coded using the data collection and classification scheme described in Appendix C.  The 
testimony from each individual constituted the unit of analysis. 
 In Step 2, issue frames were constructed from Step 1 data using a process called 
memoing.  “A memo is the theorizing write up of ideas about codes and their relationships 
as they strike the analyst while coding . . . it can be a sentence, a paragraph or a few pages . . . 
it exhausts the analyst’s momentary ideation based on data with perhaps a little conceptual 
elaboration. . .” (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 72, quoting Glaser 1978).  More information 
on the memoing process can be found in Appendix C. 
 Aim 3: Factors Affecting ODA Reform from 1990-1994  
 The third aim was to identify factors that may have impeded or promoted ODA 
reform attempts from 1990-1994.  Primary and secondary data were collected and analyzed 
to complete this aim.  Secondary data included articles from the business, consumer, and 
medical press, as well as gray literature documents.  The Congressional testimony from the 
1990-1994 hearings also provided data and insights.  Primary data were derived from ten 
informant interviews.  The informant interview guide can be found in Appendix C. 
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 Aim 3 was semi-structured based on the Multiple Streams model (Kingdon 1995) of 
policy development.  This meant that the following elements and factors in the development 
and failure of the ODA amendments were explored: 1) Problem definition, i.e., how the 
problem defined, and whether stakeholders agreed that a problem existed; 2) policy solution; 
3) politics; 4) the broader climate (political, social, economic climate), and, 5) individuals that 
were influential in the process.  (Kingdon refers to these individuals as policy entrepreneurs, but 
this term was not used in the informant interviews, nor was it used in the reviewed 
documents.)  Hypotheses about what might impede or favor passage of legislation were 
developed in the proposal phase of this research (see Table 2).  Having these hypotheses in 
mind a priori served as a reminder of what to look for in the reviewed documents, as well as 
what to probe for in the informant interviews. 
 Selected articles and reports that informed Aim 3 were also used to inform Aim 1.  
These were described previously in this chapter.  A description of the Congressional 
testimony informed Aim 3 and Aim 2, and have already been described in this chapter.  The 
informant interviews and the process of gaining Institutional Review Approval to conduct 
these interviews will now be described.  A description of the sample, as well as the 
recruitment and interviewing process, will follow. 
 In June 2008, an application was submitted to University of North Carolina’s Office 
of Human Research Ethics Institutional Review Board (IRB) for “Determination Whether 
Research or Similar Activities Require IRB Approval.”  After one resubmission, the 
application was approved in July 2008.  It was determined that IRB approval was not 
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required because the submitted list of potential informants were considered “elected 
officials.”9 
 In late October 2008, 16 potential informants were sent an email or mailed letter that 
contained a request for a 20-30 minute phone interview.  For a copy of the correspondence, 
see Appendix D. 
 Ten (63%) informants agreed to an interview, and the interviews were completed by 
phone in the month of November 2008.  One potential informant responded to the 
interview request, but declined the interview.  The remaining 5 simply did not respond to the 
interview request.  Informants were told that their responses would remain anonymous and 
confidential.  Hence, the sample will be described in general terms.   
 The purposive sample of 10 informants was drawn from an initial target list of 16 
potential informants.  Purposive sampling is useful for gathering opinions from specific 
predefined groups.  Hence, the target list included individuals from four different ODA 
stakeholder groups: 1) federal government, 2) industry, 3) patients, and 4) payers.  The list 
also included three health policy experts that advised multiple stakeholder groups.  The 
process of creating the initial target list of 16 included identifying individuals that met most 
of the following criteria: 1) individuals that were leaders of relevant organizations or 
initiatives, e.g. leaders of the stakeholder groups listed in Appendix F, members of congress 
that chaired the hearings and sponsored the proposed ODA reforms in the 1990s, or 
presidents of the companies that were involved in the debate of the 1990s reforms; 2) 
individuals that spoke at the 1990-1994 hearings; and, 3) individuals that have advised key 
stakeholder groups on the proposed ODA reforms as a consultant or researcher.  Targeted 
informants also had to be locatable, which generally meant that they were not deceased or 
                                                 
9 The targeted informant list was not limited to officials elected to government service.  The preliminary list 
that was sent to the IRB included leaders of companies, and patient- and industry-advocacy organizations. 
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retired.  The target list of 16 informants was reviewed and approved by the dissertation 
committee chair before anyone was contacted. 
 One to two informants from each of the four stakeholder groups were interviewed.  
All of the three targeted health policy experts were interviewed.  Characteristics of the 
informants included: three of the ten informants had testified at one or more ODA hearings.  
Three had published articles on the ODA.  At least two had participated in drafting the 
ODA legislation.  Of note, most informants had worked in multiple capacities throughout 
their careers, e.g., some informants started in the federal government (e.g., Food and Drug 
Administration and the Office of Management and Budget) but later worked in industry, or 
as health policy advisors.   
 That interviewees may not remember events of 14 to 18 years ago was anticipated by 
this researcher.  Before each scheduled interview this researcher reviewed publications, 
quotes and Congressional testimony by, and about, the individual interviewee.  This 
background preparation enabled the researcher to jog the interviewee’s memory when 
necessary, and focus the interview around the given “facts” of the situation.  While 14-18 
years ago remained difficult for informants to remember, about a third of informants 
seemed to readily recall details of the players and events surrounding the 1990-1994 ODA 
amendments.  Others qualified their answers with caveats such as, “that was a long time ago, 
but I think . . .” 
 Generally, informants repeated facts, statements, and themes that were already 
available in several articles that reviewed the 1990-1994 amendments.  Hence, results from 
the interviews seem to validate the published reports and vice versa.  Note that findings 
from the informant interviews are combined with that of the document reviews and 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6  
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 Aim 4: Frame Analysis and Framing Strategy Guidance 
 The fourth aim was to analyze the frames derived from Aim 2 and to provide 
framing strategy guidance.  Findings from Aims 1 through 3 were used to complete this aim.  
Data relevant to this aim were selected and interpretively analyzed.  Analysis and strategy 
were guided by theories and research pertaining to frame reflection (Schon and Rein 1994), 
political language (Stone 2002), frame potency (Pan 2003, Van Gorp 2007, Benford et al. 
2000, Lakoff 2004), and frame breaking and creativity (Fredin 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5—History of the ODA 
 The Development and Enactment of the ODA 
 Based on the reviewed literature and informant interviews, rare disease patient advocates 
were the lead champions of the 1983 ODA legislation. Patient advocates were apparently 
proactive and purposeful in defining problems, crafting solutions, finding legislators that would 
champion those solutions, and creating a climate that favored ODA passage. It is not clear 
whether the media were initially encouraged to publicize the need for drugs for rare diseases, or 
whether they decided on their own to focus on the issue.  In the year or two prior to the ODA’s 
enactment, it does seem clear from the literature and interviews that patient advocates were 
actively involved in enlisting the support of key opinion leaders and engineering an effective 
media campaign. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, Kingdon (1995) developed the Multiple Streams Model 
from his study of the development of 23 different federal policies.  The process of creating and 
enacting the ODA appears to differ from the cases that Kingdon studied.  Unlike Kingdon’s 
cases, the ODA’s underlying problem and solution streams seemed highly coupled and 
interdependent, and policy entrepreneurs (patient advocates and select legislators) seemed very 
influential in creating a climate that favored change.   Also, the media were very important in 
galvanizing support for the ODA, whereas the media were important in only 4 out of the 23 
cases that Kingdon studied. 
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 Events Leading to the Law’s Enactment 
 The problem, that drugs for rare diseases and conditions were needed and lacking, 
captured the attention of legislators starting in the late 1970s.  First, former New York 
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman responded to this problem by drafting legislation that 
created a pool of money that could be used to develop orphan drugs.  The bill was not well 
received, especially by industry, because it proposed that profits from any drug developed with 
these monies be returned to the government.  Despite opposition, the bill was re-introduced by 
former New York Representative Ted Weiss.  It went no further.  Prospects for an orphan drug 
bill seemed bleak until the issue gained public visibility and support after it was widely publicized 
in the consumer media. 
 In early 1980, Adam Seligman, an American victim of Tourette syndrome, was obtaining 
drugs from Canada to treat his condition.  The drugs were seized at the border and Adam’s 
treatments were stopped.  In response, Adam’s mother sought the help of Representative Henry 
Waxman of California.  Waxman was interested in the Seligman’s plight.  As Chairman of the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, 
Rep. Waxman held a preliminary hearing in mid-1980 to learn more about the problems that rare 
disease patients faced in seeking treatment.  Adam testified at the hearing. 
 The hearing was sparsely attended, but one article that followed the hearing generated 
substantial interest in the issue.  A Los Angeles Times reporter attended the hearing and wrote 
an article about the dearth of treatments for rare diseases, the lack of industry interest in 
developing these treatments, and how patients were suffering as a consequence.  The article 
captured the interest of Jack Klugman, the lead actor of a popular TV series called Quincy M.E. 
(medical examiner).  Klugman offered to help the cause by raising awareness of the issue in a 
special show.  In March 1981, the show, Give Me Your Weak, aired on TV. 
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 Thousands of viewers of the television show sent letters to Klugman voicing their 
support and asking how they could help.  With a window of public support, Representative 
Waxman held a second hearing.  This time Klugman testified.  The hearing was attended by a 
variety of media and the story of the plight of rare disease patients was widely publicized. 
 Representative Waxman redesigned the orphan drug bill and introduced it to the House 
in 1981.  Former Senator Nancy Kasselbaum introduced a similar bill in the Senate.  The bill 
passed the House but then stalled in the Senate.  In response, Klugman produced another 
television show on the issue.  But this time he emphasized the holdup in Congress and included 
500 “extras” that were patients with rare diseases and conditions.  The bill passed the Senate 
after the show aired. 
 The bill had a final hurdle to overcome.  Rare disease patient advocates had heard that 
President Reagan planned on vetoing the bill.  To apply pressure just before Christmas 1982, 
they purchased full-page advertisements in Washington D.C. newspapers.  The ads urged 
Reagan to sign the bill and suggested that Reagan could become the “Grinch that stole 
Christmas” for victims of rare diseases. Klugman also offered support should a veto occur.  
Reportedly, Reagan responded to the public pressure and signed the bill in January 1983. 
 Stakeholder Interests and Roles 
 A number of interest groups had a stake in the ODA, including rare disease patient 
advocacy organizations, legislators, FDA, and the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. 
(See Appendix F for further details)   
 According to multiple sources, the lead proponents of the ODA were associated with 
patient advocacy groups and Congress.  FDA and industry also participated in drafting the ODA.  
The media raised awareness and public interest regarding the need for rare disease treatments.  
Members of Congress and President Reagan were final decision makers of the ODA’s fate. 
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 Patient Advocates 
 While the Seligmans were noted as early patient advocates, Abbey Meyers, a mother of 3 
children with Tourette syndrome, soon emerged as the face of rare disease patients in the 
orphan drug cause.  Initially, Meyers became involved as a volunteer with the Tourette 
Syndrome Association.  Later, she founded and led the National Organization for Rare 
Disorders (NORD), a federation of voluntary health organizations focused on rare diseases. 
 Voluntary, non-profit organizations that advocate for specific patient interests have a 
long history in the US. Many of these organizations have a disease focus, and often these 
organizations are founded by someone that has been personally affected by the disease.  For 
example, the March of Dimes was founded in 1938 by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to 
“fight” polio, a disease that he personally contracted. 
 There are many disease-focused organizations that advocate for the needs of patients 
with specific rare illnesses.  As a federation of over a hundred sub-organizations, NORD 
provided a unified voice in urging the passage of the ODA to develop treatments for multiple 
rare diseases.  In advocating for treatments for rare diseases, NORD uses collective terms to 
emphasize the magnitude of the problem, i.e., instead of referring to the prevalence or incidence 
of selected rare illnesses, NORD emphasizes that there are 5000-7000 rare illnesses and that, 
collectively, these affect 1 in 10 Americans.  This seems consistent with the political strategy to 
present a policy solution as having diffuse rather than concentrated benefits. 
 Government Officials 
 Legislators that have been persistent and credible in the orphan drug cause include 
Henry Waxman, a House of Representatives Democrat representing California’s 30th 
congressional district since 1975.  In addition to the ODA, Waxman has drafted many legislative 
proposals that have focused on improving cost, quality and access to health services.  From 
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1979-1995, Waxman used his position as chair of the Subcommittee on Health and the 
Environment, which is part of the Energy and Commerce Committee, to investigate a number 
of high-profile health and environmental issues.  Waxman has co-authored a number of health-
related bills with Senators Ted Kennedy and Orrin Hatch, who are also highly visible in the 
health legislative arena. 
 President Ronald Reagan was in office when the ODA was on the policy agenda.  His 
initial resistance to signing the ODA seemed consistent with his presidential campaign promises.  
For example, one of the tenets of Reagan’s campaign was to reduce the size of the federal 
government, whereas the ODA represented increased government involvement.  Nevertheless, a 
veto carried the risk of negative publicity.   
 Since the FDA would become responsible for administering the ODA, the FDA has also 
had an influence on the design and approval of the law. 
 Industry Advocates 
 According to patient advocates and newspaper articles, the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America10 (PhRMA) originally opposed passage of the ODA.  But this 
assertion has been contested by PhRMA. PhRMA apparently opposed parts of the initial ODA 
drafts, such as an early proposal to give rare disease treatments priority FDA review.  Industry 
advocates did not want new drug applications for rare disease treatments to leapfrog over drug 
applications for common illnesses because this would extend the elapsed time from submission 
of the NDA to FDA approval.  Waiting for FDA approval can be expensive.  If a drug can 
potentially generate $300 million in sales, each day of waiting for approval can represent nearly a 
million dollars of lost revenue to the drug’s sponsor. 
                                                 
10 The organization was originally called the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America (PMA).  Since the 1990s 
amendment hearings, the organization changed its name to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA). 
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 Window of Opportunity and Coupling of Streams 
 Paraphrasing Kingdon (1995), the ODA’s development and passage could be described 
as follows:  A window of opportunity opened up in the problem stream as a result of the media 
attention and public support for the issue (i.e., the plight of rare disease patients, and the lack of 
treatments and industry interest).  A policy solution had been in the works for a couple of years, 
which meant that a solution had been crafted, socialized and refined.  Hence, not only was a 
solution ready to be matched to the problem, but legislators had been exposed to the issue for 
some time and, as a result, had some time to “soften up” to the idea.  
 The overall macro-environment in late 1982 and early 1983 did not seem to contain any 
major forces that might derail passage of the ODA.  It is interesting to note, however, that many 
of the political, economic, social and technological trends and forces of the time certainly were 
not consonant with the tenets of the ODA.  But, as Kingdon (1995) points out, issues of 
healthcare cost, quality and access are “hardy perennials” on political agendas. 
 On the economic front, the nation had just emerged from a severe recession.  Though 
Reagan promised American voters that he would shrink government, he had actually increased 
government expenditures and the nation’s deficit increased markedly.  The deficit 
notwithstanding, Reagan was applauded for his handling of the difficult economy of 1981-1982, 
which included recession, inflation, and job losses.  If anything, Reagan’s association with pulling 
America out of the recession could have been used as political capital to push back on the ODA.  
On the other hand, the ODA was a “feel good” proposal that could enhance Reagan’s public 
image as being caring and attentive to the needs of Americans in a difficult situation. 
 In the months preceding ODA enactment, America was still in a “Cold War” with the 
(former) Soviet Union.  That time was marked by increased military expenditures and Reagan’s 
“Evil Empire” speech.  The Cold War was a continuing saga, rather than a new chapter in 
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American history.  Hence, it was unlikely to effect legislation such as the ODA.  Moreover, 
orphan drug legislation’s importance probably paled by comparison with America’s political 
preoccupation with the USSR. 
 In terms of social forces or trends specific to the early 1980s, nothing in particular seems 
to stand out as favoring or detracting from ODA passage. The plight of Adam Seligman and 
other rare disease patients resonated with the public, but the public seems perennially interested 
in and sympathetic to individual hardships.  According to one informant interview, Reagan also 
had a “soft spot” for individual hardship.  Reportedly, Reagan created the Medicaid waiver 
process in response to the plight of Katie Beckett and her parents.  At the time, Medicaid paid 
for Beckett’s hospital care but would not pay for care at home.  In 1982, Reagan signed the 
“Katie Beckett Waiver” law, so that states could ask the Heath Care Financing Administration 
(now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) to waive specific requirements of the 
Federal Medicaid law.  The informant further emphasized that “the bigger the issue, the more 
that ideology kicks in.”  In other words, a problem may be more ideology neutral if it is seen as 
affecting individuals that you can name and visualize. 
 Perhaps the ODA was seen in an ideology neutral light.  Certainly, the following aspects 
of the ODA did not seem consistent with conservative Republican ideologies of the early 1980’s.  
The ODA: 1) provided industry subsidies and government protection (via market exclusivity) in 
a time when deregulation and small government were emphasized; 2) influenced the choice of 
which products were developed, manufactured and marketed by private companies in a time 
when the USSR’s command economy principles were criticized; and, 3) attempted to equalize 
the rights of rare disease patients to have access to medical treatments just as patients with more 
common illnesses do.  This occurred in a time when Reagan opposed some of the tenets of the 
1964 Civil Rights act. 
 73 
 Technological factors may have played a role in enactment of the ODA.  Patient 
advocates must have believed that the pharmaceutical technologies and know-how of the time 
could yield treatments for their rare illnesses.  Otherwise, creating government-sanctioned 
incentives to invest in researching and developing these treatments might be meaningless.  It is 
noteworthy that ODA enactment coincided with the “birth” of the biotechnology industry.  The 
first genetically engineered biological treatment, human insulin, was launched in 1982.  There is 
no evidence to suggest that legislators anticipated that the ODA would support a large portion 
of these emerging biotechnologies (“biotech”).  This is important because biotech drugs are 
substantially more expensive than drugs made with traditional chemical methods.  If projected 
cost impacts of the legislation were important, then this faulty assumption would favor passage 
of the ODA because the projected cost to society of such a bill would be presumed to be 
minimal. 
 As a side note, growth trends in FDA approvals for biotech drugs and FDA approvals 
for orphan drugs seem to parallel each other. (See Figure 3)  Because ODA enactment coincided 
with the birth of biotech, it is difficult to parse out the degree to which technology drove the 
growth in orphan drugs versus the degree to which legislation drove growth.  In most reviews of 
the ODA, authors imply that legislation has been the primary driver of growth in FDA 
approvals of orphan drugs since 1983.  An alternative explanation is that the ODA coincided 
with the birth of the biotechnology industry and that the ODA may have had an additive effect, 
but wasn’t the primary cause of orphan drug development.  If one were to explore this 
alternative explanation, the following observations are relevant: 1) half of the drugs launched by 
the biotech industry have been designated as orphan drugs.  2) As mentioned, the pace of 
biotech orphan drugs mirrors that of non-orphan drugs from the biotech industry.  3) Eighty 
percent of rare diseases have a genetic basis (Lavandeira 2002).  Biotechnology drugs are well 
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suited to address conditions with genetic underpinnings, so rare diseases were a natural target of 
biotech—with or without the ODA. 
 
Figure 3--Growth in Orphan Drugs vs. Biotechnology Industry Growth 
From: Office of Inspector General Report on the ODA’s Implementation and Impact, May 2001 
 
     
 
 In summary, several factors seemed to favor passage of the ODA.  In accordance with 
propositions made in Table 2, many “problem definition” factors were favorable.  These 
included a surge in the problem stream, where the needs of rare disease patients gained visibility 
in a popular medium of the time (television and newspapers).  The story of the plight of patients 
had some exciting qualities, including the life threatening and debilitating nature of many rare 
illnesses, the well-developed characterization of the victims (i.e., personalized stories in the news 
media and “real” people appearing in Klugman’s TV show), and the identification of tangible 
villains (resistant companies and legislators).  According to numerous accounts, no one faulted 
the victims.  Their plight was not of their doing, as in lung cancer caused by smoking. Instead, 
an act of nature had inflicted these rare conditions upon them (a majority of rare diseases are 
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congenital).  That certain members of Congress and industry became villains in the story 
probably resonated with the public imagination.  Congress- and industry-bashing seems to be an 
enduring cultural theme. 
 How rare illnesses were defined as a problem also seemed to favor support for ODA 
legislation.  Rare diseases and conditions are, by definition, rare.  But, collectively, these 
conditions are not rare.  There are as many as 7000 recognized rare conditions. Collectively, 25 
million Americans are potential victims of a rare illness.  To gain widespread support for a public 
policy, it is important to define a problem so that: 1) individuals can see that they could become 
the next victim of the problem, and, 2) it is seen as a social problem (although putting a face on 
the problem makes it simultaneously a private problem).  Wisely, defining the magnitude of rare 
illnesses and conditions in collective terms is a tactic that has been used by many rare disease 
patient advocates—in pre- and post-ODA enactment times. 
 The lack of rare disease treatments seemed to be defined as a problem that had broad 
appeal and that justified government intervention.  To gain broad support, patient advocates 
described their problem as one of a violation of rights.  They contended that they had the right 
to access effective drug treatments just as victims of more common illnesses did.  This problem 
definition would likely resonate with a broad base of individuals that felt marginalized or who 
supported the rights of minorities that were marginalized. 
 Pro-ODA advocates also contended that normal market forces had failed to produce 
needed rare disease drug treatments, so it was the government’s responsibility to intervene in 
order to ensure social justice.  This frame justifies Congressional intervention. 
  Evolution of the ODA during 1983-2008 
After the ODA was signed into law in January 1983, new proposals to change the law 
circulated nearly every year.  Proposals that were successful, i.e., resulted in an amendment, 
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tended to increase the reach and effectiveness of the law.  Proposals that were not successful 
tended to decrease the benefits of the ODA, either by reducing the value of the ODA incentives 
or by reducing the number of drugs that would qualify for the incentives.  Other factors that 
may have favored or impeded changes in the law will be discussed in the next section. 
The first two successful amendments will now be discussed because of their particular 
relevance to Aim 3 of this research.  Other amendments are described in Table 1. 
In late 1984, the original definition of “rare disease or condition” was changed by P.L. 
98-551 by giving drug sponsors the option of using either a prevalence standard or a profitability 
standard to obtain orphan designation for their drug.  The law currently states, “the term rare 
disease or condition means any disease or condition which (a) affects less than 200,000 persons 
in the U.S. or (b) affects more than 200,000 persons in the U.S. but for which there is no 
reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making available in the U.S. a drug for 
such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in the U.S. of such drug.”  Prior to 
October 1984, orphan designation was based entirely on the profitability standard.  To receive 
orphan designation based on the profitability standard, potential orphan drugs are means tested 
and sponsors have to provide financial projections that demonstrate development costs will 
exceed sales. 
Several sources assert that this amendment was proposed and passed because 
stakeholders were disappointed by the dearth of orphan designation applications in the first year 
of the ODA’s existence.  Reportedly, companies did not want to share financial information, and 
the FDA was not well equipped to judge the soundness of financial projections provided by 
companies.  The profitability standard remains unpopular.  Most orphan designations are based 
on the prevalence standard. 
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 The August 1985 amendment extended ODA provisions to drugs that were patentable.  
Previous to P.L. 98-551, only drugs that were not patentable were able to receive the market 
exclusivity provision of the ODA.  This amendment significantly benefited the biotechnology 
industry, because many biotech drugs were not patentable.  The ODA market exclusivity 
provision became a surrogate for a patent because it effectively allowed inventors of biotech 
drugs to appropriate the financial benefits of their inventions.  As a result of this amendment, 
biotech entrepreneurs were better able to raise financial capital for orphan drug development 
because the ODA market exclusivity provision increased the potential commercial value of 
orphan drugs. 
 ODA Reform Attempts during 1990-1994 
 As mentioned previously, the text of the ODA suggests that Congress assumed that 
orphan drugs are unprofitable without government support.  But means testing to determine a 
drug’s financial (or commercial) potential is not currently required as a condition for such 
support.  Hence, low- and high-commercial-potential (LCP and HCP) orphan drugs are eligible 
for ODA benefits.  During 1990-1994, legislators attempted to amend the ODA to limit the 
conditions of eligibility or revoke certain benefits for HCP orphan drugs.  These amendment 
attempts were not successful. 
 Overview of the 1990-1994 Congressional Hearings 
 During 1990 to 1994, four Congressional hearings were held to discuss whether 
problems with the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) existed, and, if so, whether the ODA should be 
amended to address these problems.  As can be seen in Table 4, the hearings were held in 
February 1990, July 1990, March 1992, and June 1994. 
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 Two alleged problems were discussed in the February 1990 hearing.  The first, and most 
widely discussed problem, was that the ODA was too inclusive, i.e., that certain orphan drugs 
would have been developed without ODA incentives, meaning the ODA incentives were not 
needed to spur orphan drug development. According to presiding Congressman Henry Waxman, 
market exclusivity for these drugs resulted in “an unnecessary monopoly and higher prices to 
consumers.” Three orphan drug categories11 were identified as problems to be investigated in the 
hearing: 1) human growth hormone (hGH), 2) aerosol pentamidine, and, 3) Erythropoietin 
(EPO). Indications that ODA incentives were not needed included: 1) development of these 
drugs commenced years prior to the 1983 enactment of the law, hence the prospect of ODA 
incentives was presumably not a factor in the decision to develop the drugs; 2) sales of the drugs 
seemed to far exceed the limits of what would constitute a low-commercial-potential drug 
(LCP); and, 3) multiple companies sought orphan drug designation and FDA approval within 
each of the above drug categories.  This also indicated that these were HCP drugs and that ODA 
incentives were not necessary to spur development of these drugs. 
 A second disputed issue discussed in February 1990 was that drugs for AIDS should no 
longer qualify as orphan drugs because the prevalence of the condition had grown beyond the 
200,000 patient cut off.  Note that this issue is not the focus of this dissertation research. 
 In July 1990, Waxman submitted a bill12 (H.R. 4638) to address these problems.  
Waxman’s proposal to solve the problem of unnecessary monopolies was to allow “shared 
exclusivity” under situations where multiple sponsors were pursuing FDA approval of similar 
orphan drugs. The bill also proposed to revoke orphan drug status if the candidate population 
                                                 
11 The term “orphan drug categories” refers to a class of drugs or biological agents rather than a specific brand in 
that category.  
 
12 The ODA bills submitted between 1990 and 1994 were titled “Orphan Drug Amendments,” e.g., H.R. 4638 was 
titled “Orphan Drug Amendments of 1990.”  Hence, ODA bills submitted between 1990 and 1994 are often 
referred to in this dissertation as ODA amendments.  Unless otherwise stated, “amendments of the 1990s,” or 
“proposed amendments of the 1990s” refers to bills that were submitted to amend the ODA from 1990 to 1994. 
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for the drug became greater than 200,000.  In October 1990, the bill received the unanimous 
vote of Congress.  But in November 1990, President Bush pocket vetoed the bill.  For a copy of 
the President’s Memorandum of Disapproval, see Appendix G. 
 The purpose of the two 1992 hearings was to address the notion that the ODA was, 
according to Senator Howard Metzenbaum, “being used as a legal loophole to block competitors 
from a lucrative market for a drug of tremendous commercial value.”  Similar to the 1990 
hearing, the ODA was criticized as being too inclusive.  Critics contended that drug categories 
with HCP did not need the ODA incentives, and that providing incentives for HCP drugs 
violated the spirit of the law.  Moreover, critics believed that selected companies were abusing 
their market exclusivity position as a way to “block” competition and charge “excessive” prices. 
 Bills introduced in the 102nd Congress (H.R. 3930, S. 2060) addressed these issues by 
proposing that an orphan drug’s market exclusivity could be withdrawn once the product 
reached cumulative sales of $200 million.  The bills presumed that a cumulative sales threshold 
was a defining characteristic of an HCP drug, and that such a drug could stand on its own and 
compete without the protections of the ODA market exclusivity provision.  The bills did not 
pass. 
 The purpose of the June 1994 hearing was to hear testimony on H.R. 4160, which aimed 
to limit the ODA-granted market exclusivity provision to LCP drugs.  As written, all drugs that 
received orphan drug designation would be granted four years of market exclusivity upon FDA 
approval.  In order to extend the market exclusivity another three years, applicants would have 
to apply for approval from the Secretary of Health and Human Services and demonstrate “that 
the drug has a limited commercial potential, as determined under regulations of the Secretary, on 
the basis of total sales revenue for such drug during the 4-year period of exclusivity . . . or 
factors other than total sales revenue identified by the Secretary.”  In other words, the bill would 
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leave it up to the Secretary to define how to differentiate a LCP drug from a HCP drug. The 
criteria by which an orphan drug would have LCP were not included in the text of the bill.  
Instead, the bill specified that criteria would be developed and codified in the regulations within 
the six months following the bill’s passage into law. 
 In all, 38 statements were heard at the four hearings.  Thirty-one individuals provided 
the 38 statements.  Five individuals testified at more than one hearing.  Most notably, Abbey 
Meyers, Executive Director of NORD, testified at all of the four hearings.  Four others testified 
at two of the four hearings.13  Testimony, statements and supporting documents consumed a 
total of 881 pages. 
 Based on statements made by members of Congress and the witnesses present, several 
differences among the four hearings seemed apparent: 1) whether the hearing focused on a 
particular bill or not; 2) the amount of Pro vs. Con testimony heard in each of the hearings; and, 
3) the proportion of witnesses that represented government, industry or patient interests in each 
of the hearings. 
 The first hearing did not mention a specific bill or amendment.  The stated purpose of 
the first hearing was to determine if there was a problem, i.e., whether the ODA might be too 
inclusive.  The second and third hearings had a more specific focus on Senate bill 2060 and its 
proposition to revoke an orphan drug’s market exclusivity once its cumulative sales reached 
$200 million.  The fourth hearing also had a specific focus on a pending bill, H.R. 4160. 
 Each of the four hearings also had differing compositions of witnesses and testimony.  
As seen in Table 5, the majority (7 out of 11) of witnesses at the first hearing were affiliated with 
the industry sector.  The 7 witnesses worked in six firms.  Representatives of industry advocacy 
groups, such as the Association for Biotechnology Companies, did not testify.  Four of the 7 
                                                 
13 Wiggans testified at the first and fourth hearing; McLaughlin testified at the second and third hearing; and, 
Dresing and Hodel testified at the second and third hearing. 
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industry witnesses were in favor of a change to the ODA, while both witnesses from the 
government sector, i.e. FDA, were against change.  One representative of a patient advocacy 
group was for change, while the other (Abbey Meyers) was against change. 
 The second hearing had a greater proportion of patient advocates (7 out of 11) and the 
testimony indicated more favorable views toward changing the ODA (8 witnesses were Pro and 
3 were Con). Nearly all (6 out of 7) patient advocates were in favor of changing the ODA.  Four 
of eleven witnesses were from industry, and none of the witnesses represented the government 
sector. 
 The third hearing offered a greater witness-perspective balance compared to the other 
three hearings.  There were 1, 5 and 6 representatives of government, industry and patients, 
respectively.  Moreover, 5 witnesses were against changing the ODA while 7 were Pro change. 
 Only four witnesses testified at the 1994 hearing.  One was from the government sector, 
2 represented patients and 1 represented industry.  Of the four witnesses, 2 were in favor of 
changing the ODA. One witness was in favor of some aspects of the proposed amendment and 
another witness didn’t voice his opinion either way.  The testimony of this latter witness (Brad 
Margis) seemed off topic.  Margis’s testimony was about promoting the need for more research 
to help patients with A-T disorders (ataxia telangiectasia), and not about his position on the 
proposed ODA amendment. 
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Table 4--Summary of 1990-1994 ODA Amendment Hearings 
 
Item Description 
 
 
Number of 
hearings from 
1990-1994 
 
4 
Number of people 
that testified 
38 total witness statements 
31 total witnesses 
Number of pages 
of hearing text 
881 total 
Dates of each 
hearing 
February 7, 1990 
January 21, 1992 
March 3, 1992 
June 16, 1994 
 
Description of 
Feb. 1990 Hearing 
Title: “Orphan Drug Act” 
House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on 
Health and the Environment, Henry A. Waxman presiding 
Stated Purpose of Meeting: ”When Congress adopted the act, it recognized that there 
was a possibility the act might be too inclusive, that is, it might give exclusivity to drugs 
that would have been developed without the incentives of the law.  The result is an 
unnecessary monopoly and higher prices to consumers.  The purpose of this hearing is to 
gather information to determine whether this has happened.  We also will hear testimony 
on whether Congress should reauthorize the grants program for next year.  In particular, 
we will hear testimony about three drugs: Human growth hormone, aerosol pentamidine, 
and EPO.” 
 
Description of Jan 
1992 Hearing 
Title: “Anticompetitive Abuses of the Orphan Drug Act: Invitation to High Prices, U.S. 
Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights, Committee on the 
Judiciary, Howard Metzenbaum presiding.  Stated Purpose of Meeting: “We are here 
because the orphan drug law, which was passed to encourage one company to develop a 
rare treatment that will result in only small sales and modest profits, is being used as a 
legal loophole to block competitors from a lucrative market for a drug of tremendous 
commercial value.” 
 
Description of Mar 
1992 Hearing 
Title: “Orphan Drug Amendments of 1991” 
U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Sen. Howard Metzenbaum 
presiding.  Stated Purpose of Meeting: “Today the committee will hear testimony on the 
Orphan Drug Amendments of 1991 . . . amendment addresses issue that “Tragically, the 
act has also allowed a handful of profiteers to use their seven-year monopoly as a shield 
to block competition and charge absurdly high prices for blockbuster orphan drugs.” 
 
Description of 
June 1994 
Hearing 
Title: “Orphan Drug Reauthorization” 
House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on 
Health and the Environment, Henry Waxman presiding.  Stated Purpose of Meeting: “hear 
testimony on H.R. 4160. . . we will begin what we hope will be the final chapter in the 7-
year controversy over amendments to the Orphan Drug Act. . . . by allowing highly 
profitable drugs to have the full 7 years of market exclusivity, the law has unwittingly 
allowed drug manufacturers to charge unreasonably high prices without the constraints of 
price competition.” 
 
Valence of 
testimony, e.g., 
Pro = in favor of 
changing the ODA 
Pro: 22 
Con: 14 
Both: 1 
Neither:1 
 
Affiliation of 
witness 
Government: 4 
Industry: 17 
Patients: 17 
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Table 5--Summary Data on Witnesses and Their Testimony 
 
Last Name First Name Organization Other Org Info Affiliation Date Valence 
Benson James FDA Acting commissioner Government Feb 90 Con 
Bernard Edward Fisons Partner Research associate Industry Feb 90 Pro 
Foulds Richard Fisons Corp Medical affairs VP Industry Feb 90 Pro 
Haffner Marlene FDA Orphan products Government Feb 90 Con 
McGuire Jean AIDS Action Exec Director Patients Feb 90 Pro 
McLaughlin John Genentech Inc General counsel Industry Feb 90 Con 
Meyers Abbey NORD Exec Director Patients Feb 90 Con 
Rathman George Amgen Inc Chairman of board Industry Feb 90 Con 
Schmergel Gabriel Genetics Inst. CEO Industry Feb 90 Pro 
Tambi Brian Lyphomed Inc SVP Industry Feb 90 Con 
Wiggans Thomas Serono Labs President Industry Feb 90 Pro 
Hire Pam None (Personal situation) Patients Jan 92 Pro 
Smith Cindy None (Personal situation) Patients Jan 92 Pro 
Nathan Mary None (Personal situation) Patients Jan 92 Pro 
Hodel Derek PWA Group People w/ AIDS Patients Jan 92 Pro 
Jacobson Herb None (Personal situation) Patients Jan 92 Pro 
Dresing Robert Cystic Fibrosis President, CEO Patients Jan 92 Con 
Meyers Abbey NORD Exec Director Patients Jan 92 Pro 
McLaughlin John Genentech Inc General counsel Industry Jan 92 Con 
Termeer Henri Genzyme Chair, CEO Industry Jan 92 Con 
Castello John Ares-Serono American 
headquarters 
Industry Jan 92 Pro 
Simpson Bruce Fisons Corp Exec Vice President Industry Jan 92 Pro 
Kessler David FDA Commissioner Government Mar 92 Con 
Gasparini Dixie None (Personal situation) Patients Mar 92 Pro 
Meyers Abbey NORD Exec Director Patients Mar 92 Pro 
Hayes Catherine HD Society of 
America 
President, 
Huntington's disease 
Patients Mar 92 Pro 
Hodel Derek PWA Group People w/ AIDS Patients Mar 92 Pro 
Dresing Robert Cystic Fibrosis 
Foundation 
President, CEO Patients Mar 92 Con 
Stinson Phil None (Personal situation) Patients Mar 92 Con 
Penner Harry Novo Niordisk President Industry Mar 92 Pro 
Anthony Forest ABC President Industry Mar 92 Pro 
Sayare Mitchel ABC CEO, Director 
ImmunoGen 
Industry Mar 92 Pro 
Duzan Steve IBA Chair IBA, Chair/CEO 
Immunex 
Industry Mar 92 Con 
Mossinghoff Gerald PMA Chair PMA Industry Mar 92 Con 
Corr William Dept of HHS Pub Health Service Government Jun 94 Both 
Meyers Abbey NORD Exec Director Patients Jun 94 Pro 
Wiggans Thomas BIO President Industry Jun 94 Pro 
Margis Brad A-T Children's 
Project 
President Patients Jun 94 Neither 
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Table 6--Comparing and Contrasting the Four Congressional Hearings 
 
Date of Hearing Feb 1990 Jan 1992 Mar 1992 June 1994 
 
Valence of 
Testimony 
 
6 Con 
5 Pro 
 
3 Con 
8 Pro 
 
5 Con 
7 Pro 
 
0 Con 
2 Pro 
1 Both 
1 Neither 
 
Composition of 
Witnesses 
2 Government 
7 Industry 
2 Patients 
0 Government 
4 Industry 
7 Patients 
1 Government 
5 Industry 
6 Patients 
1 Government 
1 Industry 
2 Patients 
 
 
Cross tabulation of Table 6 data: 
                          Stakeholder Group 
 Government Industry Patients 
Valence by Date: 
Feb 1990: Pro 
 
0 
 
4 
 
1 
Con   2 3 1 
 
Jan 1992: Pro 
 
0 
 
2 
 
6 
Con 0 2 1 
 
Mar 1992: Pro 
 
0 
 
3 
 
4 
Con 1 2 2 
 
June 1994: Pro 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
Con 0 0 0 
Both 1 0 0 
Neither 0 0 1 
  
 
Chapter 6—Factors Affecting ODA Reform from 1990-1994 
 This chapter will focus on the ODA amendments that were proposed during 1990-1994 
and factors that may have promoted or impeded their passage. 
 As mentioned previously, in July 1990, Representative Henry Waxman submitted a bill 
(H.R. 4638) that would amend the ODA, address the problem of “unnecessary monopolies” and 
allow “shared exclusivity” in situations where multiple sponsors were developing similar orphan 
drugs. The bill also proposed to revoke market exclusivity if the candidate population for the 
drug became greater than 200,000.  This addressed a sub-issue that the AIDS population had 
grown beyond 200,000 and that AIDS drugs should no longer receive orphan designation.  In 
October 1990, the bill received the unanimous vote of Congress.  But in November 1990, 
President George H. W. Bush pocket vetoed the bill. 
 Waxman convened a hearing in 1990 to determine if the ODA was too inclusive, and if 
so, what should be done about it.  Spokesmen from three companies testified that they wanted a 
change in the ODA to enable them to gain FDA approval to market their rare disease 
treatments. Competitors had been granted ODA market exclusivity, and the companies argued 
that the ODA should not apply to the drug markets that they were targeting because these were 
lucrative markets that did not need government incentives and government-granted monopolies.  
Moreover, some of these companies had been doing the studies necessary for FDA approval 
before the ODA was enacted.  Enactment of the ODA had changed “the rules in the middle of 
the game.” As a result, several companies claimed that their drug development investments 
would now be wasted and their expected returns, in the form of product revenue, would now 
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vanish because they were blocked from the market.  Arguments were made that the ODA was 
intended to support development of drugs with low commercial potential and that the ODA was 
never intended to support lucrative drug markets.  Moreover, critics argued that market 
exclusivity was resulting in higher prices to patients and payers, and this situation was not 
warranted in highly lucrative drug markets, and several companies were ready to compete to 
bring prices down. 
 Based on informant interviews and published accounts of the February 1990 hearing and 
H.R. 4638 (ODA Amendments of 1990), factors that may have impeded or favored passage of 
the proposed 1990 amendment are listed in Table 7.  Factors that seem to favor the amendment 
included: 1) pro-reform industry spokesmen created a bridge to show how the problem that 
faced their companies was also a public or social problem, i.e., the monopoly blocked them from 
competing, which then caused the public to pay higher orphan drug prices; 2) the problem of 
being blocked from competing affected a powerful minority (companies that had considerable 
resources to rally for reform); and, 3) companies negatively affected by this situation were 
acutely aware of it and its consequences. 
 Informants and published sources asserted that the 1990 amendment did not gain the 
support of President Bush because the policy solution was not workable.  Reasons for this 
included: 1) the policy violated the takings clause of the constitution, i.e., the proposed change in 
the law took away a property right (market exclusivity) without compensation; and, 2) the change 
in the law would be difficult to administer.  The amendment “creates additional exceptions from 
the protection of exclusive approval, certification, or license for drugs for rare diseases for . . . 
drugs which were developed simultaneously.” FDA was responsible for determining how this 
would be carried out, and questioned how this could be done. 3) Shared exclusivity appeared to 
be a contradiction in terms, an oxymoron; and, 4) that the amendment carried the risk of making 
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the ODA less effective because it “diluted the benefits of the law.”  Anti-reformers most often 
used the fourth point in their 1990 Congressional testimony.  The fourth point relates to the 
ODA Reform as Economics and Access Frame, which is described in Chapter 7. 
 Popular stakeholders, including patient advocates and FDA, were also against a change 
in the ODA’s market exclusivity provision.  One informant asserted that if NORD had been 
behind this change in the law it would have had a good chance of passing.  NORD opposed the 
change in the 1990 Congressional hearing.  NORD seems to be regarded as a popular voice in 
ODA affairs and they are very organized, so lack of support from NORD may have been an 
important factor. 
 Informants and published reports did not mention shortcomings in the problem stream 
as significant to the failure of the 1990 amendment.  However, in the view of this researcher, as 
many as 9 factors in the problem stream may have detracted support.  (The “problem” that is 
being referred to here is that selected companies were blocked from FDA approval and market 
returns.)  1) The problem was often defined as a private problem.  Pro-reform companies 
claimed that the law took them by surprise, was not fair, and caused them financial harm.  This 
is a quasi-private problem because the law affected individual company’s interests, and some 
companies benefited while others did not.  2) The problem might get better without a policy 
change.  The enactment of the ODA was a one-time event.14  Companies caught at a 
disadvantage did not anticipate the ODA and had already invested substantial resources in R and 
D.  They were unable to recoup this investment because a competitor was first to gain FDA 
approval and ODA market exclusivity.  3) The problem suggests a solution that is intractable.  
The problem seemed ill-defined, difficult to measure or recognize, or at odds with the 
fundamentals of the ODA.  A solution that addresses a moving target and lacks some kind of 
                                                 
14 The 1984 and 1985 amendments also had an important effect on Pro-reform companies.  It may be more 
accurate to look at the 1983 enactment and the subsequent 2 amendments collectively as a one-time event. 
 88 
link to a problem would be difficult to design.  For example, in the 1990 Congressional hearing 
Waxman defined the problem as providing “exclusivity to drugs that would have been 
developed without the incentives of the law.  The result is an unnecessary monopoly and higher 
prices to consumers.”  How would a government official determine what made a sponsor decide 
to investigate a new drug?  Information about the degree to which ODA incentives affected a 
company’s decision to develop an orphan drug is not available to government officials. 4) The 
cause or blame is attributable to a source that is liked or favored.  The ODA was considered a 
successful law, a good law.  The ODA enabled a “handful of drugs” to become “excessively 
profitable” (note, excessive was never defined), but the law otherwise was “working well.”  
Other factors that could have dampened support for the amendment, or at least did not favor 
passage of it, included: 5) the problem was unintended.  In the 1990 hearing, anti-reform 
witnesses contended that a) no law is perfect, b) laws always create unintended effects, c) if the 
intended effects of the law are sound and if unintended effects are infrequent or have little 
impact on the law’s total effects then an amendment to address these unintended effects is not 
warranted—particularly if the costs or risks of amendment outweigh the benefits of correcting 
these unintended effects.  Pro-reformers did not argue with these contentions to any significant 
degree. 6) The problem wasn’t created in secrecy or from a hidden agenda.  Problems that were 
created covertly and with ill intentions seem to better capture attention and incite action.  In the 
case of the ODA, companies followed the rules of the law as it was written.  Orphan drugs that 
were first in gaining FDA clearance benefited from the law.  Competitors that did not get there 
first were at a disadvantage.  There was nothing secretive or illegal about this. 7) That the ODA 
offered a competitive advantage to some companies and a disadvantage to others wasn’t the 
kind of story that would be exciting enough to, for example, attract media attention; 8) the 
problems were seen as infrequent, i.e., the ODA was working well most of the time; and, 9) that 
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problem companies were those that were “abusing the law” and were “excessively profitable.”  
The accusation that companies were abusing the law was disputed because companies were 
following the law.  Designing an amendment that curtailed excessive profitability seemed 
problematic because this term begged for a definition.  No definition of what was acceptably 
profitable and excessively profitable was offered by reformers, and if a definition were offered, it 
would probably be disputed.  In the 1990s, the US healthcare system did not have explicit 
standards or upper limits that could be used to differentiate an excessively profitable medical 
product from one that was acceptably profitable.  Moreover, in the 1990 Congressional hearing, 
there was no agreement about how to measure the profits of a single drug.  The text of the 
ODA (see Page 1) suggests that an unprofitable orphan drug is one that would “generate 
relatively small sales in comparison to the cost of developing the drug and consequently (a 
pharmaceutical company would expect) to incur a financial loss.”  In the 1990 hearing, 
disagreements over the “cost of developing the drug” included a) that there are many other costs 
in bringing an orphan drug to market besides drug development costs, e.g., administrative costs 
and manufacturing costs; and b) disputes about whether the cost of drug development should 
include the “dry holes” or not.  For every drug that reaches the market, there may be hundreds 
or thousands that did not succeed in doing so.  Some contended that drug development costs 
had to include the costs of the unsuccessful drugs (dry holes) as well as the successful drugs. In 
other words, the costs of the dry holes had to be factored or amortized into the costs of the 
successful drugs.  This point was disputed.  Remarks included, “the ODA is designed to 
subsidize orphan drugs, not to subsidize the pharmaceutical industry.”  Or, “the drugs that never 
made it to the market have no bearing on the costs of those that did.” 
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Table 7--Factors Favoring or Impeding Passage of 1990 ODA Amendment 
Factors Proposed a priori from Policy and Framing Literature and Color-Coded Based on Research Findings 
 
Dimension Factors Favoring 
Passage of Legislation 
Factors Impeding 
Passage of Legislation 
 
Problem 
Definition 
 
 
-Defined as a social problem 
-Problem is getting worse 
-Suggests a solution that is tractable 
-Cause or blame is attributable to a 
source that is disliked 
-Problem was caused intentionally 
-Problem was caused secretly 
-Suggests problem has exciting 
qualities or is urgent 
-Problem affects a powerful 
minority or it affects the majority of 
people 
-Affected people are aware of 
problem 
-Defined so individuals can see they 
are or might become the next victim 
-Defined ambiguously to appeal to 
more people and leave wiggle room 
-Problem fixers gain resources, 
power, status 
 
 
-Defined as a private problem 
-Problem is getting better w/o policy 
-Suggests a solution that is intractable 
-Cause or blame is attributable to a 
source that is liked or favored 
-Problem was unintended/accidental 
-Problem was not created in secrecy 
-Suggests problem is not exciting or 
no longer seen as exciting; not urgent 
-Problem affects silent minority 
-Affected people are not aware of 
problem 
-Suggests a remote chance of 
becoming a victim in the foreseeable 
future 
-Defined explicitly and precisely, 
narrowing appeal and revealing 
specifics that can be disagreed upon 
-No one gains from fixing problem (or 
costs exceed benefits) 
Policy Promotion 
 
-Government action is only way to 
solve problem 
-Solution has obvious relative 
advantage to current situation or 
alternative solutions 
-Benefits of solution accrue to 
important interests 
-Policy is not seen as complex 
-Easy to communicate features 
-Policy sponsors are popular 
-Policy opponents are unpopular 
 
-Government action is one possible way 
to solve problem 
- Solution has no obvious relative 
advantage to current situation or 
alternative solutions 
-Benefits of solution accrue to 
unimportant interests 
-Policy is complex, risks are 
unknowable 
-Not easy to communicate features 
-Policy sponsors are unpopular 
-Policy opponents are popular 
Political Milieu -No major competing political issues 
-New political forces (e.g., new 
president) w/ compatible interests 
-Organized interest support or lack of 
opposition 
 
-Competing issues command attention, 
pushing issue/solution off agenda 
-No major changes in political stream that 
would favor legislation 
-Strong, organized interests opposed 
Events -Focusing event galvanizes support -Focusing event detracts from problem 
and/or solution 
 
Climate/mood -Economic, political, social, 
technological currents favor problem 
definition or solution 
 
--Economic, political, social, 
technological currents do not favor 
problem definition or solution 
Policy 
Entrepreneur 
-Persistent, credible, resourceful -No policy entrepreneur 
 
Color Code Legend: 
Red = Highly Probable Factor (meaning, this factor was mentioned in interviews or documents, and 
there was little or no evidence to refute its importance) 
Green = Somewhat Probable Factor (meaning, this factor was mentioned in interviews or documents, 
but the evidence that would support its importance was weak or mixed)  
 
 91 
 In 1991, Senators Kassebaum and Metzenbaum introduced S. 2060, a bill that would 
amend the ODA to establish a “$200 million sales trigger.”  “If cumulative net sales of an 
orphan drug exceed $200 million, marketing exclusivity will be withdrawn from the sponsor.”  
Testimony on the bill was heard in two 1992 Senate hearings.  Senators Kassebaum and 
Metzenbaum created the bill to preserve the original intent of the ODA to spur rare disease 
drugs that had little commercial potential and to curtail use of the law to “shield extremely 
profitable drugs from competition.” 
 The bill had several factors in the problem stream (See Table 8) that seemed to favor its 
passage, including an increase in the number of orphan drugs that were generating substantial 
sales or being priced at a point that patients and Congress were reacting negatively and with 
greater alarm.  While NORD had not supported the 1990 amendment, the 1991 bill had the 
support of NORD, which was important.  One informant said the reason for the change in 
attitude was because NORD and others were shocked at the price of Ceredase15, a drug for 
Gaucher’s disease that was made by Genzyme Corporation.  NORD reportedly was concerned 
that, if they did not push back on industry in some way, more orphan drugs would become 
available at prices similar to that of Ceredase (averaging $200,000 per patient per year, but as 
high as $1 million per patient per year).  Also, instead of emphasizing that the ODA had put 
selected companies at a disadvantage, as in the 1990 amendment, the emphasis of the 1991 
amendment was on vilifying selected companies and emphasizing how their pricing practices 
were hurting patients and payers.  Companies were accused of exploiting patients that were in 
desperate need of these therapies, suggesting that problem of high prices was being created 
knowingly and intentionally by companies.  A story of powerful villains and weak victims is one 
                                                 
15 Ceredase was launched by Genzyme Corporation in 1991.  Cerezyme was launched by Genzyme in 1994 to 
largely replace Ceredase.  The former was extracted from human placentas; the latter was derived by methods of 
biotechnology.  If Ceredase or Cerezyme are mentioned in this dissertation, assume that one or the other is being 
referenced, and that collectively these 2 drugs refer to Genzyme’s orphan drug for Gaucher’s disease. 
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that has exciting qualities to it, i.e., it is one that could gain the attention of legislators and attract 
media coverage.  Rare disease patients were acutely aware of the problem of paying for 
expensive orphan drugs.  Witness testimony included chilling tales of the financial burden of 
expensive orphan drugs.  Though a small number of patients are affected by rare diseases, 
patients suggested that high orphan drug prices were just the tip of the iceberg and that if 
something wasn’t done to push back on industry pricing practices that this problem would 
expand beyond orphan drugs. 
 Factors that may have impeded the 1991 bill’s passage were similar to that of the 1990 
bill, e.g., the ODA was popular, and proposed changes were seen as risky.  Also, opponents of 
the 1991 bill asserted that government action was just one possible way to address the problem 
and there were alternative, and possibly more effective, ways to address the problem of patient 
access to high-priced drugs.  For example, industry-sponsored medication assistance programs 
(MAPs) were advanced as a viable solution.  To garner support for this solution, a dozen 
companies wrote letters affirming that they had a MAP, and that patients that could not afford 
their drugs would qualify for the MAP.  Some companies provided written assurance that no 
patient would be denied access to one of their marketed drugs for financial reasons. 
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Table 8--Factors Favoring or Impeding Passage of 1991 ODA Amendment 
Factors Proposed a priori from Policy and Framing Literature and are Color-Coded Based on Research Findings 
 
Construct Factors Favoring 
Passage of Legislation 
Factors Impeding 
Passage of Legislation 
 
Problem 
Definition 
 
 
-Defined as a social problem 
-Problem is getting worse 
-Suggests a solution that is tractable 
-Cause or blame is attributable to a 
source (industry) that is disliked 
-Problem was caused intentionally 
-Problem was caused secretly 
-Suggests problem has exciting 
qualities or is urgent 
-Problem affects a powerful minority or 
it affects the majority of people 
-Affected people are aware of 
problem 
-Defined so individuals can see they 
are or might become the next victim 
-Defined ambiguously to appeal to 
more people and leave wiggle room 
-Problem fixers gain resources, power, 
status 
 
 
-Defined as a private problem 
-Problem is getting better w/o policy 
-Suggests a solution that is intractable 
-Cause or blame is attributable to a 
source (ODA) that is liked or favored 
-Problem was unintended/accidental 
-Problem was not created in secrecy 
-Suggests problem is not exciting or no 
longer seen as exciting; not urgent 
-Problem affects silent minority 
-Affected people are not aware of 
problem 
-Suggests a remote chance of becoming 
a victim in the foreseeable future 
-Defined explicitly and precisely, 
narrowing appeal and revealing specifics 
that can be disagreed upon 
-No one gains from fixing problem (or 
costs exceed benefits) 
Policy Promotion 
 
-Government action is only way to 
solve problem 
-Solution has obvious relative 
advantage to current situation or 
alternative solutions 
-Benefits of solution accrue to 
important interests 
-Policy is not seen as complex 
-Easy to communicate features 
-Policy sponsors are popular 
-Policy opponents are unpopular 
 
-Government action is one possible 
way to solve problem 
- Solution has no obvious relative 
advantage to current situation or 
alternative solutions 
-Benefits of solution accrue to 
unimportant interests 
-Policy is complex, risks are 
unknowable 
-Not easy to communicate features 
-Policy sponsors are unpopular 
-Policy opponents are popular 
Political Milieu -No major competing political issues 
-New political forces (e.g., new 
president) w/ compatible interests 
-Organized interest support (NORD) 
or lack of opposition 
 
-Competing issues command attention, 
pushing issue/solution off agenda 
-No major changes in political stream that 
would favor legislation 
-Strong, organized interests opposed 
Events -Focusing event galvanizes support -Focusing event detracts from problem 
and/or solution 
 
Climate/mood -Economic, political, social, 
technological currents favor problem 
definition or solution 
 
--Economic, political, social, 
technological currents do not favor 
problem definition or solution 
Policy 
Entrepreneur 
-Persistent, credible, resourceful -No policy entrepreneur 
Color Code Legend: 
Red = Highly Probable Factor (meaning, this factor was mentioned in interviews or documents, and 
there was little or no evidence to refute its importance) 
Green = Somewhat Probable Factor (meaning, this factor was mentioned in interviews or documents, 
but the evidence that would support its importance was weak or mixed)  
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 In 1994, Representative Waxman introduced H.R. 4160 and Senator Kassebaum 
introduced S. 1981, similar bills that would have lowered the term of ODA market exclusivity 
from seven to four years, but permitted products with demonstrated “limited commercial 
potential” to continue to qualify for an additional three years.  This proposal seemed to have 
many impeding factors, as seen in Table 9.  Notably, the proposal required that the Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) define “limited commercial potential” within six 
months of the bill’s enactment.  The FDA would have input on this issue and oversee its 
implementation, a responsibility for which the FDA was reportedly ill-equipped and reluctant to 
carry out.  One informant thought that the requirement to define “limited commercial potential” 
within six months was the most significant impeding factor.  In years of debates, Congress had 
not agreed on a definition for LCP, so it seemed an impossible task for DHHS to do it in six 
months. 
 Impeding factors that seemed common to the 1990, 1991 and 1994 bills were that the 
problem was due to a flaw in the ODA, assailing a law that was otherwise perceived as very 
good and very popular; and, that the proposed solution was perceived as risky, i.e., that 
proposals would reduce sponsor interest in orphan drugs, which would mean fewer orphan 
drugs would ultimately become available to patients. 
 Unique to the 1994 bill was the fact that another bill was competing for congressional 
attention, and, offered the possibility of making ODA grievances irrelevant.  The Clinton Health 
Security Act had been debated in Congress for months and some members of Congress shared 
Representative Bliley sentiment, “why are (we) spending these critical days in June holding 
hearings?  This is the time when we should be in mark-up considering the most important issue 
of this session—health care reform!” 
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Table 9--Factors Favoring or Impeding Passage of 1994 ODA Amendment 
 Factors Proposed a priori from Policy and Framing Literature and are Color-Coded Based on Research 
 
Construct Factors Favoring 
Passage of Legislation 
Factors Impeding 
Passage of Legislation 
 
Problem 
Definition 
 
 
-Defined as a social problem 
-Problem is getting worse 
-Suggests a solution that is tractable 
-Cause or blame is attributable to a 
source that is disliked 
-Problem was caused intentionally 
-Problem was caused secretly 
-Suggests problem has exciting 
qualities or is urgent 
-Problem affects a powerful minority or 
it affects the majority of people 
-Affected people are aware of 
problem 
-Defined so individuals can see they 
are or might become the next victim 
-Defined ambiguously to appeal to 
more people and leave wiggle room 
-Problem fixers gain resources, power, 
status 
 
 
-Defined as a private problem 
-Problem is getting better w/o policy 
-Suggests a solution that is intractable 
-Cause or blame is attributable to a 
source that is liked or favored 
-Problem was unintended/accidental 
-Problem was not created in secrecy 
-Suggests problem is not exciting or no 
longer seen as exciting; not urgent 
-Problem affects silent minority 
-Affected people are not aware of 
problem 
-Suggests a remote chance of becoming 
a victim in the foreseeable future 
-Defined explicitly and precisely, 
narrowing appeal and revealing specifics 
that can be disagreed upon 
-No one gains from fixing problem (or 
costs exceed benefits) 
Policy Promotion 
 
-Government action is only way to 
solve problem 
-Solution has obvious relative 
advantage to current situation or 
alternative solutions 
-Benefits of solution accrue to 
important interests 
-Policy is not seen as complex 
-Easy to communicate features 
-Policy sponsors are popular 
-Policy opponents are unpopular 
 
-Government action is one possible 
way to solve problem 
- Solution has no obvious relative 
advantage to current situation or 
alternative solutions 
-Benefits of solution accrue to 
unimportant interests 
-Policy is complex, risks are 
unknowable 
-Not easy to communicate features 
-Policy sponsors are unpopular 
-Policy opponents are popular 
Political Milieu -No major competing political issues 
-New political forces (e.g., new 
president) w/ compatible interests 
-Organized interest support or lack 
of opposition 
 
-Competing issues command 
attention, pushing issue/solution off 
agenda 
-No major changes in political stream that 
would favor legislation 
-Strong, organized interests opposed 
Events -Focusing event galvanizes support -Focusing event detracts from problem 
and/or solution 
 
Climate/mood -Economic, political, social, 
technological currents favor problem 
definition or solution 
 
--Economic, political, social, 
technological currents do not favor 
problem definition or solution 
Policy 
Entrepreneur 
-Persistent, credible, resourceful -No policy entrepreneur 
Color Code Legend: 
Red = Highly Probable Factor (meaning, this factor was mentioned in interviews or documents, and 
there was little or no evidence to refute its importance) 
Green = Somewhat Probable Factor (meaning, this factor was mentioned in interviews or documents, 
but the evidence that would support its importance was weak or mixed)  
  
 
 
Chapter 7—Issue Frames Used in ODA Reform Hearings 1990-1994 
 The method for constructing frames was described in Chapter 4.  Briefly, frames were 
constructed by repeated readings of the Congressional testimony and by looking at patterns in 
selected data that were extracted, coded, and placed into a table using Excel.  Summarized data 
can be found in Appendix C. 
 Four frames were constructed and named: 1) ODA Reform as Economics and Access, 
2) ODA Reform as Patient Relief, 3) ODA Reform as Rules of Participation, and, 4) ODA 
Reform as Congressional Action.  Each frame has distinctive elements, but some overlap is 
expected since each describes aspects of the same situation or phenomena. 
 ODA Reform as Economics and Access to Frame 
 The ODA Reform as Economics and Access (to orphan drugs) Frame (Economics and 
Access Frame) emphasizes the importance of output of the ODA and its potential reforms.  
Witnesses using this frame emphasized that proposed amendments must be judged based on 
how a change might effect the number of new orphan drugs that would be researched, 
developed, produced and marketed in the future (“output”).  This frame was frequently used by 
witnesses that were anti-reform.  They argued that a change in the ODA might negatively affect 
the effectiveness of the law in spurring new orphan drug development.  Assumptions underlying 
this argument were that 1) the ODA is a set of economic incentives to encourage industry to 
develop new orphan drugs; 2) that better economic incentives should lead to more orphan drug 
research activity and, consequently, more orphan drugs, and, 3) that patients with rare diseases 
 97 
and conditions were in need of new orphan drugs, hence, more orphan drugs meant greater 
patient access and the potential for health improvements. 
 Many witnesses began their testimony by using this frame.  They would first point to the 
success of the ODA in producing new orphan drugs.  They did this by citing two numbers: the 
number of drugs that been designated as orphans by the FDA and the number of designated 
orphan drugs that had received FDA approval since the law was enacted in 1983.  These 
numbers were compared to the dearth of orphan drugs that were approved in the decade prior 
to 1983.  Opponents of reform would argue that the law has been a success and that either 1) 
change was not needed because it was a success, or, 2) they were against reform because change 
could negatively affect the law’s effectiveness in the future.  In other words, this frame 
emphasizes the consequences of any action that might, as witnesses said, “undermine the ODA’s 
incentives,” or “dilute the benefits of the law.” 
 To gain support for their views, opponents of reform emphasized the tangible successes 
of the ODA in increasing access to orphan drugs, and the fear and uncertainty inherent to 
proposed ODA reforms.  Some opponents referred to a recent drop in the number of 
applications for orphan drug designations as evidence that industry had already reacted 
negatively to the idea of ODA reform.  In 1991, the number of applications had dropped 
significantly, so it was suggested that just the possibility of ODA reform was causing industry 
uncertainty about the future of the law.  This uncertainty had led to a drop in industry’s orphan 
drug development activities. 
 Proponents of ODA reform contended that the ODA needed to change because the 
future of the entire ODA policy was being endangered by a few companies, i.e., that if Congress 
didn’t act to institute change now, public support for the law could dwindle to a point where the 
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law would be repealed.  Proponents also argued that aspects of the ODA were decreasing access 
to orphan drugs rather than increasing access as intended. 
 ODA Reform as Patient Relief Frame 
 Where the Economics and Access Frame relied on enumeration (of orphan drugs), the 
Patient Relief Frame relied on anecdote and emotional appeal.  The Patient Relief Frame 
suggests that an amendment’s merits should be judged based on whether it acknowledges and 
addresses the hardships that rare disease patients endure. In the two 1992 hearings, thirteen 
patient advocates testified. Many of them recounted the hardships of having a rare disease and 
how an orphan drug had helped control the disease.  Proponents of ODA reform then 
described the burden of financing the needed orphan drug.  Proponents argued that the ODA 
market exclusivity provision allowed companies to charge unreasonable prices because there was, 
by definition, an absence of competition.  Patient advocates claimed that granting market 
exclusivity so that companies could command high prices and generate substantial sales was not 
consistent with the intent of the ODA.  Patient advocates used metaphors to depict targeted 
companies as evil, exploitive, and less than human.  The emphasis of the frame was on the 
alleged victims and villains, and the need for “something to be done.”  Reform proponents 
argued that ODA reform would result in lower orphan drug prices and reduced financial burden.  
The testimony suggested that the act of reform is perhaps more important than the substance or 
consequences of the reform.  If this is the case, ODA reform would symbolize the importance 
of patient relief and social justice, thereby signaling to industry that patient welfare is more 
important than corporate welfare. 
 Opponents of ODA reform responded to patient appeals by arguing that, yes, something 
should be done to help relieve the financial burden of orphan drugs.  But opponents argued that 
ODA reform was not the right solution for the problem.  Opponents proposed other solutions, 
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including: 1) patient assistance programs that provide free orphan drugs to the financially needy; 
2) health insurance reform; or, 3) national health reform.  Opponents further argued that 
changing the ODA could result in a reduction in orphan drugs, and that having expensive drugs 
was better than not having drugs at all. 
 ODA Reform as Rules of Participation Frame 
 The ODA Reform as Rules of Participation Frame (Rules of Participation Frame) 
emphasizes the importance of how “the game is played” and not necessarily the game itself.  
This frame centers on social etiquette and fairness, and emphasizes the do’s and don’ts of 
participating in the social process of developing, producing and marketing orphan drugs.  This 
frame is based on the idea that the right set of rules can be developed to effectively dictate fair 
and correct participation in the orphan drug process.  The challenge of this frame is on defining 
what is “right” and “fair.”  
 Users of the Rules of Participation Frame tended to be witnesses that spoke on behalf of 
individual companies.  Proponents of ODA reform claimed that the rules of the ODA needed 
to change so that one company didn’t become the “winner that takes all.”  The market 
exclusivity provision of the ODA had created a situation where multiple companies had pursued 
development of an orphan drug, e.g., human growth hormone, and the first company to get 
FDA approval “won” the entire market.  For companies that had to wait 7 years to market their 
version of the drug, they felt this situation was unfair because waiting 7 years meant effectively 
losing their entire investment in the drug.  This winner-takes-all situation was also unfair for 
patients, these companies argued, because the “winning” company was able to charge monopoly 
prices, and the situation denied patients the ability to choose among different company brands.  
Proponents argued that an orphan drug category that attracts multiple companies is likely a high 
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commercial potential market.  Hence, proponents further argued, such orphan drug categories 
didn’t need the help of the ODA, so the ODA should not apply to them. 
 To gain adherents, ODA reform proponents morally condemned companies that were 
first to gain market exclusivity, i.e., proponents contended that these companies were using the 
incentives to block competition and were “blatantly subverting the intent of the law.”  
Opponents of reform claimed that they had done nothing wrong, that they legally and rightfully 
obtained market exclusivity, and that they should not be punished for effectively and efficiently 
gaining FDA approval.  Reform opponents (companies) depicted their critics as “sore losers,” 
and emphasized that everyone knew the “rules,” and, that the rules shouldn’t be changed in the 
“middle of the game.” 
 ODA Reform as Congressional Action Frame 
 The ODA Reform as Congressional Action Frame (Congressional Action Frame) 
focuses on whether government involvement is appropriate or not.  In the context of the 
proposed ODA reforms from 1990-1994, appropriate government involvement mainly refers to 
attempts by legislators to use ODA amendments as a way to contain industry prices and profits.  
Based on documents, Congressional testimony and informant interviews, anti-reformers asserted 
that the 1990s ODA amendments were a thinly veiled attempt by Congress to exert increased 
government control over pharmaceutical industry pricing practices.  Whether government 
involvement is appropriate or not also refers to opinion about legislators’ (e.g., Rep. Waxman 
and Sen. Metzenbaum) efforts to amend the ODA in the 1990s, and whether these efforts were 
welcomed or not. For example, anti-reformers contended that the ODA was a good law that 
was working and that amendments would make it less effective.   
 The challenge of the Congressional Action frame is in defining “appropriate.”  This 
frame invokes long-held American cultural themes of the role of government vs. the role of 
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markets in creating goods and services for unmet needs.  When and how government should act 
in the interest of the public is central to progressive vs. conservative tenets, as well as a number 
of other political and economic philosophies. 
 Proponents of ODA reform argued that Congressional action was needed to help 
patients or companies because the market had failed to provide the right orphan drugs at the 
right price.  When advocating for Congressional intervention, reform proponents depicted 
Congress in a positive light, e.g., as a hero and saint. 
 Opponents of ODA reform thought that Congress should not act on the controversies 
that prompted amendment proposals because 1) this was not Congress’s responsibility (e.g., 
controlling drug prices was not Sen. Metzenbaum’s responsibility); 2) they felt Congress had 
better things to do, i.e., this should not be a priority because the law was working well; 3) 
Congress did not have the knowledge or expertise to intervene in the situation (e.g., Rep. 
Waxman was accused of trying to manipulate market forces to control prices, a job he was not 
trained to do); and/or 4) this was duplicating the work of other Congressional committees or 
other sectors of government (e.g., containing health costs was being addressed by Clinton when 
the 1994 ODA amendment was proposed).  To denigrate the actions of Congress, reform 
opponents described them as “tinkering” or “meddling.”  This invoked the idea that these 
actions were frivolous, intrusive or ill-informed.  Moreover, a couple of opponents suggested 
that Congressional actions could become a slippery slope, i.e., reforms in the ODA that 
effectively moderated orphan drug prices could set a precedence for government price controls 
in other drug markets or  industry sectors. 
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Table 10--Four Frames Constructed From Congressional Testimony 
 
 1. Economics and 
Access 
2. Patient Relief 3. Rules of 
Participation 
4. Congressional 
Action 
Basis for 
judging ODA 
amendment 
proposals 
By how it will impact the 
future number of orphan 
drugs that will be 
accessible to patients 
 
By how it will 
acknowledge and 
address patient 
hardship 
By how well it 
encourages 
appropriate 
participation in the 
orphan drug 
development process 
By whether 
governmental 
involvement is 
appropriate or not 
Pro/Con 
Assertions 
Amendment will 
increase/decrease the # 
of future orphan drugs 
Amendments will/won’t 
better recognize 
suffering & provide relief 
Amendments 
will/won’t encourage 
the right participation 
Congress 
should/shouldn’t 
intervene in situation 
Values Efficiency, Security Security, Equity Equity, Liberty Security, Liberty, Equity 
Underlying 
Assumptions 
ODA is a set of 
incentives.  Better 
incentives lead to more 
orphan drugs, which 
means more rare 
disease patients can be 
helped 
The legislative process 
is a way for citizens to 
raise awareness of 
perceived injustices, 
seek retribution, and 
better balance power 
ODA is a set of rules.  
The right rules will be 
fair and result in the 
right companies doing 
the right things to help 
patients with rare 
diseases 
Certain situations 
require Congressional 
involvement, others do 
not 
Challenges Relationship between 
incentives, new drugs 
and unintended effects 
Who should be helped 
and how? 
What is “right” and 
“fair” participation? 
Who and what is 
“appropriate” 
involvement? 
Amendment 
Proponents’ 
Claims 
--Reform will increase 
patient access to orphan 
drugs 
-- Reform will preserve 
patient access to orphan 
drugs 
Something must be 
done because . . . 
--Patients are suffering 
from rare diseases 
--Patients have been 
exploited or abandoned 
 
Rules should be 
changed so the law 
won’t: 
--Apply to HCP drugs 
--Help one company 
by hurting another 
--Take something 
away that rightfully 
belongs to a company 
--Allow companies to 
subvert the intent of 
the law 
We need Congress to 
help us because . . . 
--The market has failed 
to provide the right 
drugs at the right price 
 
Amendment 
Opponent 
Claims 
--We don’t know how 
reform will affect patient 
access to drugs, so we 
shouldn’t do it 
--Overall the ODA is 
working as intended, so 
leave it alone 
--Reform will decrease 
patient access 
--Something should be 
done to help patients in 
need, but reform could 
hurt them not help them 
 
--ODA isn’t perfect, 
but no law is 
--No law can control 
every possible 
behavior or outcome 
--Changing the law 
could create new, 
unforeseen problems 
--Congress should not 
take this action b/c: 
--This is not their 
responsibility 
--They have more 
important things to do 
--They lack knowledge 
or expertise in this area 
--They are duplicating 
the work of others 
Metaphors Hydrology: Flow of new 
orphan drugs; Geology: 
“undermine incentives” 
A physical struggle  
between good and evil, 
weak and strong 
A game with rules, 
fair play vs. cheating 
(“abusers”) 
Congress as: hero and 
savior; child “tinkering;” 
intruder “meddling” 
 
What Law 
Symbolizes 
Law as inducement Law as social justice Law as etiquette 
 
Law as paternalism 
Cultural 
Themes 
Ecology; Black box with 
inputs and outputs 
Dualism, conflict, civil 
rights 
Gamesmanship vs. 
sportsmanship 
Government vs. market 
controls, progressives 
vs. conservatives 
Stakeholder 
Roles 
Producers, consumers, 
suppliers (of incentives) 
Victims, villains, heroes Winners, losers, 
cheaters, rule 
makers, referees 
Legislators, regulators, 
capitalists, civilians 
Motivational 
Tactics Used 
Instill fear and 
uncertainty that action, 
or lack of action, could 
have negative 
consequences in the 
future 
Foster pity for patients 
and disdain for 
companies. Personalize 
the problem: have 
patient or parent tell 
story of individual plight.  
Depict “evil” companies 
as less than human (eg. 
“parasites”) 
Foster pity for the 
“cheated” and disdain 
for the “cheaters.”  To 
discourage reform, 
portray the “cheated” 
as “sore losers.”  
Instill doubt that 
action is needed; 
Instill fear. 
Discredit Congress, 
e.g., use “meddling & 
tinkering” to describe 
their actions.  Instill 
fear: depict their 
actions as a “slippery 
slope.”  Pro reform: 
Depict Congress as 
hero and savior 
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 Values or Goals of Frames 
 Stone (2002) asserts that political arguments usually have one of four generic goals or 
values: security, equity, liberty, and efficiency.  This researcher expected that each frame would 
clearly rely on one of these values.  Yet, as can be seen in Table 10, each frame seemed to 
suggest 2 to 3 of these values or goals.  For example, the Patient Relief Frame implied that 
security and equity were important goals.  Moreover, trying to “fit” the goal of the frame to one 
or more of these four goals was not without difficulty.  For example, the Economics and Access 
Frame was deemed as having efficiency and security as its primary goals.  However, efficiency is 
likely a crude way of expressing that the frame emphasizes the importance of the impact of 
ODA reform on the number of orphan drugs that will be produced and marketed in the future.   
 Of note, all patient advocates used arguments that advanced the importance of security, 
i.e., that rare diseases and conditions were often life threatening and debilitating, and, orphan 
drugs were needed to ensure patients’ minimum requirements for biological survival and 
activities of daily living.  When patients were described as being victimized or treated unfairly by 
drug companies, equity as a value or goal was implied. 
 The Economics and Access Frame seemed to have a foundation of efficiency.  As 
described by Stone, efficiency is about getting a greater output out of a given input, or “getting a 
bigger bang for the buck.”  The frame promotes efficiency in that it emphasizes the importance 
of inputs (ODA incentives and uncertainty about reform) in optimizing outputs of the social 
system (people, processes and things that are related to orphan drugs). Of note, ODA efficiency 
was often tied to the value of security, because greater efficiency (more orphan drugs) meant 
that a greater number of rare disease patients could be helped. 
 The Rules of Participation Frame seems to be based on the values of equity and liberty.  
In fact, testimony suggested that there was a trade-off between the two values, i.e., greater equity 
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might result in less liberty, and vice versa.  For example, ODA rule changes that ensure more 
equal treatment of individual companies (equity) might reduce the ability of one company to 
choose a course of action that suited their self-interests (liberty). 
 The Congressional Action Frame appears to be based on the values of security, equity 
and liberty.  Congress coming to the aid of patients means security for patients.  Equity is 
promoted when Congressional action redistributes resources, e.g., when one party gets more of 
something (patients get more orphan drugs) and another gets less (taxpayers get a reduction in 
their assets when taxes are increased). Congress “meddling” in self-organizing markets suggests a 
derogatory reference to Congress interfering with the liberty of market participants.  Of note, 
“laissez-faire capitalism” literally translates to “hands off” capitalism, as in the government 
keeping their hands out of market or business practices. 
  
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 8—Framing Strategy and Guidance 
 Strategic framing is considered an important tool in influencing individual attitudes, 
knowledge or behavior (Gandy 2003), exerting political influence (Entman 2007); exercising 
power (Reese 2003), instigating social change and winning debates or adherents (Lakoff 2004, 
Pan 2003); mobilizing collective action (Snow, Rocheford, Worden and Benford 1986, Benford 
1993, Benford and Snow 2000); and, expanding social and political actors’ realm of influence 
(Pan 2003).  
 This case study research explored the question of “How does framing support policy 
development?”  This chapter begins by addressing this question in the context of the proposed 
ODA reforms of the 1990s.  A summary and analysis of the four ODA frames are then included.  
General recommendations to help public policy stakeholders better consider how they and 
others think about complex issues and advance public policy change are then provided.  The 
chapter closes with a practical guide for how to use framing theory in public health practice. 
 How Does Framing Support Policy Development? 
 This research indicates that framing was an important part of promoting or impeding 
ODA policy developments during 1990-1994, and supports Stone’s contention that the struggle 
over ideas is the essence of policy making in political communities.  “Ideas are a medium of 
exchange and a mode of influence even more powerful than money and votes and guns.  Shared 
meanings motivate people to action and meld individual striving into collective action.  Ideas are 
at the center of all political conflict.” (Stone 2002, page 11) 
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 Potential policy developments, such as the 1990-1994 ODA reforms, are complex and 
ambiguous, and people rely on others to interpret and translate for them “what is going on 
here?”  By definition, ambiguous situations can be interpreted in a multitude of ways.  For 
example, the ODA reform case could be described as a case of a disenfranchised minority group 
arguing for their rights and attempting to rebalance power with capitalist exploiters, or a case of 
government meddling in private affairs.  Each of these frames implies a different problem, 
solution, and set of criteria for evaluation.  Ambiguity provides the opportunity for interpreters 
to frame the situation in a way that is positive or negative, clear or confusing, inspiring or 
disempowering.  
 Frames are organizing constructs that help simplify and guide understanding of a 
complex reality.  At the same time, frames force us to view the world from a particular, and 
limited, perspective, and thereby limit the options we can see.  Reframing could be used to 
diffuse a conflict and help combatants constructively explore how they can reach accord.  
Reframing could also help a teenager find the inner courage and justification for becoming a 
suicide bomber.  In other words, framing can be used for constructive and destructive purposes.  
While this is an unfortunate fact, this research lends support to the idea that framing is critical 
for those interested in shaping the future of health policy.   
 As Russo and Shoemaker (2001) point out, every decision is embedded within a frame.  
The question is whether you control the frame—or the frame controls you. 
 Strategic Assessment of ODA Reform Frames 
 The case of how issues were framed during attempted ODA reform hearings in 1990-
1994 is an interesting one. Advocates were highly skilled in framing their arguments, so there is 
much to be learned from this case. 
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 To recap, frames constructed from the text of the debates were named ODA Reform 
as . . . : 1) Economics and Access, 2) Patient Relief, 3) Rules of Participation, and, 4) 
Congressional Action.  The frame analysis suggested that each frame evoked different values, 
beliefs and systems of logic, and that the criteria by which to evaluate the merits of proposed 
reforms varied from frame to frame.  For example, the Economics and Access Frame asserts 
that reforms should be judged by how they might impact the future number of orphan drugs 
that will become available.  The Patient Relief Frame asserts that reforms should be judged 
based on how it acknowledges and addresses hardships experienced by rare disease patients.  
Reform would be judged in the Rules of Participation Frame based on how well it encourages 
appropriate behavior or participation in the orphan drug process.  In the Congressional Action 
Frame reform would be judged based on whether Congressional involvement is deemed 
appropriate or not. 
 The Economics and Access frame was most often used by anti-reformers.  Using this 
frame, anti-reformers would cite statistics on the marked increase in orphan drug development 
that occurred after ODA enactment, compared to years prior.  This frame depends on fostering 
fear of the unknown and reform’s potential for negative effects.  Arguments that invoked this 
frame emphasized potential causes and effects of reform, and how these might ultimately affect 
the future number of orphan drugs that might be accessible to patients with rare illnesses. 
 The Patient Relief Frame depended on fostering pity for patients with rare diseases and 
disdain for greedy companies.  This frame suggested that “something should be done,” but 
“something” was not usually identified. 
 Those using the Rules of Participation Frame often used the metaphor of a game, i.e., 
winning and losing, cheaters and the cheated, inequity and fairness, competition, and, rules being 
changed in the middle of the game.  Competitive companies argued about whether the ODA 
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had given them a fair or unfair advantage in competing in their respective orphan drug markets.  
To discourage reform, companies said their accusers were “sore losers.”  To encourage reform, 
companies said that the advantaged competitor was not acting in the spirit of the law. 
 The Congressional Action Frame was more dominant in the 1994 amendment hearing, 
although use of the frame was sprinkled throughout 1990-1994.  In 1994, congressional action 
was questioned by members of Congress because representatives of patient, industry, and 
governmental groups testified that they would support the 1994 bill in order to put an end to the 
prolonged threats of Congress to change the ODA.  Attempts to discredit the bill’s creators 
were implied by comments such as the bill’s supporters were “putting the rabbit in the hat,” 
“meddling” or “tinkering” with issues that they were not qualified or welcomed to deal with. 
 Using principles that were summarized in Chapter 3 and Appendix B, potential strengths 
and weaknesses of the frames are assessed in Table 11. This armchair assessment indicates that 
all four frames contained elements that could promote frame resonance.  For example, users of 
the Rules of Participation frame used the simple to understand metaphor of a game, and 
denigrators of Congressional Action described the actions as “meddling” and “tinkering.”  Each 
of these examples fit into cultural myths and common narratives. 
 It is difficult to assess the degree to which the frames might elicit what Lakoff calls, 
Level 1 values (Dorfman 2005).  While all frames suggest Level 1 values, users of the Rules of 
Participation Frame tended to devote most of their arguments to Level 3 values, while users of 
the other frames tended to focus on Level 2 values.  According to Dorfman (2005), Level 1 is 
the expression of overarching values, such as fairness, responsibility, equality, equity, and so 
forth, the core values that motivate us to change the world or not change it. Level 2 is the 
general issue being addressed, such as housing, the environment, schools, or health. Level 3 is 
about the nitty gritty of those issues, including the policy detail or strategy and tactics for 
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achieving change.  Messages can be generated from any level, but Level 1 is most important 
because it is at Level 1 that people connect in the deepest way.  Level 1 is uncovered in the 
second of the following three questions that advocates should ask themselves before 
constructing their messages. 1. What’s wrong? 2. Why does it matter? 3. What should be done 
about it? 
 Arguments rooted in the Economics and Access Frame appeared to be effective in 
discouraging ODA reform because the frame tended to emphasize the bigger picture, or 
landscape, and emphasize the potential impact of ODA reforms on the total “system.”  The call 
to action of this frame was clear (e.g., do nothing, do not reform the ODA), because users of 
this frame tended to assert “it ain’t broke, so don’t fix it.”  The frame was also flexible in that it 
was easy to bridge from the other frames to this one, and the frame was inclusive so many 
stakeholders could see the benefit of thinking in this frame. 
 The Patient Relief Frame seemed to have the strengths of consistency and credibility.  
Patient advocates provided empirical evidence that supported the frame (e.g., cost of the 
medications as a percent of their salaries, difficulties in obtaining medical insurance, etc.), and 
listeners would likely have similar experiences and opinions if they were in the situation of 
patients that were described.  The weakness of the Patient Relief Frame was that it did not seem 
to leave the listener with a sense of what to do, or a call to action.  Users of the frame seemed to 
evoke emotion and a feeling of “how awful,” but listeners were probably left with a feeling of 
inadequacy when it came to devising or evaluating remedies.  As informants suggested that rare 
disease patient advocates were not overly enthused about the prospect of reforming the ODA in 
the 1990s, lack of an action orientation may have been purposeful. 
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 The Congressional Action Frame did seem to clearly support an action, but that action 
seemed clear only when anti-ODA reformers used the frame.  The action suggested was to stop 
“meddling” with a successful law and don’t reform it. 
 
Table 11—Strengths and Weaknesses of Four ODA Reform Frames 
 
Frame 
Element 
1. Economics and 
Access 
2. Patient Relief 3. Rules of 
Participation 
4. Congressional 
Action 
Level 1 
Message?   -  
Emphasize 
Landscape? + -   
Frame 
Resonance? + + + + 
Action 
Oriented? + -  + 
Flexible? +    
Consistent? 
 +   
Credible? 
 +   
Frame 
Devices?   +  
 
Legend: 
“+” means this seemed to be a strength of the frame 
“-“ means this seemed to be a weakness of the frame 
These evaluations were based on the researcher’s judgment and interpretation of the framing literature as it 
applied to the four ODA reform frames.   
For a description of why each of these frame elements are considered important, see Chapter 3 and Appendix B 
 
 Framing Strategy Recommendations 
 As discussed in the next chapter, it is unlikely that there will be strong demand in the 
near future for ODA reforms of the type seen in the 1990s.  Hence, there is little need to 
reframe the ODA debate to further encourage or discourage ODA reforms that address how, 
and to what extent, sponsors of high commercial potential drugs should benefit from ODA 
provisions.  Instead, the following recommendations are general in nature, and not limited to the 
ODA. 
 As previously stated, this research supports the importance of using potent frames in 
political communications.  It is highly recommended that health policy practitioners learn more 
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about the art and science of framing, and explore opportunities to use framing principles to craft 
messages that instigate positive social change.  However, caveat emptor.  There are no guarantees 
that it will help.  The field of framing is arcane and more art than science.  Moreover, message 
framing is just one factor in the complex political equation to promote positive change.  And 
finally, framing is not easy.  Based on the experience of conducting this dissertation research, it 
is difficult to become self-aware of the frames that limit your own perspectives of the world, and 
it is difficult to train your mind to recognize frames in a communicating text.  It is also a 
challenge to evaluate the degree to which frames are working as intended and to create new ones 
if they are not. 
 The Typology of Framing (Appendix B) can serve as a preliminary guide and reduce the 
difficulties of applying framing theory to practical problems.  Further development of this is 
needed. 
 Since framing theories are a challenge to apply to real world situations, framing novices 
would benefit from expert guidance.  Fortunately, guidance is already available, although the 
quality of such guidance has not been evaluated by this researcher.  For example, The 
FrameWorks Institute provides training and resources on framing to non-profit organizations in 
order to “change the public conversation about social problems.”  FrameWorks has developed a 
proprietary approach, called “Strategic Frame Analysis,” that can be found at 
http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/sfa.html. 
 This dissertation research also points to the importance of systems thinking in framing 
research.  Chapter 3 includes a preliminary exploration of alternative views of the ODA as a first 
step toward deconstructing and reconstructing how we view a complex social issue in order to 
change the social dialogue.  Systems theories and approaches may facilitate such a process and 
guide how we might introduce interventions into a social system to instigate change. 
 112 
 For example, Meadows (1999) has outlined a potentially useful systems approach.  She 
identifies twelve basic ways to intervene in a complex social system to cause positive change.  
The least effective of the twelve is to change parameters in the system, such as subsidies, taxes 
and standards, and the most effective are to change the system’s paradigms, or even transcend 
the paradigms.  Changing paradigms is a powerful way to change a system because they are the 
shared social agreements about the reality of the system, and hence, ultimately govern the 
structure, rules and goals of the system.  Assuming that the world of laws, people, illnesses, 
treatments, etc. is a social system and that we can intervene in this system in a number of ways, it 
would be informative to better understand the goals of this system and the alternative ways to 
meet these goals.  Questions that could be asked include, what are the goals of this system, e.g., 
to eliminate or alleviate every rare illnesses at any cost?  What are the social agreements that we 
have about participating in this system? Can we use framing to change the paradigm of this 
social system?  Or should we intervene with leverage points that operate at a lower, and possibly 
less effective, level?  Some of the social agreements and potential tools of intervention were 
described in Chapter 3 (Foundations for Framing the ODA) 
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Table 12—Leverage Points in a System 
Adapted from Leverage Points, Places to Intervene in a System, Meadows (1999 p. 2) 
Effectiveness Leverage Point 
 
Least 
Effective 
 
Constants, parameters, numbers (such as subsidies, taxes, standards)  
 
 
The size of buffers and other stabilizing stocks, relative to their flows  
 
The structure of material stocks and flows (such as transport network, 
population age structures)  
 
The length of delays, relative to the rate of system changes  
 
The strength of negative feedback loops, relative to the effect they are trying 
to correct against  
 
The gain around driving positive feedback loops  
 
The structure of information flow (who does and does not have access to 
what kinds of information)  
 
The rules of the system (such as incentives, punishment, constraints)  
 
The power to add, change, evolve or self-organize system structure  
 
The goal of the system  
 
The mindset or paradigm that the system — its goals, structure, rules, delays, 
parameters — arises out of  
 
Most 
Effective 
The power to transcend paradigms 
 
Note: stocks and flows could relate to the number of orphan drugs; parameters might include the number of rare 
diseases measured against the number of drugs that substantially alleviate suffering from these diseases; 
stabilizing stocks relate to inventory of drugs or monies to pay for them; length of delays could relate to the time it 
takes to discover and develop new drugs or receive an accurate disease diagnosis. . . rules might include laws 
and regulations for developing and paying for orphan drugs, etc. 
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 How to Use Framing Theory in Public Health Practice 
 Framing theory can be used to enhance the way that public health practitioners advocate 
for change, as it can inform and guide how organizations: 1) conduct research on target 
audiences and perceptions of products, services or social causes; 2) determine marketing 
strategies, such as segmentation, targeting, and positioning; and, 3) craft, deliver and test specific 
messages.  Based on this dissertation research, as well as the researcher’s experience in strategic 
planning, this section provides practical advice for applying framing theory throughout the 
advocacy planning process.  Note that framing theory tips are highlighted in green. 
 If advocacy is about changing “what is” into “what should be,” a strategic plan is the 
roadmap for getting from the current state of “what is” to the desired state of “what should be.” 
Like the evolutionary plan that inspires a flock of birds to fly in close formation as they travel 
from north to south for the winter, a clear strategic advocacy plan will inspire a pattern of 
organizational activities that are aligned, aimed in the right direction at the right time, and result 
in reaching organizational goals.  Accordingly, public health organizations should ask the 
following questions: Where are we now? Where do we want to be? How do we get there? And, 
are we getting there? 
 Framing theory will now be described in the larger context of a strategic planning 
process.  To simplify terms, assume that a public health organization is advocating for “Idea A.”  
Idea A could be one of a number of innovations that improves health, e.g., a health reform 
policy, a vaccine for HIV, or, an anti-smoking educational campaign. 
 Where are we now? 
 Public health advocates can assess “where they are now” by using business strategy 
techniques such as a PEST analysis (Kotter and Schlesinger 1991), competitive assessment 
(Kotler 1997), and SWOT analysis (Kotler 1997).  A variety of data sources can be used for this 
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current-state analysis, including published articles and reports, web sites, informant interviews, 
focus groups, and surveys. 
 A PEST analysis is an organized way to scan the broader environment and identify 
political, economic, social, and technological (P-E-S-T) factors and trends that may favor or 
impede an organization’s ability to shape and create a desired future.  PEST analysis can also 
include a historical analysis to better understand “how we got here.”   
 Many important snapshots can be derived from the PEST analysis.  At minimum, the 
following summaries from the PEST analysis should be developed: 1) opportunities and threats 
(the O-T of SWOT) for the organization; and, 2) a stakeholder analysis or a community map 
that identifies and describes the players in the Idea A social system, how they interact, and what 
motivates and satisfies them. 
 A competitive assessment identifies alternatives to Idea A.  Among other things, it 
includes a summary of Idea A’s competitive strengths and weaknesses (the S-W of SWOT).  To 
set the stage for reframing, it is important to identify current and potential criteria that can be 
used to compare competitive alternatives. 
 
Framing theory tip: Do a deep dive into how target audiences think and 
communicate about Idea A and the competition. What criteria do target 
audiences use to compare and evaluate Idea A? What problem does Idea 
A (or B, C and D) solve (for target audiences)?  Why does solving the 
problem matter? What is causing the problem?  How does one Idea solve 
the problem better than another? What is the target audience’s mental 
model for how an Idea works in the social system? Or, how does one Idea 
effect a change on the current state of the social system and lead to some 
desired or undesired state? Under which mental model(s) does Idea A 
stand out as superior? 
  
 Think broadly and creatively about potential alternatives to Idea A, i.e., use a systems 
thinking framework to uncover potential public health levers and leverage points in the social 
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system of interest (see Table 12 for an example).  Note that alternatives could include “do 
nothing, stay the course, or, continue with existing behaviors.” 
 Analyze current and potential frames, and summarize them in a format similar to Table 
10.  This will improve the organization’s ability to understand and deflect current frames, as well 
as inform the creative process of creating new frames.  Table 10 was created from extensive 
debate and dialogue on a public policy issue, as found in Congressional testimony.  Depending 
on the nature of Idea A, other sources for conducting a frame analysis include articles and blogs 
that review and opine about Idea A and alternatives, paid advertisements and other collateral 
materials, observing conversation and live debate, and, primary target audience research. 
 Summarize findings in the form of a SWOT (Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-
Threats) analysis.  Strengths are internal attributes which can be leveraged to your advantage.  
Weaknesses are internal attributes which should be protected or improved to keep competitors 
from using them against you.  Opportunities are external events or conditions that may allow 
you to strengthen your position, or weaken your competitors’ position.  Threats are external 
events or conditions that could adversely impact your position. 
 Where do we want to be? 
 A strategic roadmap is of little use if an organization is not clear about 
where they want to be in the future.  Hence, it is important to articulate the 
organization’s vision of this ideal or achievable future, and the organization’s goals 
and role in creating that future. 
 
Framing theory tip: Do a deep dive into how your organization thinks and 
communicates about where it wants to go. What assumptions underlie the 
organization’s vision and mission?  What do these assumptions reveal about 
dominant organizational perceptions and judgments about Idea A target 
audiences, problems, causes and solutions? Self-examination of the 
organization’s frames may be an important first step toward breaking away from 
legacy mindsets and creating new ways to frame a complex reality. 
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 How do we get there? 
 An Idea A strategic roadmap will define how the organization intends to focus its 
resources to accomplish its goals.  All public health organizations have limited resources and 
must therefore focus on carrying out organizational initiatives that build on strengths and 
opportunities, and minimize weaknesses and threats.  The communications campaign is one 
such initiative.  Hence, organizations need to devise a communications plan that will effectively 
and efficiently use organizational resources to communicate the value of Idea A and elicit a 
desired response, such as an increase in demand for Idea A.  Framing theory can inform the 
communications plan and, hence, is the focus of this section. 
 A communications plan specifies: 1) the primary target audiences that will be reached; 2) 
the desired response the communications intend to elicit; 3) the primary messages to be used; 4) 
the vehicles that will be used to deliver messages; 5) the source of the messages; and, 6) the plan 
for evaluating the success of the communications campaign.  For advocates who want to 
fundamentally change the way target audiences view social conditions, define problems, identify 
causes and solutions, and formulate relevant judgments, framing theory can inform and guide 
many of these communications plan elements. 
 Once advocates determine who they want to reach and what response they want to elicit, 
they will be ready to craft and test messages that can potentially reframe problems, causes, and 
solutions; and, help target audiences see new possibilities for public health innovations. 
 The FrameWorks Institute (2002) has created a checklist16 to evaluate whether messages 
are on point and capitalize on framing theory and research.  This checklist assumes that the 
innovation is a public policy, but many of the FrameWorks questions are potentially relevant to 
other public health interventions.  In addition to using such message development tools, framing 
                                                 
16 From the FrameWorks Institute Toolkit on Framing Public Issues.  Accessed March 1, 2009 at 
http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/assets/files/PDF/FramingPublicIssuesfinal.pdf 
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theory novices may want to seek the help and advice of framing theory experts such as the 
FrameWorks Institute.  A few example questions from the FrameWorks Institute checklist are 
shown below. 
 
Framing theory tips for developing effective messages: 
 (from FrameWorks Institute Toolkit on Framing Public Issues (2002) 
http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/assets/files/PDF/FramingPublicIssuesfinal.pdf) 
 
o Based solely on the material you have provided, are you confident that an 
ordinary reader/viewer could answer the critical question: What is this about? 
Is it about prevention, safety, freedom, etc.? 
 
o In your attempt to frame for the reader “what is this about,” did you begin at 
Level One, by introducing a value like responsibility, stewardship, or 
fairness? 
 
o Did you reinforce your Level One message by using words, images, and 
metaphors that support your frames? 
 
o Did you signal early in your message that solutions exist? Do the solutions 
“fit” the problem as defined? 
 
o Did you establish the cause of the problem, and did you assign 
responsibility? Reviewing your material, can you tell who created the problem 
and who should fix it? 
 
o Did you effectively put the problem in context, explaining long-term 
consequences, trends and opportunities to resolve the problem, so that your 
story is not episodic? 
 
o Did you anticipate and deflect the default frame? Did you avoid arguing with 
it directly and, instead, substitute a new frame? 
 
o Did you use credible and unlikely messengers? Are they likely to be 
perceived as overly vested in the issue or a sole solution? 
 
o Is your message strategically oriented to the intended audience, i.e. if 
addressing business leaders, did you frame your issue as appealing to 
managerial competence and responsibility? 
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Chapter 9—Discussion and Conclusions 
 This historical case study of the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) explored two general 
questions: 1) what factors seem to promote or impede policy development; and, 2) how does 
issue framing support policy development?  Factors that may have favored or impeded ODA 
policy change in the 1990s were proposed and evaluated.  The literature on framing was 
reviewed to help evaluate how ODA reform stakeholders framed their arguments and to provide 
framing strategy guidance.  The research provides many useful insights that may benefit policy 
stakeholders and academicians who want to better understand or influence public policy 
developments.  At the same time, there are limits to how these research findings can be used. 
 This chapter discusses the opportunities and challenges of conducting this dissertation 
research and the future of ODA reforms. 
 Conducting Historical Case Study Research 
 Historical policy studies often inform what could or should be done in the future 
(George 2004, Hacker 2001, Schon and Rein 1994). But it is difficult to cull lessons from the 
past to predict or guide potential courses of action in the future.  Although “history often 
repeats itself,” history is a natural experiment with a vast world that is complex, dynamic and 
often chaotic.  Unlike experiments in physics, where variables can be isolated and manipulated in 
controlled conditions to determine their effect on some outcome, the interacting social systems 
of business, politics, and medicine are not amenable to reductionism, determinism and other tidy 
scientific principles.  But, paraphrasing Voltaire, health policy students should not let the perfect 
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be the enemy of the good.  Some understanding of what happened in the past and what might 
happen in the future is better than ignorance justified by futility. 
 One general approach that might be particularly useful in applying health policy lessons 
of the past to the future is scenario analysis.  Scenarios could be constructed a number of ways 
and include scenarios that are based on extending trends that are already occurring, that use new 
paradigms for how people and things could interact in a system, or envision how the future 
might look if something unexpected might occur.  Scenario analysis is useful to understand the 
range of possible futures, evaluate how one might influence or react to those possible futures, 
and become aware of the early signals that portend those futures. 
 Applying Theory to Policy Practice 
 This research began with an extensive review of framing and policy development theory.  
The literature on framing theory is vast, abstract, and buried within many related disciplines, e.g., 
psychology, sociology, political science, linguistics, philosophy, economics, and decision science.  
In order to evolve from a state of “eyes glazed over” to that of understanding, this researcher 
needed to 1) summarize the key points into a typology or guide (see Appendix B); 2) develop a 
priori hypotheses (e.g., see Table 2); 3) discover and review alternative methods for extracting 
frames, and select the one that seemed least problematic (see Chapter 4); and, 4) apply these 
concepts, hypotheses and methods to a real-world case. 
 Certainly, there are no guarantees that a theory will provide a more accurate analysis than 
research using no theory at all.  But the benefits of using theory for research, especially 
dissertation research, seem to far outweigh the risks. 
 Moreover, “One simply cannot look for, and see, everything.” (Sabatier 1999 p. 4)  A 
model elucidates the variables that will be explored, and provides focus to the inquiry and 
structure for the research findings.  This can increase efficiency and prevent “boiling the ocean.”  
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That a model forces the researcher to make variables and assumptions explicit is also a benefit.  
However, there is a certain irony to using theory to structure a study that has a primary focus on 
framing.  The conceptual model frames the research.  Conceptual models, like issue frames, “are 
organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time that work symbolically to 
meaningfully structure the world” (Reese 2003).  Frames can introduce certain biases into the 
research, and potentially blind the researcher to important data that fall outside the scope of the 
frame.  At the same time, conceptual models urge the researcher to make his or her assumptions 
and focal points explicit, making the researcher more conscious of the limitations they place on 
the research. 
 But what if the model does not help explain the case?  For example, some of the 
assumptions in the MS model did not seem to apply to development of the ODA in the early 
1980s.  The garbage can model (see Appendix A) did not seem to explain the problem and 
policy streams.  The policy (the ODA) seemed to be directly linked and rationally developed as a 
way to solve a particular problem.  The streams did not seem to be independent, nor were they 
chaotically and opportunistically linked to each other by “organized anarchies.”  However, the 
MS model did help explain aspects of the 1990-1994 amendments.  Private and public payers, as 
well as patients, were concerned about high drug prices specifically and healthcare costs 
generally.  The debates over ODA reform seemed to morph into an airing of grievances over 
drug prices and high-cost treatments.  Hence, the ODA reform debate seemed independent, but 
related, to the problem of health care costs. 
 Another challenge of the MS model is determining how to identify factors in the larger 
political, economic, social and technological environment that may have favored or impeded 
policy development.  To get a sense of major events and trends, this researcher reviewed every 
December and January issue of Time Magazine that was published from 1980 to 2000 (covering 
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pre-ODA enactment to post-ODA reforms of 1990-1994).  The December issues included a 
photographic “year in review,” and the January issue often included predictions and concerns 
about the year ahead.  Though efficient, this was obviously a very limited historical review. 
 It is interesting to note that none of the informants interviewed for this research seemed 
to use a comprehensive theory17 to evaluate whether a proposed policy has what it takes to get 
successfully passed or adopted, or to evaluate what conditions should change to better ensure 
that a policy succeeds or fails.  Comments about the idea of using theory included, 1) “I’m aware 
of different political science theories about policy development, but I’m not a political scientist 
and I don’t think about policies in that way.” 2) “No one knows why a policy succeeds or 
fails . . . (policy development) theories are for academics and pretty much useless;” 3) “You have 
to get enough votes in the Senate, that’s the most important thing;” and, 4) “The policy has to 
be workable. You have to be able to implement it.” 
 Finally, if the purpose of a doctorate is to take one’s capacity to think about complex 
issues to a new level, then theory-mediated dissertation research is very beneficial.  It points to 
how malleable our views of the world are, and how we can break out of our usual ways of 
framing issues to generate novel, creative, and sometimes more compassionate insights. 
 Factors that may have Promoted or Impeded Policy Reform 
 From 1990 to 1994, several amendments to the ODA were attempted but failed to gain 
passage.  Though several issues were addressed in these amendments, one reform issue 
dominated and was the focus of this study: the law was intended to provide government 
incentives for development of drugs that had low commercial potential (LCP).  Pro-reformers 
thought the law should be amended to reduce support of high commercial potential (HCP) 
                                                 
17 Informants were asked, “Do you have a favorite theory that helps you evaluate whether a public policy will get 
passed or not. . . . or, perhaps, a checklist of important things that a policy must have in order to get passed?” 
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drugs.  Anti-reformers thought the law was working well and that reforms to address this issue 
carried the risk of reducing the effectiveness of the law. 
 Arguments for reform seemed less developed and defensible.18  Anti-reformers also had 
many factors in their favor including: 1) the ODA was a popular, feel-good law that was 
considered a success; 2) anti-reformers had inertia on their side; 3) patient advocates didn’t 
initially support ODA reform, and their later support may have been tepid; 4) the amendment’s 
initial backers were a handful of companies that felt cheated by the law, and they were in zero-
sum opposition with another handful of companies; 5) the proposed solution was difficult to 
administer; 6) the problem seemed amorphous;19 and, 7) what constituted a HCP drug, 
“excessive” profitability, and ill-intent in using the law was never defined or, even worse, feasibly 
definable. 
 The Future of ODA Reform 
 According to multiple sources, and based on a series of unsuccessful attempts in the 
1990s, it is unlikely that attempts will be made in the near future to reform the ODA to better 
limit benefits of the law to low commercial potential drugs. 
 Patient advocates that were interviewed think the ODA is working well, and doesn’t 
need to be amended.  Moreover, amendments could have undesirable consequences.  One 
informant commented, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”  Another said, “We don’t want 
amendments (to the ODA).  Amendments invite mischief.  People try to Christmas tree their 
other issues on to amendments.” 
                                                 
18 For example, patients wanted “something to be done” about the financial burden of orphan drugs, but 
“something” wasn’t clearly articulated.  Or, legislators urged amendments to the ODA that would solve the 
problem of excessive drug prices and profits, but the way in which this would be defined and measured was unclear. 
 
19 For example, one definition of the problem in 1990 was that it was not fair that the ODA had created a situation 
where one company benefited from the ODA at the expense of another.  Using the ODA to “block competitors” 
from entering a market was described as a problem.  This seems like an amorphous problem because the market 
exclusivity provision, by definition, blocks competitors from entering a market. 
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 Several informants believed the ODA amendments of the 1990s were about drug prices, 
not about high profits or sales.  Some contended that high-priced orphan drugs like Ceredase are 
what brought so many to the table to discuss ODA reform in the 1990s.  But, most informants 
thought that the issue of high-priced drugs is larger than prices of orphan drugs.  Comments 
included, “Orphan drugs are not going to drive the discussion.  The issue is bigger than that”; 
and, “It’s not that orphan drugs are expensive, drugs are expensive.”   
 One informant commented that pricing a drug at $200,000 to $1 million per year per 
patient is “unconscionable.”   Another said, “There’s a sea of public hostility building toward 
pharma and biotech companies about their prices.”  But, as an informant from a large health 
maintenance organization said, “drugs like Cerezyme that cost $200,000 a year for a patient are 
irritating, but we only have 12 patients on it (out of 8 million HMO members), so it (pushing 
back on such prices) is not a high priority for us.” 
 Accusations that orphan drug sponsors “abused” the ODA market exclusivity provision 
to block competition, charge “unreasonable” prices, and generate “excessive” profits were 
frequently heard in during the ODA reform hearings from 1990 to 1994.  It is interesting to note 
that these same accusations can be found in discussions about drug company practices outside 
of the realm of orphan drugs.  Drug companies with patent protections that enable market 
exclusivity for their drugs have also been accused of abusing their patent rights to block 
competition, charge “unreasonable” prices, and generate “excessive” profits. 
 Evidence that would support the need for 1990s-like ODA reforms is mixed.  In the 
1990s, the rationale behind reducing the length or degree of market exclusivity was that this 
action would increase competition and lead to lower orphan drug prices.  However, expiration 
of market exclusivity is not always followed by increases in competition and lower prices.  For 
example, market exclusivity has expired for Cerezyme, an orphan drug that is frequently the 
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poster child of price “gouging.”  Yet, Cerezyme remains the sole orphan drug for Gaucher’s 
disease and its price has remained high.  (According to Anand (2005), Cerezyme can cost up to a 
million dollars per year per patient.)  Biologics like Cerezyme are currently protected from 
competition because of the way that biologics are currently regulated. 
 Prices of many biologics, meaning drugs that are derived from living organisms, have 
been under particular scrutiny.  Legislation to encourage generic versions of biologics that no 
longer have patent protection is under consideration.  The FDA does not yet have a regulatory 
pathway to approve biologics that are therapeutically equivalent (“bio-generics” or “bio-
similars”).  Hence, makers of many biologic products continue to hold market monopolies. 
Because competition from generic drugs can have a significant effect on drug pricing, and many 
orphan drugs are biological20, this legislation could help contain biologic drug prices and lessen 
the need for ODA reforms that try to contain orphan drug prices. 
 As health care costs continue to rise, there will be continued interest in developing 
public policies that promote health care cost containment.  As demand for new, improved health 
technologies continues, demand for public policies that promote innovation will continue as well.  
According to Saloner and Ranji (2008), availability of more expensive, state-of-the-art drugs can 
fuel health care spending not only because the development costs of these products must be 
recouped by industry but also because they generate consumer demand for more intense, costly 
services even if they are not necessarily cost-effective.  Simultaneous demand for policies that 
promote cost containment and innovation will likely create tensions and frame conflicts that 
were similar to that found in the ODA reform hearings of 1990-1994. 
 Patents, and other forms of market exclusivity, are seen as critical in promoting 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry (Schacht and Thomas 2005).  In 2003, the cost to 
                                                 
20 According to Anand (2005), more than half of the drugs produced by biotechnology companies are orphan drugs. 
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bring a novel pharmaceutical product to market topped $800 million (DiMasi et al 2003).  
Patents and other exclusivity provisions better enable the inventor to recoup this expense. 
 Congress has supported patent and market exclusivity protections for pharmaceutical 
and biological therapies on numerous occasions in the past two decades.  The Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-417), commonly known 
as the Hatch-Waxman Act, made it easier for generic copies of brand name drugs to gain FDA 
approval and enter the marketplace after the brand’s patent expires.  But, at the same time, the 
Act introduced several significant changes to patent laws in order to preserve investors’ interests 
in drug R&D.  These include methods for extending the term of a drug patent up to five years to 
reflect property rights lost during the long FDA review process.  The Act also uses marketing 
exclusivity provisions to protect drugs from competition if, for example, the drugs are new 
chemical entities or are being clinically studied in new ways.  Market exclusivity continues to be a 
popular tool for encouraging selective health interventions, i.e., several bills were recently 
introduced in Congress to provide additional patent protection or FDA-administered marketing 
exclusivities as a tool to encourage development of bioterrorism countermeasures (Schacht and 
Thomas 2006). 
 Informants believed that drug prices will continue to be an important political issue 
because prescription drugs are now covered under Medicare Part D, meaning the federal 
government is now an even larger payer of prescription drugs.  Moreover, many believe the 
pressure for government to wield its purchasing power will grow as baby boomers age into 
Medicare, costs continue to rise, and Democrats increase power in Washington DC.  Other 
policy means to moderate drug prices include increasing the use of “comparative effectiveness” 
evaluations in drug purchasing decisions, and, promoting re-importation of drugs from Canada 
and other countries that better negotiate lower drug prices. 
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 The increased creation and promotion of Medication Assistance Programs (MAPs) or 
patient assistance programs appear to have taken some of the wind out of the 1990s ODA 
reform argument.  Pro-reformers contended that high prices were affecting patients’ ability to 
access orphan drugs.  Many pharmaceutical companies administer, support, or donate to MAPs, 
and claim that no patient will go without one of their drugs for financial reasons.  PhRMA offers 
a single point of access to public and private MAPs, as do many voluntary, non-profit 
organizations.  According to PhRMA (2008), there are more than 475 public and private patient 
assistance programs, including more than 180 programs offered by pharmaceutical companies.  
MAPs are likely available for all or most orphan drugs.  
 Lifetime caps on insurance policies continue to challenge patients on expensive orphan 
drugs.  According to NORD, a lifetime cap of $1 million is sometimes inadequate for rare 
disease patients.  The challenge of these caps is that they apply to the entire family, i.e., if 
medical costs for one family member exceed the policy’s lifetime cap of $1 million, then all 
family members become ineligible for medical coverage under the plan.  The Health Insurance 
Coverage Protection Act, a bill that was recently introduced to Congress, proposes to phase in 
an increase in minimum lifetime caps in private insurance plans to $10 million with an annual 
inflationary index thereafter. 
 Most sources seem to accept the idea that prices of drugs for small populations are 
expected to be higher than drugs used by large populations.  As it seems the number of orphan 
drugs will only increase in the future, one can expect that concerns about orphan drug prices will 
grow accordingly. According to FDA, 325 orphan drugs were approved for marketing by May 
2008, and approximately 1500 additional orphan drugs are in the development pipeline.  Though 
millions of rare disease patients have been helped by these drugs, there are as many as 7000 
different rare illnesses, so millions more are likely in need of more effective therapies. 
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 Technological advances in genetics and drug discovery, as well as the trend toward 
personalized medicine, are likely to drive further increases in the number of future orphan drugs. 
Pharmacogenomics, the study of how variations in the human genome affect how individuals 
respond to drugs, will continue to enable development of drugs that are more targeted and 
better tailored to the genetic makeup of individuals. (Haffner 2002 and 2006, Loughnot 2005) 
 If a resurgence of interest in ODA reform were to occur, it is unclear who would drive 
this debate.  In 2001, the Office of Inspector General conducted a survey of rare disease patient 
advocacy organizations and firms that were developing orphan drugs.  The study concluded that 
these stakeholders were highly satisfied with the ODA and that no amendments were needed.  
Moreover, two informants thought ODA reform had its day in Congress, and that it would be 
difficult to get traction for future ODA reforms because of issue fatigue.   
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Appendix A: Decision-Making and Policy Development Paradigms 
 Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (2002) have characterized three strategic decision-making 
paradigms: 1) the cognitive paradigm, which assumes that decisions are information driven; 2) 
the politics and power model, which assumes that decisions are socially driven, and the 3) 
garbage can model, which assumes that decisions arise from a random confluence of events via 
organized anarchies.  Many experts on policy analysis and political decision making refer to or 
invoke one or more of these paradigms in their writings (e.g., Allison and Zelikow 1999, Bardach 
2005, Feldstein 2001, Feldstein 2003, Hendersen 2002, Kingdon 1995, Longest 2001, Longest 
2002, Sabatier 1999, Shi 1997, Stone 2002, Veney and Kaluzny 1998, and, Weissert and Weissert 
2002). Hence, a summary of these paradigms follows. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, a model related to the garbage can model was selected to 
guide portions of this research (the Multiple Streams Model by Kingdon 1995).  In the final 
analysis of this research, this assumption was challenged, i.e., the question of whether the MS 
model seemed appropriate or useful for describing and predicting the outcomes of the Orphan 
Drug Act amendments was be addressed. 
 The Cognitive Paradigm 
 According to Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (2002), the cognitive paradigm of decision 
making assumes that decisions are made based on mental processing of information.  This 
paradigm recognizes that decisions can be fully rational or boundedly rational.  Fully rational 
decision making means that, given adequate time and resources, decision alternatives can be 
known and understood, and that a systematic process of evaluating the alternatives will point the 
way to the right decision.  The rational model predicts that decision makers will know and/or 
understand the goal of the decision, then follow a sequential process that basically includes steps 
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to: 1) gather information, 2) develop a set of alternatives, and, 3) select from the alternatives 
based on some set of considerations and analyses. 
 Based on the work of Herbert Simon in the mid-20th century, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 
also describe a less idealistic cognitive paradigm where decision making is boundedly rational.  In 
this paradigm, decision making is still information-driven, rational and logical, but cognitive 
limitations of decision makers are assumed and acknowledged.  Simon described people as 
partially or “boundedly” rational agents that experience limits in formulating and solving 
complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information.  
This view of decision making acknowledges that goals can be unknown, unclear and/or 
inconsistent across people and time, and goals and choices can be simultaneously discovered.  
The model predicts that: 1) decision-making processes may be haphazard, opportunistic, 
iterative and non-sequential; 2) actions may be dictated by what has been done in the past, rather 
than what should be done; and, 3) alternatives may be eliminated by objection one by one, rather 
than considered simultaneously, exhaustively and systematically.  Complex and/or contentious 
decisions, threatening environments and high uncertainty can make decision making more 
boundedly rational. 
 The cognitive paradigm is reflected in, for example, Shi’s (1997) description of policy 
analysis where a decision maker “lays out goals, identifies alternatives that can meet the goals, 
uses logical and rational processes to evaluate identified alternatives, and chooses the best or 
optimal way to reach the goals” (page 189).  Shi acknowledges the bounds of rationality in the 
statement, “Policy analysis is typically performed with constraints on time, information, and 
resources.”  Policy analysis is further described as a five-step framework that includes 1) 
establishing the context, 2) identifying the alternatives, 3) predicting the consequences, 4) valuing 
the outcomes, and 5) making a choice. 
 131 
 Bardach (2005) offers an eight-step framework for policy analysis that is also rooted in 
the cognitive paradigm.  The eight steps in his framework are to 1) define the problem; 2) 
assemble some evidence; 3) construct the alternatives; 4) select the criteria; 5) project the 
outcomes; 6) confront the trade-offs; 7) decide; and, 8) tell your story.  This is described as an 
iterative process. 
 The Bardach and Shi descriptions of policy analysis resemble an assembly line, invoking 
a machine metaphor with subassemblies, and inputs processed into outputs.  In similar fashion, 
Longest (2001) describes the component parts of the policy making process in a machine-like 
model.  The process is circular, where policy arises, if successful, out of the formulation and 
implementation phase.  A policy modification phase ensues after stakeholders have had 
experience with the policy, or as conditions change.  If policy change is needed or demanded, 
the process circles back to the formulation phase, and so forth. 
 The Politics and Power Paradigm 
 The politics and power paradigm of decision making assumes that organizations are 
political systems and that conflict is inherent in decision making (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 2002).  
The paradigm implies that decisions are based on their anticipated social impacts, that goals are 
known and actions are calculated, and, that power prevails in decision making.  War or sports 
metaphors are often invoked as decisions are portrayed as a conflict with winners and losers.  
This paradigm predicts that conflict will arise because of differing self-interests, assumptions and 
places in the power ladder; decisions will culminate from a process that involves people with 
conflicting interests and where the powerful triumph; and, in order to change the power 
structure in their favor, decision makers will engage in political tactics, e.g., coalition formation, 
cooptation and engagement of outside experts.  One can view this paradigm in a negative light, 
i.e., that politics are dirty or bad, signal dysfunctional decision making, or, that politics are power 
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and conflict driven.  In a positive or accepting light, political decision making can be seen as 
inherent to social interaction and that political maneuvering, such as advocacy and lobbying, can 
raise awareness, understanding and commitment to causes that can have broad public benefit. 
 Policy creation and evolution is prompted by changes in the macro-environment, such as 
political-legal, economic, socio-demographic and ecological or technical changes, and changes in 
what people want or demand.  Longest (2002) invokes the politics and power paradigm of 
decision making in describing social demands.  He describes a political marketplace where, using 
Feldstein’s economic view (Feldstein 2001, 2003) there are demanders and suppliers of policies 
that seek to further their objectives.  Power and influence are the models by which they 
accomplish their objectives.  Influence in political markets is the process of persuading others to 
follow.  Power is the potential to exert influence and can be mustered through legitimate means, 
as in having formal power or authority in a social system.  Power can also be obtained through 
rewards, which can materialize in the form of political capital, e.g., favors that can be provided 
or exchanged, or influence that can be used now or at a later time.  Coercive power is the flip 
side of reward power, where rewards are prevented or directly withheld. (Longest 2002) 
 The Garbage Can Paradigm 
 In the garbage can paradigm, decisions arise from a random confluence of events via 
organized anarchies (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 2002).  The garbage can model of organizational 
choice was first described by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972).  Cohen et al described organized 
anarchies as organizations or decision situations that had three characteristics: 1) problematic 
preferences, where organizations have ill-defined and inconsistent preferences and a loose 
collection of ideas; 2) unclear technology, i.e., where the organizational processes are unclear to 
its members and where trial and error, learning from past accidents and pragmatic inventions 
based on necessity prevail; and, 3) fluid participation, meaning participants meander in and out 
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of decision situations or organizational activities, hence, the audiences and decision makers for 
any organizational choice change constantly and capriciously.  Cohen et al posit that traditional 
decision making and management theories fail to work in situations where goals are unknown, 
processes (technologies) are hazy and participation is fluid. 
 In the garbage can model, decisions in an organization are made in a complex interplay 
of factors including: problems in the organization, deployment of personnel, the production of 
solutions and the opportunities for choices.  Cohen et al state, “Although it may be convenient 
to imagine that choice opportunities lead first to the generation of decision alternatives, then to 
an examination of their consequences, then to an evaluation of those consequences in terms of 
objectives, and finally to a decision, this type of model is often a poor description of what 
actually happens.  In contrast, a decision in the garbage can model is an outcome or 
interpretation of several relatively independent streams within an organization.” (Cohen et al 
1972, p. 2) 
 Based on his research in health and transportation policy, Kingdon (1995) determined 
that the garbage can model best characterized public policy making in the 23 cases he studied.  
Kingdon also thought the federal government operated similarly to Cohen et al’s description of 
organized anarchies.  In Kingdon’s “Multiple Streams” model of policy development, he 
adopted many of the features of Cohen et al’s garbage can model, i.e., that many conditions are 
ambiguous and that the meaning of solutions or problems can change over time; that 
solutions/choices search for a suitable problem; and that the amount of time participants have is 
a major constraint on where they focus their attention (“agenda setting”).  Kingdon did change 
some of Cohen et al’s concepts.  For example, rather than applying the model to an organization, 
Kingdon applied the garbage can model to policy actors that are not under one organizational 
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umbrella; and, Kingdon reduced and renamed some of Cohen et al’s “streams21.” Also, Kingdon 
introduced the idea of the policy entrepreneur into the MS model.  While Cohen et al described 
different types of decision makers or structures, e.g., hierarchical, specialized and unsegmented, 
they did not discuss the notion of a single person, or small set of people, championing a choice 
and matching that to a problem and political/social situation.  For a further description of 
Kingdon’s MS model, see Chapter 1. 
 Hybrid Paradigms 
 Stone (2002) portrays policy development and decision making with elements of both 
the politics and power paradigm and the garbage can paradigm.  As described by Stone and 
summarized in Table A1, the rational-analytic model fails to capture how decisions are analyzed 
and made in the “polis.”  The polis is Stone’s conception of society where problems and 
decision processes are ambiguous and strategically portrayed or manipulated by political actors.  
Stone asserts that the rational-analytic model of solving a problem by having explicit and 
consistent goals, and rationally evaluating many alternatives to achieve those goals, is not suitable 
for complex social issues that are to be addressed in political arenas.  Instead, in Stone’s polis 
model, goals are ambiguous and changing, and alternatives are purposely ignored and evaluated 
by criteria that favor the political actor’s preferred solution. 
 
                                                 
21 In 1972, Cohen et al characterized and named four streams: 1) a stream of choices that contains choice 
opportunities, 2) a stream of problems, 3) a rate of flow of solutions, and 4) a stream of energy from participants.  
Kingdon reduced the four streams to three and modified their names slightly to: 1) a problem stream, 2) a policy 
stream, and 3) a politics stream.  Kingdon then uses the concept of a window of opportunity for policy decisions in 
his model.  This seems to replace Cohen et al’s first stream, “a stream of choices.” 
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Table A1: Stone’s Polis Model, A Hybrid Decision-Making Model 
 
Stages in Decision 
Process 
Decision-Making Model 
 in the Polis 
Rational Decision  
Making Model 
 
Define Goals 
 
• Goals are stated 
ambiguously 
• Some goals may be kept 
secret or hidden 
• Goals may shift and be 
redefined as political 
situation dictates 
 
 
• Goals are explicit and 
precise 
• The same goal is used 
throughout the analysis 
Identify Alternatives • Purposely keep 
undesirable alternatives 
from being considered 
• Use rhetorical devices to 
blend alternatives and 
define them ambiguously 
to avoid triggering 
opposition 
 
• Try to generate and 
imagine as many 
alternatives as possible 
• Define each alternative 
clearly as a distinct 
course of action 
Evaluate 
Alternatives 
• Make your preferred 
alternative seem most 
feasible or possible 
• Selectively represent the 
costs and benefits of your 
preferred alternative 
 
• Accurately and 
completely evaluate 
the costs and benefits 
of each alternative and 
course of action 
Decide • Choose the course of 
action that hurts powerful 
interests the least 
• Portray your decision as 
creating maximum social 
good for a broad public 
• Choose the alternative 
that best meets your 
defined 
objectives/goals 
• Choose the alternative 
that maximizes total 
welfare 
 
Adapted from Stone, D. (2002). Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. 
 New York, NY: Norton, page 256 
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Appendix B: A Typology of Framing 
“Categorization is, in fact, the necessary condition of abstract thought and of the utilization of symbols.” 
(Edelman 1993 p. 232, as quoted in Durham 2003 p. 125) 
 
Author Phenomenon Components 
Entman 2007, 
1993 
How framing is defined 
esp. with regard to 
political communication 
and issue frames 
The process of culling a few elements of perceived reality 
and assembling a narrative that highlights connections 
among them to promote a particular interpretation 
Nelson (2003) What types of frames 
there are 
• Collective action frames 
• Decision frames 
• News frames 
• Issue frames 
 
Entman (2007), 
Reese (2003),  
Goffman (1974), 
Snow et al. 
(1986) 
 
How frames “organize” 
thinking 
 
• Frames introduce or raise the salience of certain 
ideas, activating schemas that encourage target 
audiences to think, feel or decide in a particular way 
• People assimilate new information by fitting it into 
their existing way of viewing similar things.  Goffman: 
frames interact with an individual’s “schemata of 
interpretation.” 
• Cognitive frames—invite us to think about social 
phenomena in a certain way, often by appealing to 
basic psychological biases (Reese) 
• Cultural frames—invite us to marshal a cultural 
understanding that is deeper, more persistent and 
extends past the immediate information. . . a broader 
way to account for social reality (Reese) 
 
Entman (1993), 
Maher (2003) 
Van Gorp 
(2007) 
Where frames are located 
in communications 
process 
• Communicator (where frame is selected/sponsored) 
• Text (where frame is manifested) 
• Receiver (where frame is accepted, modified, 
rejected or ignored) 
• Culture (where enduring frames are generated, 
where the grand inventory of frames is located) 
Gamson and 
Modigliani 
(1989), 
Fisher (1997) 
How people understand 
issues 
• People use cultural tools to make sense of both the 
original discourse and media translations of that 
discourse 
• Original discourse --produced by interested parties 
about a topic 
• Media—translates debates between proponents of 
different original discourses.  Media are central in 
production of meaning as well as the place where 
social movements compete 
 
Benford et al. 
(2000) 
How communicators, 
receivers and culture 
interact to create meaning 
and frames 
• Social groups consume existing cultural meanings 
and produce new meanings 
• Frame communicators and receivers interact 
• Receivers can affect the form and content of the 
message . . . Receivers can precipitate frame 
transformation 
 
Entman (2007), 
Benfford et al. 
(2000), Snow et 
al. (1986), 
Stone (2002) 
Why political elites and 
social movement 
organizations (SMOs) use 
frames 
 
• They care what people think because they want them 
to behave in ways that support, or at least tolerate, 
their activities 
• There are multiple ways of seeing a complex social 
issue.  Politics is about controlling interpretation.  
Shared meanings motivate people to action 
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Author Phenomenon Components 
Goffman (1974), 
Entman (2007, 
1993), Maher 
(2003) 
What frames do • Frames enable individuals to “locate, perceive, 
identify and label” events and situations in their world 
• Fully developed frames function to: 
o Define problems 
o Diagnose causes 
o Imply moral judgments 
o Suggest solutions 
Benford et al. 
(2000) 
What tasks can be 
accomplished by which 
types of frames 
• Diagnostic frames articulate cause or blame 
• Prognostic frames suggest solutions to problems 
• Motivational frames provide the rationale for action—
severity, urgency, efficacy, propriety 
Pan (2003) How frames can be used 
strategically 
• Promote configuration of social and political forces 
• Unify discursive community 
• Promote deliberative democracy 
• Promote political  and discursive goals 
• Attract more supporters 
• Mobilize collective action 
• Expand actors’ realm of influence 
• Increase chances of winning 
Snow et al. 
(1986) 
To whom frames are 
intentionally or 
strategically targeted (esp. 
to promote social 
movements) 
• Adherents 
• Constituents 
• Bystander publics 
• Media 
• Potential allies 
• Antagonists or Counter movements 
• Elite decisions-makers or Arbiters 
Pan (2003) What framing strategies to 
consider 
• Which frame to sponsor 
• How to sponsor it 
• How to expand its appeal 
Snow et al. 
(1986) 
What factors influence 
social movement 
participation 
 
• Contingent on frame alignment between individual 
and social movement organization (SMO) 
• Grievances 
• Four processes promote frame alignment (see below) 
• Frame alignment can be temporary because it is 
subject to reassessment and renegotiation 
• Frame alignment is a crucial aspect of adherent and 
constituent mobilization 
 
Snow et al. 
(1986) 
What processes promote 
frame alignment (thereby 
attracting social 
movement adherents) 
• Frame bridging 
• Frame amplification 
• Frame extension 
• Frame transformation 
 
Dorfman et al. 
(2005) 
How advocates can 
influence issue 
interpretation  
Trigger frames that connect to values.  Generate Level 1 
messages that address “Why does it matter?” 
• Level 1: expresses overarching values 
• Level 2: the general issue being addressed 
• Level 3: details of the issue 
Emphasize the context: 
• Context is in “landscape” messages 
• . . . not “portrait messages” 
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Author Phenomenon Components 
Entman (1993, 
2007), Snow et 
al. (1986) 
Lakoff (2004) 
What proponents say 
about frame potency 
• “the concept of framing consistently offers a way to 
describe the power of a communicating text” (Entman 
1993, p. 51) 
• “Reframing is social change” (Lakoff 2004, p. xv) 
• “agenda setting, framing, and priming fit together as 
critical tools in the exercise of political power”. . . the 
“succinct definition of power is the ability to get others 
to do what one wants, ‘telling people what to think 
about’ is how one exerts political influence in non-
coercive political systems” (Entman 2007) 
• The power of a given frame to attract & mobilize 
constituents is dependent on frame resonance 
Pan (2003) What increases the 
potency of frames 
• Linkage with societal values 
• Cultural attributes of frames used 
• Symbolic devices used 
• Sociological: size & depth of web of subsidies 
• Linkage with news values in society 
• Adoption of frame in policymaking community 
 
Van Gorp 
(2007) 
What characterizes the 
potency of a frame 
• Activates a schema with a single reference to it 
• Triggers a causal chain of reasoning devices 
•  Stealth: Except for framing device, nothing is explicit 
in the text 
 
Benford et al.  
(2000) 
What characteristics a 
potent frame should have 
• Broad in interpretive approach 
• Inclusive 
• Flexible 
• Culturally resonant, especially connecting to other 
historical movements (eg, gay rights, civil rights) 
 
Benford et al. 
(2000) 
What features 
characterize collective 
action frames 
• Action-oriented core framing tasks 
• Interactive, discursive processes 
Fisher (1997) 
referencing 
Triandafyllidou 
(1995) 
What master frames are • Higher-level deep structural frame that subsumes and 
shapes lower level deep structural frames 
Benford et al. 
(2000) 
What examples illustrate 
“master frames” 
• Rights frames 
• Choice frames 
• Human injustice frames 
• Environmental justice frames 
• Sexual terrorism frames 
• Oppositional frames 
• Hegemonic frames 
• “Return to democracy” frame 
 
Lau and 
Schlesinger 
(2005) 
What dominant frames are 
used describing medicine 
and the role of 
government 
• Health care as a societal right 
• Health care as a community obligation 
• Health care as an employer responsibility 
• Health care as a marketable commodity 
• Health care as a professional service 
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Author Phenomenon Components 
Benford et al. 
(2000) 
What factors influence 
frame credibility 
• Frame consistency (congruence between beliefs, 
claims, actions) 
• Empirical consistency (fit between framing and 
observable/understandable evidence) 
• Credibility of the frame articulators or claimsmakers 
 
Benford et al. 
(2000) 
What factors influence 
frame salience 
• Centrality (beliefs, values, ideas are central to targets 
of mobilization) 
• Experiential commensurability (congruent w/ 
personal, everyday experience of targets) 
• Narrative fidelity (resonate w/ cultural narratives or 
myths) 
 
Benford et al. 
(2000) 
What contextual 
constraints and facilitators 
affect frames 
• Political opportunity—affected by cultural opportunity. 
Contingent on how they are framed 
• Cultural opportunity—extant stock of meanings, 
beliefs, ideologies, practices, values, myths, 
narratives, etc. 
• Audience effects—a dynamic interaction between 
social movement, frames and audience 
 
Van Gorp 
(2007) 
What frame 
breakthroughs do 
• “ . . . sometimes, a kind of shock is required for the 
receiver to be able to break through a persistent 
frame” (p. 69) 
 
Van Gorp 
(2007) 
Why the notion of a 
cultural repertoire of 
frames is important 
• # in repertoire > than # currently applied 
• Frames exist in culture and are persistent 
• Not the same as personal/individual mental structure 
(“schemata”) 
• Selected frame (in journalism) depends on media 
routines, organizational factors, external power 
forces  . . as well as frame sponsor influence 
 
Van Gorp 
(2007) 
What constituent elements 
are in a frame package 
• Manifest framing devices—words, metaphors, 
exemplars, descriptions, arguments, visual images 
that point at the same core idea 
• Manifest or latent reasoning devices—explicit and 
implicit statements that deal with justifications, 
causes and consequences in a temporal order 
• Implicit cultural phenomenon that displays the 
package as a whole—meta-communication, ties into 
shared cultural phenomena 
• All elements need not be present in text 
 
Van Gorp 
(2007) 
How frames embedded in 
text can be reconstructed 
• Inductively construct an inventory of frames based on 
media content, public discourse, literature review 
• List framing and reasoning devices that are most 
indicative of the identified frames (matrix: rows are 
the frames, columns are the devices) 
• Deductively determine to what extent these framing 
devices are present in the complete data set  
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Author Phenomenon Components 
Van Gorp 
(2007), Fisher 
(1997), Nelson 
and Willey 
(2003) 
What limits and 
challenges framing 
research 
• Labor intensive 
• No guaranteed yield 
• Researcher subjectivity is inevitable 
• Frames are not literally outlined in the text 
• Frames lack fixed and quantifiable markers 
o Cannot identify frames by counting key 
words or phrases, or specific argumentative 
structures 
• Just one frame element in the text can be enough to 
suggest  or recall the whole set of elements 
o one part can stand for the whole 
• May need to be a member of the culture to find the 
storylines that characterize cultural frames 
• Frames are slippery and hard to measure 
 
deLeon (1998) What approach to policy 
analysis makes sense 
• Positivistic—disaggregates, produces predictions, 
more empirical, feeble with “wicked” problems 
• Post-positivistic—views holistically, produces 
understanding and insights, more normative 
 
McLeod (2003) How frame analysis 
should be done 
methodologically 
• Prepare: Read widely among ideologically divergent 
sources to gain awareness of an array of potential 
frames for the topic under study 
• Develop Frame Models: Develop preliminary models 
of frames and sub-frames (the more, the better) 
• Analysis: Match frames to sponsor groups, sensitize 
yourself to symbolic representations, develop 
hypotheses of relationships among frames, 
ideologies, narrative structures 
• Methods: Identify methods appropriate to studying 
frames in the context of selected topic 
 
Tankard (2003) How frame construction 
can be done with a list of 
frames approach 
• To determine how an issue or event is portrayed (in 
the news) 
• Attempts to be precise about frame definitions and 
systematic about procedures used in identifying 
frames 
• More systematic than quantitative 
• Assumes there are defining characteristics of media 
frames and that different observers/coders can 
recognize and agree upon them 
• How to: 
o Identify a list of frames for the particular 
domain of interest 
o Specify keywords, catchphrases and images 
that will help detect each frame 
o Identify frames in a content analysis 
 
Tankard (2003) How inter-coder reliability 
can be achieved 
• Collapse frame categories into 2, e.g., those pro and 
those con 
• Narrow the conception of framing to one dimension, 
such as causation 
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Author Phenomenon Components 
Schon and Rein 
(1994) 
How policy controversy 
can be addressed 
• Continuation or escalation—improve strategies for 
attack or defense 
• Marketing strategy—better understand wants and 
needs of object and reshape policy object to better 
meet needs, wants 
• Negotiation—find a compromise; convert win-lose to 
win-win by finding situations of joint gain 
• Co-design—cooperative policy design (requires 
frame reflection) 
 
Schon and Rein 
(1994) 
How a “policy ladder” can 
help us see the hierarchy 
of frame concepts 
1. Policy practices—regulation, screening, verification 
2. Policy object—set of rules, laws, prohibitions, 
entitlements, resources allocations 
3. Policy-making process—includes its debates and 
struggles 
4. Policy frames—positions and arguments used by 
advocates and opponents; pertains to specific policy 
issue 
5. Institutional action frames—values, perspectives held 
by particular institutions and interest groups; #4 
derived from these 
6. Meta-cultural frames—broadly shared beliefs, values 
and perspectives among societal members; #5 
derived from these 
 
Schon and Rein 
(1994) 
How meta-cultural frames 
can be understood 
• Action frames can be mapped to these 
• Examples w/ typical responses: 
o Market frame—when market fails, state 
should restore the market 
o Social welfare frame—when market fails, 
state has obligation to help people in need; 
individuals are just the starting point for 
understanding the problem 
o Social control frame—society must protect 
itself against criminals etc./ social problem 
defined in terms of problem people 
(victimizers) 
 
Schon and Rein 
(1994) 
How frame reflection 
should be done 
• Recognize discrepant frames from which conflicting 
policy positions arise 
• Subject them to critical reflection 
 
 142 
 
Author Phenomenon Components 
 
Stone (2002) 
 
What the typical policy 
argument entails 
 
• Goals, problems and solutions 
• Each construction is often politically constructed and 
invokes a different set of rules 
 
Stone (2002) What the generic goals 
are in policy making 
• Equity—everyone gets the same; distributive justice 
o Recipients—who is everyone? Distribute by 
membership, rank, group? 
o Items—what is the division? Divide by 
boundary of item, value of item? 
o Process—how to divide? Divide by 
competition, lottery, or voting? 
• Efficiency—getting the most out of a given input 
o Who gets the benefits and bears the 
burdens of a policy? 
o How should we measure the values and 
costs of a policy? 
• Security—Minimum requirements for biological 
survival 
o Valuation—how to assess need; by 
satisfaction derived or material value? 
o Standards—how to measure need; by a 
fixed or relative standard? 
o Purpose—for immediate survival or higher 
purpose? 
o Time—for current needs or needs in the 
future? 
o Unit of analysis—needs of individuals or 
needs of people in relation to society 
• Liberty—People free to do what they want as long as 
no harm is done 
o Defining harm to individual—material, risk, 
aesthetic, emotional/psychological, 
spiritual/moral 
o Defining harm to group/community—
structural/capacity, accumulative, extent 
(harm to 1 or all), harm by omission 
o Whose liberty should be curtailed 
 
Stone (2002) How policy problems can 
be defined or portrayed 
• Symbols 
• Numbers 
• Causes 
• Interests 
• Decisions 
 
Stone (2002) What generic strategies 
can be used in policy 
solutions 
• Inducements 
• Rules 
• Facts 
• Rights 
• Powers 
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 Appendix C: Data Collection and Analysis for Each Aim 
 As mentioned in Chapter 4, the research had four aims and the data collection and 
analysis process varied from aim to aim.   
 To recap, the following data collection instruments were used for each aim.  Aim 1 used 
an outline; Aim 2 used a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and iterative memos; and, Aim 3 used an 
interview guide. These are shown in the following pages.  More information on data sourcing, 
collection and analysis is also presented in this Appendix. 
 Data Collection and Analysis for Aim 1  
 To provide a history and overview of the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (ODA), an outline 
of key elements was developed and used as the data collection instrument.  Though not typically 
considered a “data collection instrument,” the outline did serve as a reminder of what data 
needed to be collected to complete the aim. As data were discovered and analyzed, each section 
of the outline was completed. 
 A summarized version of the outline is shown below. 
1. Summary and Overview of the Orphan Drug Act of 1983  
2. Early history of ODA—Leading up to Enactment 
3. Evolution of ODA post-enactment 
4. Unintended Effects of ODA (focusing on the issue that incentives were intended for 
drugs of limited commercial value) 
 
 Aim 1 data included peer-reviewed articles, articles found in the general and business 
press, government documents and reports, and information found on key stakeholder websites.  
In mid-2006, a comprehensive search for literature regarding the ODA’s history and evolution 
was conducted.  This search yielded 79 articles.  Between mid-2006 and 2008, articles and other 
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gray literature reports were added to this initial base of 79 articles if they provided new 
information.  The mid-2006 literature search method will now be described. 
 2006 Literature Search Methods 
 The first step of this review was to identify a set of peer-reviewed articles, from a 
credible health science database, that contained a discussion of ODA problems.  These articles 
formed the initial core of the review.  From this core, additional articles were added to help 
explain and verify points made in the core articles.  The core articles were identified via an 
electronic database search of PubMed.  Additional articles were identified via the literature 
review method known as snowball sampling.  This sampling technique is like a chain reaction, in 
that one article leads to another.  Leads to additional articles were primarily derived by reviewing 
references in articles and reviewing those references for relevance to the study. 
 PubMed Search for the Core Articles 
 PubMed includes over 16 million citations from MEDLINE and other life science 
journals for biomedical articles dating back to the 1950s. 
 After considerable experimentation with search terms, Medical Subject Headings 
(MeSH) were found to be most efficient and effective. The MeSH term “Orphan Drug 
Production” was used in the PubMed search.  This term is defined as “production of drugs or 
biologicals which are unlikely to be manufactured by private industry unless special incentives 
are provided by others.”  The MeSH search was restricted in 3 ways: 1) By using Limits that 
restricted the output to publications written in English and publications that were dated from 
1980 to 2006 (including commentary just prior to ODA enactment to the present); 2) By 
restricting the search to Major Topic Headings Only; and, 3) By limiting the MeSH search to 
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selected Orphan Drug Production subheadings. Subheadings were “economics,” “legislation and 
jurisprudence,” and, “ethics.” 
 Of the 110 article summaries retrieved using this PubMed search, 39 articles were 
included in this literature review.  Included articles had to address the history and outcomes of 
the ODA, or include a discussion of needed modifications or shortcomings, and, focus on 
orphan drugs over other orphan products, focus on the U.S. over other countries, and be 
published in English between 1980 and 2006, inclusive.  All titles of the 110 articles were 
reviewed and, when available, all abstracts were reviewed.  Approximately 50 articles were 
targeted for inclusion in the literature review.  For each of these 50 articles, full content was 
subsequently obtained and reviewed. Eleven of the 50 articles were then found to be off the 
mark, leaving the 39 final PubMed articles. 
 Factiva Database Search 
 Factiva provides tools for searching and monitoring general news and company, industry, 
and other business information.  Factiva content is drawn from more than 10,000 sources from 
152 countries in 22 languages, including more than 120 continuously updated newswires.  The 
aim of using Factiva was to do a check to make sure that the PubMed articles adequately 
covered issues of interest (e.g., history and outcomes of the ODA, or discussions of needed 
modifications or shortcomings).  Articles included from the Factiva search were provided only if 
they included new information.  In other words, Factiva articles complemented the core 
PubMed articles.  The Factiva search was not restricted by date of publication, but was restricted 
to articles that were published in English. 
 The “More Like This” search feature in Factiva had the highest yield of articles that met 
the inclusion criteria. A 2006 article by Haffner seemed most representative of the desired 
articles so the “More Like This” link was used to find Factiva articles like the Haffner article.  In 
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Factiva, the More Like This link selected keywords from the headline and lead sentences of the 
Haffner article. These terms were then connected by the "OR" operator to run a new search. A 
More Like This search was also conducted using an article that discussed how Orphan Drug 
costs were straining budgets.  As the most relevant documents are presented first in a More Like 
This search, only the first 50 documents in each of these two searches (a total of 100 articles) 
were read by this researcher.  Approximately 10 articles were duplicates from the PubMed search.  
Duplicates from each of the two Factiva searches were also eliminated.  Ten new articles met the 
Factiva inclusion criteria and were included in this review.   
 Snowball Search 
 The references in nearly all 39 PubMed-found articles were reviewed for leads to articles 
that would provide broader context or explain concepts addressed in the PubMed articles.   
From this approach, 15 articles were added to the literature database. 
 Personal Knowledge 
 Fifteen articles were discovered by means other than the above—mainly through this 
researcher’s prior knowledge of the article.  For example, this researcher had prior knowledge of 
five 2005 articles from a Wall Street Journal series on specialty drugs (four articles by Anand 
2005 and one by Horowitz 2005).  Four of these articles did not appear in the Factiva search, 
but were included in the 2006 literature review because they contained relevant information 
about development of drugs for rare diseases. 
 This researcher also had previous knowledge of a number of relevant articles based on 
her extensive experience in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries and previous graduate 
public health coursework.  Included articles addressed drug patents (Barton et al 2005), drug 
pricing (Gregson et al 2005 and Arnst 2006), drug sales revenues (Grabowski and Vernon 2000), 
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drug company ethics (Hatch 2003), and drug research and development costs (Cockburn 2004 
and DiMasi et al 2003). Also, this researcher discovered an Office of the Inspector General 
report (2001) during a search for government studies on orphan drugs.  The report was found 
via a Google search. This particular report was not cited in the PubMed search. 
 Literature Search Results  
 A summary of the results from this initial 2006 literature search is shown in Table C2.  
An annotated bibliography of the 79 articles can be found under separate cover. 
 
Results of 2006 Literature Search: 
Total Number of Articles Found (Hits) vs. Total Number of Articles Included 
 
Strategy 
 
Total Number of Hits 
 
Number Included 
 
1--Electronic Databases 
  PubMed 
  Factiva 
 
210 
110 
100* 
 
49 
39 
10 
2--Snowball Method n/a 15 
3--Personal Knowledge n/a 15 
TOTAL  79 
   *(1st 50 articles in each of two searches) 
 Characteristics of the 2006 Literature Search Articles 
Most of the 79 articles could be characterized as narrative reviews or opinion pieces 
regarding the ODA and related issues.  The data to support expressed opinions were typically in 
the form of single case descriptions or single scenarios.  The history of ODA and related events 
were often described in the articles, along with selected contextual factors.  Supporting data were 
typically derived from informant interviews, legislative and regulatory publications, corporate 
records and a variety of other sources. 
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Cross-sectional data were also used to support claims in the articles.  The latest FDA 
data on the number of orphan drugs approved and the number in development were most often 
quoted.  The latest FDA count of orphan drugs was usually compared to the pre-1983 count to 
support the claim of ODA success in spurring industry development of orphan drugs.  Other 
cross-sectional data included prevalence counts of selected rare diseases and conditions, and 
dollar revenue and pricing data on selected drugs.
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 Data Collection and Analysis for Aim 2-Step 1 
 To investigate issue frames used in the ODA amendment hearings from 1990-1994, data 
were collected in accordance with the following variable and coding descriptions.  Data were 
recorded in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. 
Data Collection and Classification 
 
Variable Description Coding Categories 
 
Speaker 
 
What is the name of the speaker? 
 
 
Open code: insert speaker’s name 
 
Organization What is the name of speaker’s 
organization? 
 
Open code: insert organization name 
Authority In whose name are statements made? Industry, Public, Patients/family, Government, Payers, 
Academia/Research, Other (specify) 
 
Subject What is the testimony about, i.e., which 
bill in Congress? 
 
H.R. 4638, S. 2576, S. 2060, H.R. 4959, H.R. 3930, H.R. 
4160, H.R. 4865 
 
Valence How is the subject treated? 
 
Positive/supportive; Negative/opposed; both; neither 
 
Rationale What is rationale for valence? 
 
Open code: insert verbatim excerpt 
Evidence What evidence is presented to support 
the speaker’s position? 
 
Open code: insert verbatim excerpt 
Values What values, goals, or wants are 
revealed in rationale? 
 
Equity, Efficiency, Security, Liberty, other (specify) 
 
Values 
Verbatim 
What leads the coder to conclude the 
basis for “Values” coding? 
 
Open code: insert verbatim excerpt or insert coder 
explanation 
Level 1 
Problem 
Why does speaker’s position matter? 
What problem(s) is to be solved by 
support or opposition to amendment? 
(implied or stated) 
 
Open code: if problem is implied, coder to insert 
implication.  If problem is stated, coder to insert verbatim 
comment 
 
Cause What is the cause of the problem to be 
solved—that is implied or stated? 
Open code: if cause is implied, coder to insert implication.  
If cause is stated, coder to insert verbatim comment 
 
Rules What rules or belief system would be 
used to solve the problem? 
 
Ethical/moral, economic, legal, clinical/medical, other 
Rules 
Verbatim 
What leads the coder to conclude the 
basis for “Rules” coding? 
 
Open code: insert verbatim excerpt 
Remedy What remedy to the problem does the 
speaker suggest? (implied or stated) 
Open code: if remedy is implied, coder to insert implication.  
If remedy is stated, coder to insert verbatim comment  
 
Metaphors Does the speaker use metaphors to 
explain phenomena? Specify. 
 
Open code up to 5 metaphors 
Categories Does the speaker use categories to 
explain phenomena? Specify. 
Open code up to 5 categories 
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 The codebook that guided data entry for selected items in Aim 3—Step 1 follows.  
 
Data Collection Codebook 
 
Variable Coding Categories Specifications 
 
Speaker 
 
Open code: insert 
speaker’s name 
 
Column 1: Assign ID# starting with 001 
Column 2: Input last name 
Column 3: Input first name 
 
Organizati
on 
Open code: insert 
organization name 
 
Column 4: Input org name 
Column 5:  Input department name if applicable 
 
Authority Industry, Public, 
Patients/family, 
Government, Payers, 
Academia/Research, Other 
(specify) 
 
Column 6:  
Industry, i.e., pharmaceutical or biotechnology firms or industry group (e.g., 
PhRMA, BIO) representatives 
Public, i.e., all Americans 
Patients/Family, i.e., individuals directly affected by rare health conditions 
Government, i.e., Executive, Legislative, Judicial branches, federal, state or 
local 
Payers, i.e.,3rd party that pays for medications on behalf of patients such as 
Insurance companies, managed care organizations, employers, Medicare, 
Medicaid 
Academic/Research, i.e., organizations that study the ODA to inform 
decisions or devise policies (include GAO or OMB here?) 
Other 
 
Column 7: Specify “other” 
Subject H.R. 4638, S. 2576, S. 
2060, H.R. 4959, H.R. 
3930, H.R. 4160, H.R. 
4865 
 
Column 8: Input Bill # 
 
Valence Positive/supportive; 
Negative/opposed; both; 
neither 
 
Column 9 
 
Rationale Open code: insert verbatim 
excerpt 
Column 10 
Evidence Open code: insert verbatim 
excerpt 
Column 11 
Values Equity, Efficiency, Security, 
Liberty, other (specify) 
 
See definitions from Stone 
(2002) 
 
Column 12 
 
Column 13 (specify “other) 
 
Values 
Verbatim 
Open code: insert verbatim 
excerpt or insert coder 
explanation 
Column 14 
Level 1 
Problem 
Open code: if problem is 
implied, coder to insert 
implication.  If problem is 
stated, coder to insert 
verbatim comment 
 
Column 15 
Cause Open code: if cause is 
implied, coder to insert 
implication.  If cause is 
stated, coder to insert 
verbatim comment 
 
Column 16 
Rules Ethical/moral, economic, 
legal, clinical/medical, 
other 
 
Column 17 
 
Column 18 (specify “other) 
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Data Collection Codebook (continued) 
 
Variable Coding Categories Specifications 
Rules 
Verbatim 
Open code: insert verbatim 
excerpt 
Column 19 
Remedy Open code: if remedy is 
implied, coder to insert 
implication.  If remedy is 
stated, coder to insert 
verbatim comment  
 
Column 20 
Metaphors Open code up to 5 
metaphors 
Columns 21-25 
Categories Open code up to 5 
categories 
Column 26-30 
 
 
 
Examples of five coded testimonies are shown on the following two pages. Note that not all 
sought after data points were included in every witness statement.  For example, some witnesses 
made claims but did not provide evidence to support these claims.  In this case, no data were 
entered in the cell for “evidence.”  Or, only a few witnesses used a metaphor in their statement.  
When metaphors were used, the metaphor was input into its designated cell.  If a metaphor was 
not used in the witness’s statement, the cell was left blank. 
 The name, organization, and subject of the testimony associated with each of the four 
example witnesses are described below. 
  
1. James Benson, Acting Commissioner of FDA, HR 4638 
2. Tom Wiggans, President Serono Labs, S 2060 
3. Herb Jacobsen, Representing self (personal situation), S 2060 
4. Abbey Meyers, President NORD, S 2060 
5. Tom Wiggans, President of BIO, HR 416 
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Example Testimony as Coded Per Data Collection Specification for Aim 2-Step 1 
 ID Valence Rationale Evidence Values Values Quote 
1 Con 
ODA has worked well 
to accomplish its 
objectives; any 
change to the law 
(eg. exclusivity) 
would likely make the 
law less effective 
which would hurt pts 
The reasons for changing from 
profitability to prevalence standard 
in the 1985 ODA amendment 
were b/c the profitability standard 
didn't work. . . Current standard 
works-based on # of drugs 
developed 
Efficiency, 
security 
Efficiency: Prevalence 
standard better than 
profitability standard in 
producing desired results.  
No program eligibility 
standard will be 100% 
effective.  Security: change 
in ODA could deprive 
patients of desperately 
needed therapies 
2 Pro 
ODA shouldn't apply 
to hgh 
hgh already available before 
ODA, 5 companies were 
developing rHGH before ODA, 
hgh has always been 
commercially viable, the 85 ODA 
amendment changed rules of 
game for firms that had already 
invested in hgh 
efficiency, 
equity 
"the rules shouldn't be 
changed in midstream" 
3 Pro 
high cost of Ceredase 
due to lack of 
competition 
Genzyme's pricing and the burden 
of paying for Ceredase 
efficiency, 
security,  
equity 
pts being victimized, 
assaulted by the deadliest 
weapon in this era, 
unbridled greed 
4 Pro 
"Ceredase is the 
Orphan Drug that 
broke the camel's 
back" 
High prices of ODs as examples 
of unscrupulous companies 
security, 
liberty, equity 
pts need Congress's 
protection from 
unscrupulous companies 
who charge beyond what 
the market can bear 
5 Pro 
Put an end to 
controversy, provide 
greater certainty for 
industry to make 
investment decisions 
re: ODs 
Congress has threatened 
amendments for several years. 
Uncertainty is compounded by 
proposed health care reforms--
later mentions support for "joint 
development" amendment will 
"make sure it is not a winner-take-
all game any more" 
security, 
liberty   
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Example Testimony as Coded Per Data Collection Specification for Aim 2-Step 1 (continued) 
 ID Lev1 Problem Cause Rules Rules Quote Remedy Metaphors 
1 
(there is no 
problem) OD 
therapies are 
desperately 
needed by pts, 
the more that 
get Rx, the 
better; pt needs 
outweigh risk of 
changing a law 
that works pretty 
well 
If law is 
changed, pts 
may get fewer 
Ods 
Legal, 
economic, 
medical 
Legal: law creates inducements 
which work well; economic: 
altering exclusivity could lower 
firms' profit potential and 
decrease OD development; 
medical: pts need help 
leave ODA 
alone n/a 
2 
ODA blocked 
Serono from 
market causing 
them to lose 
money 
rules were 
changed for hgh 
mfrs 
Legal, 
economic, 
medical 
GNE's exclusivity is an abuse 
of the law, "a billion dollar drug 
is no orphan"…..let competition 
work where it was intended to 
work, eliminate this blatant 
circumvention of Congressional 
intent.. The ODA was enacted 
by Congress to help pts, not 
companies 
change rules 
so that they 
are fair 
"if Protropin 
is an 'orphan 
drug', it has 
found its 
Daddy 
Warbucks." 
3 
not fair, pts in 
desperate need 
"given them a 
monopoly w/ no 
accountability" 
"incredible 
abuse of sick 
and defenseless 
human beings" 
Economic, 
legal, moral 
give it a dose of medicine--the 
free enterprise system, 
competition legislation 
victims, 
assault by 
pharma 
4 
unfair, 
companies " 
feed on the 
desperation of 
families" 
 Unscrup-ulous 
companies 
 Economic, 
legal,  
moral 
"only the rich will live and the 
poor will die" 
Congress 
needs to take 
responsibility 
for rare 
disease pts " 
our lives are 
in your 
hands" 
"feed on 
desperation" 
parasite 
5 Uncertainty 
Congressional 
threats 
compounded by 
health reform 
debate, lack of 
compromise 
solution to ODA 
amendments 
Legal, 
economic n/a n/a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
game 
 
 154 
 Data Collection and Analysis for Aim 2-Step 2 
 In this step, frames were constructed from Step 1 data using a process called memoing.  
“A memo is the theorizing write up of ideas about codes and their relationships as they strike the 
analyst while coding . . . it can be a sentence, a paragraph or a few pages . . . it exhausts the 
analyst’s momentary ideation based on data with perhaps a little conceptual elaboration. . .” 
(Miles and Huberman 1994 p. 72, quoting Glaser 1978).  In the proposal stage of this research, it 
was thought that the researcher would simply begin writing a memo for each frame.  It was 
proposed that a reminder of what the researcher should look for be written at the top of the 
memo as shown below. 
 
 
Frame Construction Memo 
 
Objective: To construct a frame from the Congressional Testimony 
 
Reminder: Frames are organizing principles that are socially shared and 
persistent over time that work symbolically to meaningfully structure 
the world (Reese 2003).  To frame is to “select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, 
in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation 
for the item described” (Entman 1993, p. 52).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 However, the memoing process for this research was much less structured.  As Miles 
and Huberman suggest, the memoing process began as a loose collection of notes that were 
made during the process of coding the Congressional testimony.  However, once the coding was 
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completed, this researcher still had not formulated the idea that there were X frames and, 
therefore, X memos needed to be written.  Instead, the researcher began her seven-day journey 
of constructing frames with no particular frames in mind at all. 
 Much of the first and second day of the 7-day frame construction process were spent 
reviewing framing fundamentals and exploring basic questions such as “what is a frame,” “what 
does it look like,” and, “what clues should I use to find it?” Appendix B and Chapter 3 were 
reviewed, and selected books and articles were reread.  In the first day or two, the researcher 
attempted to use some of the coding categories to create frames.  For example, the idea of using 
Stone’s (2002) 4 categories of values or goals was explored, meaning, the idea of creating a 
“security frame”, a “liberty frame,” an “equity frame,” and an “efficiency frame” was explored.  
Other explorations included constructing frames from the metaphors that were mentioned in 
the testimony, or constructing frames from the coded “rules” categories (e.g., constructing legal, 
moral, and economic frames).  The ideas of constructing frames based on stakeholder groups, or 
based on whether witnesses emphasized the ODA reform process, structure or outcomes were 
also explored. 
 Frames began to emerge in day 2 or 3 when the researcher used the latter part of Nelson 
and Willey’s (2003) definition of an issue frame, i.e., descriptions of social policies and problems 
that shape understanding of how the problem came to be and the important criteria by which 
policy solutions should be evaluated.  In various Congressional testimonies, witnesses made 
assertions about how proposed ODA reform should be judged.  A list of these assertions was 
made and elements of their arguments were noted.  These were put into a matrix, similar to one 
that Van Gorp (2007) has described.  Frames were put into the columns of the matrix and 
“framing and reasoning devices” (Van Gorp 2007) were put into the rows.  Four frames had 
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emerged by day 4, and days 4 through 7 were spent revising the frame matrix, which is now 
Table 10, until no other revisions seemed necessary or compelling. 
 The frame construction process was done by a single researcher without input from 
others.  The frames were informally tested out in the informant interviews (Aim 3), when 
different positions on ODA reform were discussed and evaluated.  The frames seemed to help 
“organize and structure” (Reese 2003) arguments for and against ODA reform, and were not 
edited at all until this dissertation was reviewed by this researcher’s dissertation committee 
members.  In response to committee suggestion, the frame names were edited slightly and an 
error in logic on the Congressional Action frame was corrected. 
 Committee members agreed with the researcher’s contention that frames constructed 
from the Congressional testimony would likely differ from researcher to researcher.  But as 
agreed to in the proposal stage of this dissertation research, an information-rich frame 
construction method that might have poor inter-coder reliability was chosen over one that might 
yield frames with good inter-coder reliability but limited usefulness. 
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 Data Collection Instrument for Aim 3 
 To investigate ODA amendment failure from 1990-1994, an interview guide was 
developed and used as the data collection instrument during one-on-one telephone interviews 
with 10 informants.  The following preliminary interview guide was customized for each 
interview: 
1. How have you been involved in the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (ODA)? 
a. When were you involved? 
b. What was your role? 
c. What was your affiliation? 
2. What did you think of the 1990-1994 amendments . . . did events unfold as you 
expected?  Why/Why not? (This is a “warm-up” question and is purposely open-ended.) 
3. What factors may have impeded ODA reforms that were proposed from 1990-1994? 
a. Use Table 2 to develop probes (e.g., whether there were problem definition, 
policy, or political issues that impeded reform) 
4. What are your thoughts about the future of the issue these amendments attempted to 
address (i.e., use of incentives for high-commercial-potential drugs)? 
a. Probes: Is this issue being addressed now?  Or, since 1994? 
b. Probes: What would you like to see happen with regard to this issue? 
i. Do something . . . what?  Why? 
ii. Do nothing . . . why? 
5. Do you have a favorite theory about why some public policies get approved and others 
don’t?  Or, perhaps, a checklist of important things a public policy must have in order to 
get approved? 
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 Appendix D: Informant Correspondence 
 At the end of October 2008, a letter or email with the following information was sent to 
a list of 16 potential informants.  Ten interviews were completed during the month of 
November 2008. 
 
Dear X: 
 
I would like to conduct a 20-30 minute phone interview with you as part of my doctoral 
dissertation research.  I am interested in hearing your perspectives on the Orphan Drug 
Act, a public law that encourages development of drugs for individuals with rare diseases 
and conditions.  I am particularly interested in issues that prompted amendment 
attempts in the 1990s, and why the attempts were not successful. 
 
My dissertation, The Orphan Drug Act of 1983: A Case Study of Issue Framing and the 
Failure to Effect Policy Change from 1990-1994, is being completed as part of the health 
policy and management doctoral program in the School of Public Health, University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
 
Please let me know a good time to call you at your earliest convenience.  I would greatly 
appreciate it. 
 
By the way, your answers and comments would remain confidential and anonymous, and 
I would not audio record the interview.  
 
Thank you in advance for your help. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Lynn Redington, MPH, MBA, DrPH Candidate 
(contact information was provided) 
 159 
Appendix E: The Orphan Drug Act (as amended) 
 The text of the current law is included below.  This was accessed and copied September 
10, 2007 from http://www.fda.gov/orphan/oda.htm 
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS FOR THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT 
The Congress finds that--- 
(1) there are many diseases and conditions, such as Huntington's disease, myoclonus, 
ALS (Lou Gehrig's disease), Tourette syndrome, and muscular dystrophy which affect 
such small numbers of individuals residing in the United States that the diseases and 
conditions are considered rare in the United States; 
(2) adequate drugs for many of such diseases and conditions have not been developed; 
(3) drugs for these diseases and conditions are commonly referred to as "orphan drugs"; 
(4) because so few individuals are affected by any one rare disease or condition, a 
pharmaceutical company which develops an orphan drug may reasonably expect the 
drug to generate relatively small sales in comparison to the cost of developing the drug 
and consequently to incur a financial loss; 
(5) there is reason to believe that some promising orphan drugs will not be developed 
unless changes are made in the applicable Federal laws to reduce the costs of developing 
such drugs and to provide financial incentives to develop such drugs; and 
(6) it is in the public interest to provide such changes and incentives for the development 
of orphan drugs. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DRUGS FOR RARE DISEASES OR 
CONDITIONS  
SEC. 525 [360aa]. 
(a) The sponsor of a drug for a disease or condition which is rare in the States may 
request the Secretary to provide written recommendations for the nonclinical and clinical 
investigations which must be conducted with the drug before--- 
(1) it may be approved for such disease or condition under section 505,  
(2) if the drug is an antibiotic, it may be certified for such disease or condition under 
section 507, or  
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(3) if the drug is a biological product, it may be licensed for such disease or condition 
under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act.  
If the Secretary has reason to believe that a drug for which a request is made under this 
section is a drug for a disease or condition which is rare in the States, the Secretary shall 
provide the person making the request written recommendations for the nonclinical and 
clinical investigations which the Secretary believes, on the basis of information available 
to the Secretary at the time of the request under this section, would be necessary for 
approval of such drug for such disease or condition under section 505, certification of 
such drug for such disease or condition under section 507, or licensing of such drug for 
such disease or condition under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act.  
1. The Secretary shall by regulation promulgate procedures for the implementation 
of subsection (a).  
DESIGNATION OF DRUGS FOR RARE DISEASES OR CONDITIONS  
SEC. 526 [360bb]. (a)(1) The manufacturer or the sponsor of a drug may request the 
Secretary to designate the drug as a drug for a rare disease or condition. A request for 
designation of a drug shall be made before the submission of an application under 
section 505(b) for the drug, the submission of an application for certification of the drug 
under section 507, or the submission of an application for licensing of the drug under 
section 351 of the Public Health Service Act. If the Secretary finds that a drug for which 
a request is submitted under this subsection is being or will be investigated for a rare 
disease or condition and--- 
(A) if an application for such drug is approved under section 505,  
(B) if a certification for such drug is issued under section 507, or  
(C) if a license for such drug is issued under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act, 
the approval, certification, or license would be for use for such disease or condition, the 
Secretary shall designate the drug as a drug for such disease or condition. A request for a 
designation of a drug under this subsection shall contain the consent of the applicant to 
notice being given by the Secretary under subsection (b) respecting the designation of 
the drug.  
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term “rare disease or condition” means any 
disease or condition which (A) affects less than 200,000 persons in the United States, or 
(B) affects more than 200,000 in the United States and for which there is no reasonable 
expectation that the cost of developing and making available in the United States a drug 
for such disease or condition will recovered from sales in the United States of such drug. 
Determinations under the preceding sentence with respect to any drug shall be made on 
the basis of the facts and circumstances as of the date the request for designation of the 
drug under this subsection is made. 
(b) A designation of a drug under subsection (a) shall be subject to the condition that--- 
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(1) if an application was approved for the drug under section 505(b), a certificate was 
issued for the drug under section 507, or a license was issued for the drug under section 
351 of the Public Health Service Act, the manufacturer of the drug will notify the 
Secretary of any discontinuance of the production of the drug at least one year before 
discontinuance, and  
(2) if an application has not been approved for the drug under section 505(b), a 
certificate has not been issued for the drug under section 507, or a license has not been 
issued for the drug under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act and if preclinical 
investigations or investigations under section 505(i) are being conducted with the drug, 
the manufacturer or sponsor of the drug will notify the Secretary of any decision to 
discontinue active pursuit of approval of an application under section 505(b), approval 
of an application for certification under section 507, or approval of a license under 
section 351 of the Public Health Service Act.  
(c) Notice respecting the designation of a drug under subsection (a) shall be made 
available to the public. 
(d) The Secretary shall by regulation promulgate procedures for the implementation of 
subsection (a).  
PROTECTION FOR DRUGS FOR RARE DISEASES OR CONDITIONS  
SEC. 527 [360cc]. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), if the Secretary--- 
(1) approves an application filed pursuant to section 505(b),  
(2) issues a certification under section 507, or  
(3) issues a license under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act for a drug 
designated under section 526 for a rare disease or condition, the Secretary may not 
approve another application under section 505(b), issue another certification under 
section 507, or issue another license under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act 
for such drug for such disease or condition for a person who is not the holder of such 
approved application, of such certification, or of such license until the expiration seven 
years from the date of the approval of the approved application, the issuance of the 
certification or the issuance of the license. Section 505(c)(2) does not apply to the refusal 
to approve an application under the preceding sentence.  
(b) If an application filed pursuant to section 505(b) is approved for a drug designated 
under section 526 for a rare disease or condition, if a certification is issued under section 
507 for such a drug or if a license is issued under section 351 of the Public Health 
Service Act for such a drug, the Secretary may, during the seven-year period beginning 
on the date of the application approval, of the issuance of the certification under section 
507, or of the issuance of the license, approve another application under section 505(b), 
issue another certification under section 507, or, issue a license under section 351 of the 
Public Health Service Act, for such drug for such disease or condition for a person who 
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is not the holder of such approved application, of such certification, or of such license if-
-- 
(1) the Secretary finds, after providing the holder notice and opportunity for the 
submission of views, that in such period the holder of the approved application, of the 
certification, or of the license cannot assure the availability of sufficient quantities of the 
drug to meet the needs of persons with the disease or condition for which the drug was 
designated; or  
(2) such holder provides the Secretary in writing the consent of such holder for the 
approval of other applications, issuance of other certifications, or the issuance of other 
licenses before the expiration of such seven-year period.  
OPEN PROTOCOLS FOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DRUGS FOR RARE DISEASES OR 
CONDITIONS  
SEC. 528 [360dd]. If a drug is designated under section 526 as a drug for a rare disease 
or condition and if notice of a claimed exemption under section 505(i) or regulations 
issued thereunder is filed for such drug, the Secretary shall encourage the sponsor of 
such drug to design protocols for clinical investigations of the drug which may be 
conducted under the exemption to permit the addition to the investigations of persons 
with the disease or condition who need the drug to treat the disease or condition and 
who cannot be satisfactorily treated by available alternative drugs.  
GRANTS AND CONTRACTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF DRUGS FOR RARE DISEASES 
AND CONDITIONS  
SEC. 5. [360ee](a) The Secretary may make grants to and enter into contracts with public 
and private entities and individuals to assist in (1) defraying the costs of qualified clinical 
testing expenses incurred in connection with the development of drugs for rare diseases 
and conditions, (2) defraying the costs of developing medical devices for rare diseases or 
conditions, and (3) defraying the costs of developing medical foods for rare diseases or 
conditions. 
(b) For purposes of subsection (a): 
(1) The term “qualified testing” means---  
(A) human clinical testing---  
(i) which is carried out under an exemption for a drug for a rare disease or condition 
under section 505(i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (or regulations issued 
under such section);  
(ii) which occurs after the date such drug is designated under section 526 of such Act 
and before the date on which an application with respect to such drug is submitted 
under section 506(b) or 507 of such Act or under section 351 of the Public Health 
Service Act; and  
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(B) preclinical testing involving a drug is designated under section 526 of such Act and 
before the date on which an application with respect to such drug is submitted under 
section 505(b) or 507 of such Act or under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act. 
(2) The term “rare disease or condition” means 
(A) in the case of a drug, any disease or conditions which (A) affects less than 200,000 
persons in the United States, or (B) affects more than 200,000 in the United States and 
for which there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making 
available in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be recovered from 
sales in the United States of such drug,  
(B) in the case of a medical device, any disease or condition that occurs so infrequently 
in the United States that there is no reasonable expectation that a medical device for 
such disease or condition will be developed without assistance under subsection (a), and  
(C) in the case of a medical food, any disease or condition that occurs so infrequently in 
the United States that there is no reasonable expectation that a medical food for such 
disease or condition will be developed without assistance under subsection (a). 
Determinations under the preceding sentence with respect to any drug shall be made on 
the basis of the facts and circumstances as of the date the request for designation of the 
drug under section 526 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is made.  
(D) The term “medical food” means a food which is formulated to be consumed or 
administered enterally under the supervision of a physician and which is intended for the 
specific dietary management of a disease or condition for which distinctive nutritional 
requirements, based on recognized scientific principles, are established by medical 
evaluation.  
(c) For grants and contracts under subsection (a) there are authorized to be appropriated 
$10,000,000 for fiscal year 1988, $12,000,000 for fiscal year 1989, $14,000,000 for fiscal 
year 1990. 
(d) STUDY.---The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall conduct a study to 
determine whether the application of subchapter B of chapter V of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (relating to drugs for rare diseases and conditions) and section 
28 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to tax credit) to medical devices or 
medical foods for rare diseases or conditions or to both is needed to encourage the 
development of such devices and foods. The Secretary shall report the results of the 
study to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and 
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources of the Senate not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act. For purposes of this section, the term "rare 
diseases or conditions" has the meaning prescribed by section 5 of the Orphan Drug Act 
(21 U.S.C. 360ee). 
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ORPHAN PRODUCTS BOARD  
SEC. 227 [236]. (a) There is established in the Department of Health and Human 
Services a board for the development of drugs (including Biologics) and devices 
(including diagnostic products) for rare diseases or conditions to be known as the 
Orphan Products Board. The Board shall be comprised of the Assistant Secretary for 
Health of the Department of Health and Human Services and representatives, selected 
by the Secretary, of the Food and Drug Administration, the National Institutes Health, 
the Centers for Disease Control and, any other Federal department or agency which the 
Secretary determines has activities relating to drugs and devices for rare diseases or 
conditions. The Assistant Secretary for Health shall chair the Board. 
(b) The function of the Board shall be to promote the development of drugs and devices 
for rare diseases or conditions and the coordination among Federal, other public, and 
private agencies in carrying out their respective functions relating to the development of 
such articles for such diseases or conditions.  
(c) In the case of drugs for rare diseases or conditions the Board shall--- 
(1) evaluate---  
(A) the effect of subchapter B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act on the 
development of such drugs, and  
(B) the implementation of such subchapter;  
(2) evaluate the activities of the National Institutes of Health and the Alcohol, Drug 
Abuse, and Mental Health Administration for the development of drugs for such 
diseases or conditions, 
(3) assure appropriate coordination among the Food and Drug Administration, the 
National Institutes of Health, the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health 
Administration, and the Centers for Disease Control in the carrying out of their 
respective functions relating to the development of drugs for such diseases or conditions 
to assure that the activities of each agency are complementary, 
(4) assure appropriate coordination among all interested Federal agencies, manufacturers, 
and organizations representing patients, in their activities relating to such drugs, 
(5) with the consent of the sponsor of a drug for a rare disease or condition exempt 
under section 505(i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or regulations issued 
under such section, inform physicians and the public respecting the availability of such 
drug for such disease or condition and inform physicians and the public respecting the 
availability of drugs approved under section 505(c) of such Act or licensed under section 
351 of this Act for rare diseases or conditions, 
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(6) seek business entities and others to undertake the sponsorship of drugs for rare 
diseases or conditions, seek investigators to facilitate the development of such drugs, and 
seek business entities to participate in the distribution of such drugs, and 
(7) reorganize the efforts of public and private entities and individuals in seeking the 
development of drugs for rare diseases or conditions and in developing such drugs. 
(d) The Board shall consult with interested persons respecting the activities of the Board 
under this section and as part of such consultation shall provide the opportunity for the 
submission of oral views. 
(e) The Board shall submit to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources of the 
Senate and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives 
an annual report--- 
(1) identifying the drugs which have been designated under section 526 of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for a rare disease or condition,  
(2) describing the activities of the Board, and  
(3) containing the results of the evaluations carried out by the Board.  
The Director of the National Institutes of Health and the Administrator of the Alcohol, 
Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration shall submit to the Board for inclusion 
in the annual report a report on the rare disease and condition research activities of the 
Institutes of the National Institutes of Health and the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental 
Health Administration; the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the Board for 
inclusion in the annual report a report on the use of the credit against tax provided by 
section 44H of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; and the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services shall submit to the Board for inclusion in the annual report a report on 
the program of assistance under section 5 of the Orphan Drug Act for the development 
of drugs for rare diseases and conditions. Each annual report shall be submitted by June 
1 of each year for the preceding calendar year. 
http://www.fda.gov/orphan/oda.htm 
Accessed and copied September 10, 2007 
 
 166 
Appendix F: Stakeholder Organizations 
 The following information on important ODA stakeholder organizations was accessed 
and copied on September 10, 2007 from http://www.fda.gov/orphan/rdid/index.htm 
 
Office of Orphan Products Development 
Food and Drug Administration 
5600 Fishers Lane 
Rockville, Maryland 20857 
Telephone: (301) 827-3666 or 1-800-300-7469 
http://www.fda.gov/orphan/index.htm 
 
The Office of Orphan Products Development (OOPD) is dedicated to promoting the 
development of products that demonstrate promise for the diagnosis and/or treatment 
of rare diseases or conditions since 1982. OOPD interacts with the medical and research 
communities, professional organizations, academia, and the pharmaceutical industry, as 
well as rare disease groups. The OOPD administers the major provisions of the Orphan 
Drug Act (ODA) which provide incentives for sponsors to develop products for rare 
diseases. 
 
Office of Rare Diseases 
National Institutes of Health 
6100 Executive Boulevard, 3B-01  
Bethesda, Maryland 20892–7518 
Telephone: (301) 402–4336  
ord@od.nih.gov 
 
The Office of Rare Diseases (ORD) was established in 1993 within the Office of the 
Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). On November 6, 2002, the 
President established the Office in statute (Public Law 107-280, the Rare Diseases Act of 
2002). The goals of ORD are to stimulate and coordinate research on rare diseases and 
to support research to respond to the needs of patients who have any one of the more 
than 6,000 rare diseases known today. 
 
National Organization for Rare Disorders (NORD)  
55 Kenosia Avenue  
P. O. Box 1968  
Danbury, CT 06813-1968  
(800) 999-NORD(6673) or (203) 744-0100  
TDD Number (203) 797-9590 
E-mail: orphan@rarediseases.org  
www.rarediseases.org  
 
The National Organization for Rare Disorders is the federation of voluntary health 
organizations dedicated to helping people with rare “orphan” diseases and assisting the 
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organizations that serve them. NORD is committed to the identification, treatment, and 
cure of rare disorders through programs of education, advocacy, research, and service. 
 
Biotechnology Industry Organization 
1225 I Street NW, Suite 400 
Washington, DC 2005 
(202) 962-9200 
FAX (202) 962-9201 
E-mail: bio@bio.org 
www.bio.org  
 
The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) is the largest trade organization to serve 
and represent the emerging biotechnology in the United States and around the globe. 
 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
1100 15th Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20005  
(202) 835-3400 
1-800-762-4636 Patient Assistance Program  
www.phrma.org  
 
The mission of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America is to help 
the research-based pharmaceutical industry successfully meet its goal of discovering, 
developing, and bringing to market medicines to improve human health, patient 
satisfaction, and the quality of life around the world, as well as to reduce the overall cost 
of healthcare. 
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 Appendix G: President’s Disapproval of 1990 ODA Amendment 
 Background information on the Orphan Drug Act Amendment of 1990 (H.R. 4638) 
follows, along with a copy of the Memorandum of Disapproval that was issued from the office 
of President George H.W. Bush. 
 H.R. 4638 would have permitted simultaneous licensing of the same orphan product for 
the same indication if 1) the second company requested orphan designation within 6 months of 
publication by the FDA of its action to designate the drug for the first company; 2) the second 
company initiated human clinical trials not more than 12 months after the first company initiated 
clinical trials; and 3) the second company submitted an approvable new drug application to the 
FDA no more than one year after the first company submitted its new drug application. 
 A hearing to discuss the need for H.R. 4638 was conducted in February 1990.  H.R. 4638 
was introduced to Congress in July 1990.  The House and Senate unanimously passed 4638 in 
October 1990.  President George H.W. Bush pocket vetoed 4638 in November 1990, i.e., the 
President had until November 8, 1990 to act on the bill, but he did not.  On November 9th, he 
released the following memorandum explaining his decision.  
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19023 accessed and copied September 10, 2007) 
  
 Memorandum of Disapproval for the Orphan Drug Amendments of 
 1990 
 
 November 8, 1990 
 
 I am withholding my approval of H.R. 4638, the “Orphan Drug Amendments of 
1990.” This legislation would make substantive changes to the orphan drug provisions of 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Orphan Drug Act.  
 Enacted in 1983, the Orphan Drug Act created economic incentives for drug 
companies to develop drugs for rare diseases and conditions -- so-called “orphan drugs.” 
Typically, these drugs would not be profitable to develop because of their small patient 
populations.  
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 By any measure, the Orphan Drug Act has been a tremendous success. A total of 
49 new drugs for rare diseases have been approved under this program, and 370 others 
are in the development stage. These drugs have provided lifesaving treatments for such 
terrible diseases as enzyme deficiency, which affects adversely the immune system of 
about 40 children nationwide. Until the orphan drug was developed to treat these 
children, they had to spend their entire lives in the protection of an isolation bubble. 
One of the first orphan drugs is another example of a triumph. The most difficult form 
of leprosy affects only 4,000 people. A drug known for over 14 years to be effective in 
treating this condition was not being marketed by any drug company, because it was 
considered unprofitable -- until the Orphan Drug Act provided the marketing incentive. 
In a similar manner, orphan drugs provide treatment for terrible diseases for which there 
is usually no alternative therapy.  
 I have serious concerns about the effect that H.R. 4638 would have upon the 
incentive of drug companies to develop orphan drugs. I believe we must not endanger 
the success of this program, which is due in large measure to the existence of the 
“market exclusivity” provision in the Orphan Drug Act that allows companies to have 
exclusive marketing rights to an orphan drug for 7 years. Weakening the current 7-year 
exclusivity provision would certainly discourage development of desperately needed new 
orphan drugs.  
 Under current law, firms may apply to develop the same orphan drug, but only 
the first firm to have its drug approved receives market exclusivity. The certainty of this 
7-year period is the basis of the economic incentive to attract drug firms to invest in 
orphan drugs.  
 The bill would make two major changes to the market exclusivity provisions of 
the Orphan Drug Act. First, the bill provides for “shared exclusivity.” Firms that can 
demonstrate that they have developed the orphan drug simultaneously would be allowed 
to share the market with the firm initially awarded the market exclusivity. Second, the bill 
requires the Food and Drug Administration to withdraw the marketing exclusivity as 
soon as the patient population exceeds a 200,000 patient limit. Both of these changes 
have the effect of weakening the marketing incentives provided by the Act. Under this 
bill, the length of the market exclusivity period will depend on how quickly the patient 
population grows and whether other firms file claims for simultaneous development.  
 In addition, as currently constructed, the 200,000 patient population limit would 
be applied to orphan drugs approved prior to the enactment of the bill as well as to 
those approved in the future. This retroactive rule change would send a troublesome 
signal to all those who might wish to develop orphan drugs that the Federal 
Government may change unilaterally the rules for firms that made investment decisions 
based on the expectation of 7 years of market exclusivity.  
 I am aware that this bill was passed after a number of compromises among 
Members of Congress. I am extremely concerned, however, that individuals with rare 
diseases may suffer because of changes that this bill would make in the incentives to 
develop new drug treatments. Accordingly, I am withholding my approval of H.R. 4638.  
 
George Bush  
The White House,  
November 8, 1990.  
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